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The empirical research focuses on the common risk factors in stock returns and trading activities.  
The first essay is titled “Asset Pricing with Extreme Liquidity Risk”. Defining extreme liquidity 
as the tails of illiquidity for all stocks, I propose a direct measure of market-wide extreme 
liquidity risk and find that extreme liquidity risk is priced cross-sectionally in the U.S. equity 
market. From 1973 through 2011, stocks in the highest quintile of extreme liquidity risk loadings 
earned value-weighted average returns 6.6% per year higher than stocks in the lowest quintile. 
The extreme liquidity risk premium is robust to common risk factors related to size, value and 
momentum. The premium is different from that on aggregate liquidity risk documented in Pástor 
and Stambaugh (2003) as well as that based on tail risk of Kelly (2011). Extreme liquidity 
estimates can offer a warning sign of extreme liquidity events. Predictive regressions show that 
extreme liquidity measure reliably outperforms aggregate liquidity measures in predicting future 
market returns. Finally, I incorporate the extreme liquidity risk into Acharya and Pedersen’s 
(2005) framework and find new supporting evidence for their liquidity-adjusted capital asset 
pricing model. 
The second essay is co-authored with Prof. Andrew Karolyi. We have developed a multi-factor 
returns-generating model for an international setting that captures how restrictions on 
investability or accessibility can matter. The model works reasonably well in a wide variety of 
 settings. More specifically, using monthly returns for over 37,000 stocks from 46 developed and 
emerging market countries over a two-decade period, we propose and test a multi-factor model 
that includes factor portfolios based on firm characteristics and that builds separate factors 
comprised of globally-accessible stocks, which we call “global factors,” and of locally-accessible 
stocks, which we call “local factors.” Our new “hybrid” multi-factor model with both global and 
local factors not only captures strong common variation in global stock returns, but also achieves 
low pricing errors and rejection rates using conventional testing procedures for a variety of 
regional and global test asset portfolios formed on size, value, and momentum. 
In the third essay, I examine the implications of the Lo and Wang (2000, 2006) mutual fund 
separation model in the cross-sectional behavior of global trading activity. It demonstrates that 
return-based factors work poorly around the world. On average across countries, market-wide 
turnover captures 37% of all systematic turnover components in individual stock trading, and 
two additional Fama and French (1993) factor turnovers increase the explanatory power by 23%. 
Similarly Lo and Wang’s (2000) turnovers only capture on average 64% of all systematic 
turnover components. Using this multi-factor asset pricing-trading framework, a horserace is 
further performed to explore other factors in return by examining the turnover behavior of 
different factor mimicking portfolios. All the return-based factors capture at most 67% of the 
common variation in trading, suggesting that stock pricing and trading volume may not be 
compatible around the world. In cross-country analysis, the explanatory power of the return-
based factor model varies substantially across countries and markets, with better performance for 
European developed markets and China. Surprisingly, in North America, Japan and most 
emerging markets there are larger amounts of commonality in trading, mostly higher than 47%, 
for reasons other than return motive.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
One of the central questions in finance is why different assets earn different rates of return. All 
asset pricing models agree on the central insight that returns are compensation for bearing 
systematic risk. What they differ on is what constitutes systematic risk. The most celebrated asset 
pricing model is the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965a), 
and Mossin (1966) which identify the return on market portfolio as the only common factor, 
exposures to which determine expected returns. The results in early empirical tests of Fama and 
Macbeth (1973) seem to reject the prediction that expected returns are related only to market 
betas. The failure of the CAPM to explain cross-sectionally return difference has prompted 
researchers to resort to other variables, often based on stock characteristics. The most prominent 
example is the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, in which a size factor and a book-to-
market-equity factor are added to the market risk factor in the CAPM. In the years since their 
seminal study, Fama and French (1993) three-factor model has remained extremely influential 
while, at the same time, debate has emerged over the empirical performance of their three 
factors.  
Three key debates, among many others, have further advanced with new and more broad-based 
evidence over the past decade:  
a) The “liquidity crunch of 2007-2008” (Brunnermeier, 2009) highlights the need to 
better understand what exactly a liquidity shock is despite that there have been numerous studies 
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question whether systematic liquidity risk is a priced factor1. Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) find 
that stocks with high loadings on the market liquidity factor outperform stocks with low loadings 
by 7.5% annually. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) derive an equilibrium model for returns that 
includes the liquidity level and a stock's liquidity co-variation with market liquidity and the 
market return. Hasbrouck (2009), however, finds only weak evidence of liquidity risk as a priced 
factor during a long horizon, 1926–2006. Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) leave the question of 
“whether expected returns are related to stocks’ sensitivities to fluctuations in other aspects of 
aggregate liquidity” as one direction for future research. Given the most recent financial crisis, 
Pedersen (2008) emphasizes the importance of investigating extreme liquidity risk, which is the 
risk that market liquidity worsens to the extent that dealers are shutting down when the trader 
needs to unwind;  
b) Whether securities are priced locally or globally is an enduring question in 
international asset pricing (Karolyi and Stulz, 2003; Lewis, 2011). Early empirical tests focused 
on whether market risk is priced locally or globally. In the past decade, however, focus has 
shifted to the role of firm characteristics, such as size, book-to-market-equity ratios, cash-flow-
to-price ratios, and momentum, in pricing securities in global markets. And an important debate 
has ensured over whether the explanatory power of these characteristics arises locally or 
globally. Along this line of investigation, two most recent studies provide all-encompassing 
examinations of the firm-level characteristics that explain the cross-sectional variation in global 
stock returns. Hou, Karolyi, and Kho (HKK, 2011) examine the relative performance of global, 
local, and what they call “international” versions of various multifactor models to explain the 
                                                 
1 Among many others, I include Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyan (1996), Brennan, 
Chordia, and Subrahmanyan (1998), Jacoby, Flower, and Gottesman (2000), Jones (2002), Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Sadka (2006), Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2009), and Brennan, 
Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong (2012). 
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returns of industry and characteristics-sorted test portfolios in each country. The international 
versions of their models represent a factor structure that includes separately local, country-
specific factors as well as foreign factors built from stocks outside the country of interest. They 
find that the international versions of these multifactor models have much lower pricing errors 
than the purely local and global versions.  They recommend that the foreign components of 
these factors are as important as local components for pricing global stocks. Fama and French 
(2012), however, show that a global multi-factor model performs only passably for average 
returns on global size/book-to-market ratios (“B/M” hereafter) and size/momentum portfolios, 
and it works poorly when asked to explain average returns on regional (for North America, 
Europe, Japan, Asia-Pacific) size/B/M or size/momentum portfolios. They test hybrid models 
following the methods in Griffin (2002) and HKK (2011) but find little improvement in 
performance in terms of explanatory power and lower pricing errors over the strictly local 
versions of the model (for which they deem the performance only passable);  
c) If price and quantity are the fundamental building blocks of any theory of market 
interactions, the importance of trading volume in modeling asset markets is clear. Although there 
have been many rich explanation for the level of trading volume, such as tax-driven trading, 
liquidity trading, portfolio rebalancing and speculation, less effort has been devoted to improving 
our understanding of the commonality in trading activity across different stocks. Decomposing 
trading activity to measure how much of the trading process is driven by systematic factors and 
how much is because of firm-specific causes is valuable for modeling asset pricing and trading 
volume. Understanding commonality of trading around the world is also important for global 
asset managers concerned with diversifying their investment and trading strategies.  
The dissertation contributes to the three debates. More specifically, in CHAPTER 2, I propose a 
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threshold-based measure of liquidity risk and find that it is priced in the cross section of stock 
returns. The nature of extreme liquidity risk is that the market experiences infrequent liquidity 
events of extreme magnitude, although it is in a normal liquidity state most of the time. The 
arrival of such liquidity crises is often unexpected, so an investor may have little or no clue as to 
when the market will seize up. The fear that market liquidity could dry up precipitously could 
have a significant impact on investors’ trading behaviors and on equilibrium asset prices, even 
before the realization of such an event. My findings describe the economic magnitude of extreme 
liquidity risk for the U.S. equity market. 
CHAPTER 3, entitled “The Role of Investability Restrictions on Size, Value, and Momentum 
in International Stock Returns”, is co-authored with Prof. Andrew Karolyi. We propose and test 
a new multi-factor model based on firm characteristics that builds separate factor portfolios 
comprised of only globally-accessible stocks, which we call “global factors,” and of locally-
accessible stocks, which we call “local factors.”  We define the measure of investability, or 
accessibility, based on the extent to which stocks are actually listed and actively traded, primarily 
or secondarily in the cross-listed form, in the markets fully open to global investors. We find that 
neither a purely global factor model nor a purely local factor model can work as well as the new 
“hybrid” when asked to explain average returns on global and regional size/value and 
size/momentum portfolios. The new “hybrid” model does not encounter the problems of the 
purely global factor models, such as high rates of rejections with GRS tests and large average 
absolute intercepts. Rather, it improves the regression fit and reduces the pricing errors, with or 
without microcap stocks. And, at the same time, the new “hybrid” model fares reasonably 
relative to a purely local factor model, and works even better for emerging markets, in terms of 
explanatory power, model pricing errors and rejection rates. The robustness of the new “hybrid” 
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model is confirmed by tests conducted with a variety of definitions of global accessibility, other 
double-sorted test portfolios, expanded test portfolios, and other asset pricing models. We 
interpret our findings in this study as a step forward in the international asset pricing literature 
with important implications for practitioners in guiding cost-of-capital calculations and risk 
control and performance evaluation analysis of global portfolios. 
CHAPTER 4 then examines the implication of the Lo and Wang (2000, 2006) mutual fund 
separation model in the cross-sectional behavior of global trading activity. Considerable 
evidence has shown that the systematic variation of stock returns are related with firm-level 
characteristics such as size, book-to-market equity, cash flow to price, momentum while we 
know little about the theoretical foundation for the co-movement in stock trading. To fill the gap, 
Lo and Wang (LW hereafter, 2000 and 2006) have developed a multifactor model for turnover 
based on mutual fund separation theorem. This model suggests that the number of return factors 
and the number of turnover factors should be the same. And the turnover factors in turnover 
model are nothing but the turnover on the K return factors. Although their model gives rise to a 
decomposition of turnover into systematic and idiosyncratic components, difficulties still exist in 
implementing conventional procedures of multifactor estimation due to severe heteroscedasticity 
and nonstationarity in turnover data. In order to overcome these problems, Cremers and Mei 
(CM hereafter, 2007) employ two statistical procedures developed by Bai and Ng (BN hereafter, 
2002 and 2004) and document that there are four or five systematic factors driving stock 
turnover in the NYSE and AMEX for the period of 1962-2001.This chapter is motivated in the 
same spirit but broadens the investigation to over 30,000 stocks from 48 countries using weekly 
turnover data over the 1977 to 2010 period. Given the widespread acceptance of the common 
factors in return, do these fundamental factors, like the market factor, the size factor, the value 
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factor and the momentum factor, also drive the systematic trading around the world? The 
purpose of this paper is to answer this important question. The key finding is that on average 33% 
of the co-movement of trading around the world could not be explained by these common factors 
in return. The difference between the return-motivated commonality in trading and the true 
commonality in trading varies substantially across markets, with larger gaps for North America, 
Japan and emerging markets.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ASSET PRICING WITH EXTREME LIQUIDITY RISK 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The “liquidity crunch of 2007-2008” (Brunnermeier, 2009) highlights the need to measure and 
model liquidity risk, which, in its extreme form, arises from the simultaneous drying up of 
liquidity across assets and can lead to the freezing up of the markets. Liquidity risk is not 
continuous, but is subject to abrupt changes. Investors might not worry about liquidity risk in 
normal market climates, but it can become a concern in the case of liquidity crises. After 
liquidity risk exceeds a certain threshold, it doesn’t follow a mean-reversion pattern; instead, it 
feeds on itself, gathers momentum, and causes more severe market declines than would occur in 
normal occurrences (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009). Despite the intuitive appeal of a 
threshold-based measure of liquidity risk, there has been little empirical research into how 
liquidity risk in its extreme form is priced in the cross-section of stock returns. Prior research has 
found that a stock’s exposure to systematic liquidity risk and whether its liquidity dries up at 
inopportune times does matter for investors (e.g., Pástor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and 
Pedersen, 2005; Sadka, 2006; Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008; Lee, 2011). However, because most 
studies focus on the aggregate level of market liquidity in which extreme liquidity events are 
rarely observed, this research could not accurately measure extreme liquidity risk, which is the 
risk that market liquidity worsens to the extent that dealers are shutting down when the trader 
needs to unwind (Pedersen, 2008).  
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In this paper, I propose a direct and viable measure of economy-wide extreme liquidity risk by 
taking a panel approach. The nature of extreme liquidity risk is that the market experiences 
infrequent liquidity events of extreme magnitude, although it is in a normal liquidity state most 
of the time. The arrival of such liquidity crises is often unexpected, so an investor may have little 
or no clue as to when the market will seize up. The fear that market liquidity could dry up 
precipitously could have a significant impact on investors’ trading behaviors and on equilibrium 
asset prices, even before the realization of such an event. Rather than waiting to accumulate 
extreme observations in market-wide liquidity dry-ups, I assume that extreme liquidity risks of 
individual stocks are driven by a common underlying dynamic.2 Therefore, information about 
the likelihood of a market-wide extreme liquidity event could be extracted from the cross section 
of extreme liquidity events occurring for different individual stocks at each point in time. Based 
on this approach, I build my extreme liquidity estimate from the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure for individual firms on a daily basis. I find that the cross-section of expected stock 
returns reflects a premium for extreme liquidity risk. From 1973 through 2011, stocks in the 
highest quintile of extreme liquidity risk loadings earned value-weighted average returns of 
0.55% per month higher than stocks in the lowest quintile. The extreme liquidity risk premium 
remains robust after controlling for a number of common risk factors, including the Fama and 
French (1993) three factors, the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, the Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003) traded liquidity factor, Kelly’s (2011) traded tail risk factor, and Acharya and Pedersen’s 
(2005) liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Extreme liquidity estimates can 
                                                 
2 One example for this assumption is the limited number of liquidity suppliers (Comerton-Forde, Hendershott, 
Jones, Moulton, and Seasholes, 2010). Another reason is the correlated trading among institutionals (Koch, Ruenzi, 
and Starks, 2009). 
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offer a warning sign of extreme liquidity events3. Predictive regressions also show that my 
extreme liquidity risk estimates forecast market returns consistently and outperforms aggregate 
liquidity measures. I incorporate my measured extreme liquidity risk into Acharya and 
Pedersen’s (2005) framework and provide new evidence to support their liquidity-adjusted 
CAPM. The cross-sectional return premium corresponding to their three liquidity betas, using 
my measure of extreme liquidity risk, is statistically and economically significant. 
My analysis focuses on the tail distribution of liquidity risk. This intuition comes from the recent 
financial crisis, which has reinforced the importance of the risk of infrequent, but severe, market 
events, and from a long standing literature on how tail risk plays a special role in determining 
expected return. Early studies analyzed the behavior of the tails in stock returns, following 
seminal work by Mandelbrot (1963) and Fama (1965) that documented that stock returns are not 
Gaussian but have univariate heavy tails. In the past decade, focus has shifted to the role of 
heavy-tailed shocks to economic fundamentals in pricing securities. Researchers, including 
Eraker and Shaliastovich (2008), Bansal and Shaliastovich (2011), Drechsler and Yaron (2011), 
Gabaix (2012), and Wachter (2012), have built asset pricing models in which fat-tailed processes 
are used to explain the equity premium, excess volatility, and risk free rate puzzles. Empirical 
studies, such as Ang, Chen and Xing (2006), Kelly (2011), and Ruenzi and Weigert (2011), 
investigate the impact of downside risk and tail risk on the cross-section of expected stock 
returns. They find that investors demand additional compensation for stocks that are crash-prone, 
that is, stocks that have particularly bad returns exactly when the market crashes. None of these 
papers, however, investigates the implication of extreme liquidity risk for asset pricing. Although 
                                                 
3 Examples include the Mideast oil embargo in 1973, the stock market crash in 1987, the Long Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) crisis in 1999, the stock market downturn of 2002,  and  the “liquidity crunch of 2007–
2008” (Brunnermeier, 2009). I later discuss these events in detail.  
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the study of liquidity considers the factors impacting the cost of trading, rarely are the contagion 
and correlation of liquidity demands, such as those observed in the most recent global financial 
crisis, taken into account in security risk measures. In order for a measurement of liquidity to be 
meaningful to market participants, it needs to include, not just the aggregate level of liquidity, 
but also the possibility of extreme liquidity event that leads investors to withdraw from markets 
they would otherwise be prepared to invest in. This serves as the primary motivation for my 
paper.  
My investigation differs from numerous earlier studies that question whether systematic liquidity 
risk is a priced factor.4 Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) find that stocks with high loadings on the 
market liquidity factor outperform stocks with low loadings by 7.5% annually. Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005) derive an equilibrium model for returns that includes the liquidity level and a 
stock's liquidity co-variation with market liquidity and the market return. Hasbrouck (2009), 
however, finds only weak evidence of liquidity risk as a priced factor during a long horizon, 
1926–2006. Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) leave the question of “whether expected returns are 
related to stocks’ sensitivities to fluctuations in other aspects of aggregate liquidity” as one 
direction for future research. I seek to answer this question by focusing on a new dimension of 
liquidity risk: the likelihood of market liquidity at its extremes. My extreme liquidity measures 
can offer a warning sign of extreme liquidity events. The measured extreme liquidity index has 
hit its three-year high jump before periods characterized by liquidity crises. High extreme 
liquidity risk is associated with bad market states. It implies that stocks that hedge extreme 
liquidity risk are more valuable than those adversely exposed to extreme liquidity risk, and 
                                                 
4 Among many others, I include Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyan (1996), Brennan, 
Chordia, and Subrahmanyan (1998), Jacoby, Flower, and Gottesman (2000), Jones (2002), Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Sadka (2006), Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2009), and Brennan, 
Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Tong (2012). 
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therefore have lower expected returns. I find strong evidence that the market-wide extreme 
liquidity risk is positively priced in the cross-section. I also implement Acharya and Pedersen’s 
(2005) liquidity-adjusted CAPM using extreme liquidity risk and provide consistent evidence for 
the return premium related to all three liquidity-related betas in their model. 
My inspiration for this particular extreme liquidity risk choice is also drawn from important new 
literature on how commonality in liquidity – also known as liquidity black holes – intensifies 
during large market downturns. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and other models predict that 
the large market declines affect the funding liquidity of financial intermediaries. As a 
consequence, these intermediaries reduce the provision of liquidity across many securities. The 
resulting decrease in market liquidity and the increase in commonality in liquidity lead to further 
losses and/or margin increase, creating an “illiquidity spiral” that further tightens the funding 
liquidity and pushes down the price. Empirical studies have found consistent evidence that 
commonality in liquidity increases during market downturns, such as those of Comerton-Forde et 
al. (2010), and Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010), with regard to the U.S., and that of 
Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012) regarding global markets. Given the close relation between 
large market declines and liquidity dry-ups, a logical question is whether extreme liquidity risk is 
a state variable important for asset pricing. I find that the cross-section of expected stock returns 
does reflect a premium for extreme liquidity risk, which may shed light on the source of tail risk, 
specifically during episodes of panic liquidation.  
How I measure the level of extreme liquidity risk is critical for my exercise. My empirical 
estimate is based on the assumption that extreme liquidity risks of individual stocks are driven by 
a common underlying process. Given this assumption, the rich variation in the cross section of 
extreme liquidity events occurring for individual stocks could be used to provide accurate 
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information about the prevailing market-wide level of extreme liquidity risk for each point in 
time. This avoids having to accumulate years of extreme liquidity events from the aggregate 
market time series in order to estimate extreme liquidity risk, and therefore avoids using stale 
observations that carry little information about current extreme liquidity risk. My approach 
applies Hill’s (1975) power law estimator to the cross section of extreme liquidity events across 
stocks in the market. It is distinct from a large volume of literature that has modeled extreme 
returns using jump processes (e.g., Duffie, Pan and Singleton, 2000) and copulas (e.g., Ané and 
Kharoubi, 2003; Ruenzi and Weigert, 2011). Instead, my approach models conditional liquidity 
tails in discrete time and uses dynamic extreme value theory. This procedure has been adopted as 
a measure of systemic banking sector risk by Allen, Bali, and Tang (2011), as a measure of 
return tail risk by Kelly (2011), and as a measure of hedge fund tail risk by Jiang and Kelly 
(2011).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II explains the construction of the 
extreme liquidity measure, presents the data and summary statistics, and furnishes empirical 
features of extreme liquidity measure. Section III examines the significance of a cross-sectional 
relation between extreme liquidity risk and expected stock returns. Section IV lays out several 
robustness checks, and Section V concludes. 
 
2.2 Measuring Extreme Liquidity Risk 
 
2.2.1 The Tail Distribution of Liquidity 
A stock is in a normal liquidity state most days, but can experience liquidity events of extreme 
magnitude, so the nature of extreme liquidity risk is that it is infrequent, comes suddenly, and is 
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somewhat unpredictable. Investors might care little about liquidity in normal conditions, but high 
transaction costs might become a first order concern if the market hits a disaster liquidity state; 
that is, its illiquidity cost lies at the right tail of the distribution. The arrival of such liquidity 
crises is often unexpected, so an investor may have little or no clue as to when the market will 
seize up. The fear that market liquidity could dry up precipitously could have a significant 
impact on investors’ trading behaviors and on equilibrium asset prices, even before the 
realization of such events.  
Extreme value theory provides a statistical framework characterizing the asymptotic extreme 
characteristics of stationary distributions. The theory allows us to obtain an adequate 
characterization of the extreme behavior and, to this end, the estimation of the so-called tail 
index is essential, for which theory offers a variety of different approaches.  
Originally Mandelbrot (1963), and later Fama (1965), pointed out that the distribution of the 
empirical returns is often leptokurtic and frequently positively skewed, which implies that it is 
peaked and fat-tailed. Since these observations were made, extreme value theory has been 
increasingly used in the modeling of the tail of stock returns.5 More recent studies (Plerou, 
Gopikrishnan, Amara, Gabaix, and Stanley, 2000; Gabaix, Gopikrishnan, Plerou, and Stanley, 
2006; and Gabaix, 2009) have argued that the power law applies not only to the tail distribution 
of returns but also to the tail distributions of other critical financial time series, including price 
impact, trading volume, the number of trades, and the size of large investors. Among them, the 
unconditional tail distribution of price impact is aptly described by a power law, which yields a 
concave price impact function (Hasbrouck, 1991; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; and Plerou, 
                                                 
5 Consider, among many others, studies by Quintos, Fan, and Phillips (2001), Wagner (2003), Galbraith and Zernov 
(2004), and Werner and Upper (2004). 
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Gopikrishnan, Gabaix, and Stanley, 2002). The power law parameterization is often used, for 
example, by Barra (1997); Grinold and Kahn (1999); Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001); and Gabaix, 
Gopikrishnan, Plerou, and Stanley (2003).  
Given the power law of price impact, I use Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure as my measure of 
price impact6 and therefore propose a novel specification for equity liquidities in which the tail 
distribution obeys a power law that potentially changes over time,  
𝑃(𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡,𝑑
𝑖 > 𝑥|𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑡,𝑑
𝑖 > 𝑝𝑡
∗, ℱt  )~ (𝑥 𝑝𝑡
∗⁄ )−𝑎
𝑖𝛾𝑡 
                                                                                                                                                        
(1)                                                       
Equation (1) states that the right tail of stock illiquidity is defined as the set of liquidity events, 
that is, the observations ILLIQt,d
i  in terms of Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, exceeding 
some high threshold p*t and it follows a power law. The term of ILLIQt,d
i  takes the form of stock 
i available on day d in month t 
ILLIQit,d =|R
i
t,d| /V
i
t,d                                                                                             
(2) 
in which Rit,d  and  V
i
t,d are, respectively, the return and dollar volume (in millions) on day d in 
month t. The second term in the exponent, γt, varies with the conditioning information set ℱt. 
While different assets have different levels of extreme liquidity risk (determined by the constant 
ai), dynamics are the same for all assets because they are driven by a common conditional 
process. Thus, I refer to - γt as economy-wide extreme event risk in liquidity. The focus of this 
paper is the right tail of the liquidity distribution. The convention in extreme value theory is to 
                                                 
6 Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure has been extensively used in the literature on stock market liquidity and asset 
pricing. As suggested by Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009), it does well in measuring price impact.  
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represent a tail distribution as the right tail, and I follow this convention closely. 
The threshold parameter p*t is set to define where the center of the distribution ends and the tail 
begins. It is necessary to have enough observations in the tail to make inferences. On the other 
hand, using data points from the center of the sampling distribution tends to reduce the 
effectiveness of the tail estimates. Here I follow Gabaix et al. (2006) and Kelly (2011) by fixing 
the threshold at the 95th percentile of the cross section distribution month-by-month. 7 
Consequently, the threshold varies as the cross-sectional distribution fans out and compresses 
over time, which is a convenient way of mitigating undue effects of aggregate market liquidity 
level on the tail risk estimates.  
The Hill (1975) estimator is established as one of the most suitable methods for financial 
applications: the semi-parametric estimation approach is based on the assumption that the 
underlying distribution is in the maximum domain of attraction of the Fréchet extreme value 
distribution. This generally holds for fat-tailed distributions as analyzed in finance. Unlike, for 
example, the estimation approach based on the generalized extreme value distribution, the 
assumption for the Hill estimator does not require that exact asymptotic limits be met. I therefore 
apply the Hill (1975) estimator for the tail exponent of economy-wide liquidity for each month 
by employing the pooled set of daily Amihud (2002) liquidity observations for all stocks in 
month t. The extreme liquidity index based on the method of Hill (1975) is defined as  
1/ γ t    = (1/Nt)∑ Ntk=1ln ( ILLIQ(k)t,d / p*t ) 
                                                                                                                                                         
(3)     
                                                 
7 Similar empirical results are obtained when the thresholds are set to be between the 90th and 99th percentiles. I later 
discuss the robustness check on the threshold choice. 
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where Nt is the number of daily illiquidity observations that exceed the threshold p
*
t for month t, 
and ILLIQ(k)t,d is a daily Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure during that month if it is larger than 
p*t.  
Given that for stock i,  
Et-1[ln( x
i
k,t / p
*
t )]= 1 / (a
i γt) 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(4)                                       
the expected value of  1/ γt is the cross-sectional average tail exponent,  
Et-1[ (1/Nt)∑ Ntk=1ln ( xk,t / p*t ) | γt ]  =  1 / (ā γt) , 
                                                 where  ā ≡n/∑ ni=1(1/ai)                                                                                                                                                         
(5)                                                                                                                        
Different stocks will experience extreme liquidity events in different periods. The heterogeneity 
in the set of ai coefficients entering in the tail calculation over time will affect the estimation of 
the market-wide extreme liquidity risk. However, the conditional expectation of the Hill (1975) 
measure is unaffected by this heterogeneity since ex ante it is unknown which stocks will be in 
the tail part. Equation (5) states that the Hill estimator is expected to be equal to the true common 
tail component 1/ γt times a constant multiple; therefore, the expected value of month-by-month 
Hill estimates is perfectly correlated with the true economy-wide tail process 1/ γt.  
 
2.2.2 Data and Summary Statistics 
I collect daily Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data from July 1967 to December 
2011 from NYSE stocks with share codes 10 and 11. To keep the liquidity measure consistent 
across stocks, I exclude NASDAQ because the NASDAQ returns and volume data are available 
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from CRSP for only part of this period (beginning in 1972). Also the volume data of NASDAQ 
includes interdealer trades, unlike those reported on the NYSE and the AMEX. On the other 
hand, the CRSP sample covers all size groups, and indeed very small, microcap stocks produce 
challenging results (Fama and French, 2008), especially those with strong idiosyncratic liquidity 
shocks. Incorporating the observations from these micro-cap stocks would contaminate the 
estimation of systematic extreme liquidity risk. I therefore control for the potential influence of 
microcap stocks by excluding stocks on the AMEX8, although the results are not driven by this 
exclusion. 
On the other hand, because the accuracy of my approach relies on the quantity of observations in 
the right tail distribution, I require the liquidity observations from a large panel of stocks to gain 
sufficient information about the tail at each point. Figure 2.1 plots the effective number of stocks 
in NYSE from CRSP each month. The sample has fewer than 1,000 stocks until 1951 and, in 
July 1968, the sample size roughly rises to more than 1,200 stocks. I therefore focus my sample 
on the 1968 to 2011 period to prevent the issue of noisy estimates due to too few data points.   
All existing NYSE common stocks are considered for the whole sample period. However, in 
each month, I eliminate the stocks for which some data are missing.9 Also removed from a 
trading day are all the stocks for which the firm experienced a merger, delisting, partial 
liquidation, or seasoned equity offerings during that month. The stocks with less than one year of 
trading history on the NYSE at the start of the month are similarly discarded from that month. 
Finally, I eliminate from a trading day within that month any stock whose trading volume is zero.  
                                                 
8 Stocks on the NASDAQ and AMEX will be considered in the asset pricing tests of section III. 
9 For example, if a stock’s trading volume is missing in CRSP on any day, we simply remove that stock from that 
day.  
 18 
 
I form twenty equal-weighted portfolios based on the cross-section distribution of Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity measures month-by-month, and Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics on the 
cross-sectional properties of the whole NYSE sample. Here the sorting is based on the stock-date 
observations within each month: a stock is included in one particular portfolio as long as it has at 
least one daily Amihud (2002) illiquidity observation lying in the illiquidity range specified for 
that portfolio. It is possible for one stock to be included in both the most illiquid portfolio and the 
most liquid one during the same month. Not surprisingly, we see that illiquid stocks, that is, 
stocks with high average illiquidity cost, tend to have a lower return, a high volatility of returns, 
a lower turnover, and a small market capitalization. The most illiquid stocks in the last of twenty 
portfolios yield a much lower level of simple average monthly return, 0.51%, compared with 
1.60% for the most liquid stocks in the first of twenty portfolios. Their simple average monthly 
volatility is 3.46%, higher than that for the most liquid stocks, 1.89%. At the same time, the 
simple average monthly turnover is 4.10%, lower than 11.39% for the most liquid stocks. The 
simple average size for the most illiquid stocks, $0.12 billion, is also smaller than that for most 
liquid stocks, $11.77 billion.10 
The tail index measure in (5) only uses the observations that exceed the tail threshold p*t, that is, 
the observations of the most illiquid portfolios. And the extreme liquidity estimate accesses the 
average distance between the most extreme observations and the benchmark. Therefore, when 
the index is applied to the cross section of liquidity, it varies monotonically with the average 
frequency of extreme realizations. For example, when applied to the liquidity of various firms 
                                                 
10 The summary statistics are similar in terms of value-weighted returns and value-weighted illiquidity for these 
twenty portfolios. Quite a few studies focus on equal-weighted return and illiquidity measures, such as Chordia et al. 
(2000), Amihud (2002), and Acharya and Pedersen (2005), to name just a few. As suggested in Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005), computing the return and illiquidity as equal-weighted average can compensate for the over-
representation in the sample of large liquid stocks, as compared to the “true” portfolios in the economy. 
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each month, the index will be larger when more firms experience extremely low liquidity. This 
monotonic property with the likelihood of extreme liquidity events is what makes the extreme 
liquidity index an attractive empirical proxy for tail risk in liquidity. The more positive the power 
law exponent 1/ γt, the heavier the tails of the particular stock illiquidity costs, the higher extreme 
liquidity risk. In practice, I follow Kelly (2011) and normalize the extreme liquidity estimates 
(subtract mean and divide by standard deviation), which is denoted by ELR for later analysis11. 
 
2.2.3 Empirical Features of the Extreme Liquidity Risk Measure 
Figure 2.2 plots the estimated extreme liquidity risk series along with the NBER recessions. My 
sample starts around the late 1960’s bull market peak. Estimated extreme liquidity risk is low at 
the starting point, and continues to fall sharply until the midpoint of 1969, when it reaches its 
lowest level for the whole period. Extreme liquidity risk starts to rise sharply in the recession of 
1969–1970 when the U.S. stock market experienced a severe bear market. The risk index then 
fluctuates for several years, with obvious jumps during three recessions: from November 1973 
through March 1975, from January 1980 through July 1980, and from July 1981 through 
November 1982. Extreme liquidity risk begins to go up quickly in the months following the 1987 
October crash and reaches its highest level in the 1990 liquidity crisis. The technology boom that 
follows then pushes down the market-wide extreme liquidity risk until the LTCM collapse and 
the Russian debt crisis. Throughout the last half of the decade, extreme liquid risk rises quickly 
to another peak, especially during the 2007–2009 financial crisis and recession.  
                                                 
11 The results for unnormalized estimates are very close and available upon request in an internet appendix. 
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Although aggregate illiquidity measures12 also increase during periods characterized by liquidity 
crises, the extreme liquidity risk index is weakly associated with aggregate liquidity measures. 
As shown in Appendix I, my extreme liquidity measures have correlations of 0.12, -0.07, 0.15, 
and 0.01 with Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) aggregate liquidity innovations, Acharya and 
Pedersen’s (2005) aggregate illiquidity innovations, Hu, Pan, and Wang (2012) market-wide 
liquidity measures, and Sadka (2006) permanent liquidity factor, respectively. This suggests that 
my extreme liquidity captures a dimension of liquidity risk which is different from the aggregate 
level. On the other hand, extreme liquidity measure has a relatively high correlation of 0.48 with 
the average commonality in liquidity. Extreme liquidity risk appears fairly closely associated 
with credit risk, having the correlations of 0.41 and -0.22 with the term spread (the difference 
between yields on long- and short-term government bonds) and the default spread (the difference 
in yields on BAA and AAA corporate bonds). Compared with supply-side sources for 
commonality in liquidity, extreme liquidity index appears more closely associated with demand-
side factors13. In particular, it shares a monthly correlation of 0.63 with ETFs volume, as a 
measure of index-related basket trading in Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012). It is also closely 
correlated with NYSE margin debt outstanding (0.50) in which high levels of margin debt shows 
the effect of over-leveraging and makes the market vulnerable to nasty tumbles.  
It is hard to predict liquidity dry-ups in that liquidity risk is often high after a long period of 
abundant liquidity. But my extreme liquidity measures can offer a warning sign of possible 
                                                 
12 Consider, for example, the innovation of market liquidity in Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) and the innovation of 
market illiquidity in Acharya and Pedersen (2005).   
13 Some empirical studies have found support for supply-side sources of commonality in liquidity related to the 
funding constraints of financial intermediaries (e.g., Coughenour and Saad, 2004; Comerton-Forde et al. 2010; 
Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan, 2010). Other work has explored demand-side sources, for example those driven 
by correlated trading activity (e.g., Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Koch, 
Ruenzi, and Starks, 2009). 
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financial panics in that the sharp increase in extreme liquidity measure gives rise to the financial 
vulnerability and the likelihood of a liquidity crisis. The measured extreme liquidity index 
growth has achieved its three-year high before periods that were characterized by liquidity crises, 
for example, the Mideast oil embargo in November 1973, the stock market crash in October 
1987, the 1991 Japanese asset price bubble bursts, the LTCM collapse in 1999, the stock market 
downturn of 2002, the “liquidity crunch of 2007–2008” (Brunnermeier, 2009), and the European 
sovereign debt crisis in 2009. Compared with the abrupt changes in aggregate liquidity measures, 
the relatively persistent movement of extreme liquidity series, with the autocorrelation of 0.98, 
suggests that extreme liquidity risk has the potential to impact returns. To investigate this 
hypothesis, I estimate a series of predictive regressions for market returns based on the estimated 
extreme liquidity series. The dependent variable is the return on the CRSP value-weighted index 
at frequencies of one month, three months, six months, one year, three years, and five years. I 
compare the performance of my extreme liquidity risk measure with those of Pástor and 
Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure and Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) illiquidity measure. 
Extreme liquidity risk forecasts returns consistently over all horizons and outperforms the 
aggregate liquidity measures. For example, in the five-year horizon, extreme liquidity risk yields 
R2 value of 7.12%, higher than 0.21% for Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity level measure 
and 1.81% for Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) illiquidity level measure.  
My measure of extreme liquidity tends to be high when market volatility is high. This positive 
association between volatility and the extreme liquidity measure, reported in Appendix I, is 
reasonable, because the compensation required to providers of liquidity for a given level of order 
flow could well be greater when volatility is higher. A kind of “flight-to-quality” effect appears 
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in months with exceptionally high extreme liquidity risk14. That is, months in which extreme 
liquidity rises severely tend to be months in which stocks and fixed-income assets move in 
opposite directions. During the months when extreme liquidity measure is at least two standard 
deviations above its mean, the correlation between the return on the CRSP value-weighted index 
and the return on long-term government bonds is -0.16. In addition, extreme liquidity risk shares 
a monthly correlation of -0.52, -0.14, -0.48 and -0.17 with dividend-price ratio, unemployment, 
inflation, and the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI).  
 
2.3 Extreme Liquidity Risk and the Cross Section of Expected Returns 
 
2.3.1 Is Extreme Liquidity Risk Priced? 
My extreme liquidity risk measure relies on a large cross section of stocks and yields a monthly 
series spanning almost 40 years. As such, the series is well suited for this study’s focus on 
extreme liquidity risk and asset pricing. In this section, I test whether a stock’s expected return is 
related to the sensitivity of its return to extreme liquidity risk. Stocks with high predictive 
loadings on extreme liquidity risk are discounted more steeply and thus have higher expected 
returns going forward. On the other hand, stocks with low or negative extreme liquidity risk 
loadings serve as effective hedges and therefore have comparatively higher prices and lower 
expected returns. At the end of each year, I estimate extreme liquidity risk sensitivities of 
individual stocks with respect to extreme liquidity risk by the form  
               Et [ri,t+1 ]=μi + βi ELRt                                                                                                      
                                                                                                                                                      
                                                 
14 In crisis periods, the flight-to-quality phenomenon is well documented in the U.S. markets, for example, by 
Longstaff (2004) and Vayanos (2004), and with the global empirical evidence of Hund and Lesmond (2008) and 
Goyenko and Sarkissian (2008), among others. 
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(6) 
Here the regression uses only data available at that time. And eligible stocks are defined as 
ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with at least four years of 
non-missing monthly returns out of five years and with stock prices between $5 and $1,000. 
Stocks are then sorted into quintile portfolios based on their estimated extreme liquidity risk 
loadings. In addition, I follow Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) and construct decile portfolios to 
assess the robustness. The post-formation returns on these portfolios during the next 12 months 
are linked across years to form a single return series for each portfolio, which covers the period 
from July 1973 to December 2011.  
Panel A of Table 2.2 reports the preceding loadings, the post-ranking loadings, and additional 
properties for quintile portfolios formed on an annual basis. The upper part of Panel A presents 
summary statistics in which stocks are value-weighted, and those for the equal weighting are 
shown in the lower part. Taking the value-weighted returns as an example, both the preceding 
extreme liquidity loadings and the post-ranking loadings increase across quintiles.15 The “5–1” 
spread is comprised of longing quintile 5 (stocks with the highest preceding extreme liquidity 
loadings) and shorting quintile 1 (stocks with the lowest preceding extreme liquidity loadings). It 
has an overall-period post-ranking extreme liquidity loading of 0.58 (t = 2.33), even larger than 
its preceding loading, 0.22. Additional properties are reported: The lowest quintile portfolio 
contains stocks of smaller firms, the value-weighted size (averaged over time) is $22.93 billion, 
as compared to $27.70 billion in quintile 5. Stocks in the lowest loading portfolios tend to be less 
liquid, as measured by the value-weighted Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, although this 
                                                 
15 Here the preceding loadings are the βi in the regression (6). The post-ranking extreme liquidity loadings are 
estimated by regressing the portfolio excess returns on the extreme liquidity risk estimate and the market excess 
return factor over the whole sample period. 
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pattern is also not monotonic. Table 2.2 also reports the quintile portfolios’ betas with respect to 
the Fama-French (1993) three factors (MKT, SMB, and HML), the Carhart (1997) momentum 
factor (MOM), the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor (PS-Liquidity), and 
Kelly’s (2011) tail risk factor (K-Tail)16. The betas are estimated by regressing the quintile 
excess returns on all of the six factor portfolio returns. The MKT beta of the “5–1” spread is 
statistically significant. The SMB beta (-0.26) confirms the pattern in average market 
capitalizations. The momentum beta for the “5–1” spread is significantly positive (0.22, t = 
4.87), suggesting some tilt toward past winners. The liquidity beta (-0.08) is consistent with the 
pattern in the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. The “5–1” spread’s tail beta is significantly 
positive (0.21, with a t-statistic of 4.17), indicating some tilt toward stocks with high loadings on 
the tail risk in return.  
The empirical features of quintile portfolios sorted on extreme liquidity risk are robust to the 
weighting scheme and rebalancing frequency. Changing from value weighted portfolios to 
equally weighted portfolios does not qualitatively change these properties except that the average 
portfolio sizes shrink and the average Amihud (2002) illiquidity cost for quintile 1 becomes 
much higher than that for quintile 5. Panel B of Table 2.2 reports summary statistics for the one-
month post-formation experiments,17 which are nearly identical to those in Panel A in which the 
post formation period is one year.  
Asparouhova, Bessembinder and Kalcheva (2010) document that noisy prices lead to biases in 
                                                 
16 The MKT, SMB, HML, and MOM data are obtained from Prof. Kenneth R. French’s data library, the PS-
Liquidity data is obtained from Prof. Robert F. Stambaugh’s website, and the K-Tail data is constructed by Kelly 
(2011).  
17 Each month, I estimate the extreme liquidity loading for each stock in the regression (6) that uses the most recent 
60 months of data. Stocks are then sorted into quintile portfolios and decile portfolios based on their estimated 
extreme liquidity risk loadings. One month post-formation value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolio returns are 
tracked. Portfolios are reconstituted each month. 
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intercept and slope coefficients obtained in any ordinary least squares (OLS) regression using 
rates of return as the dependent variable.18 To mitigate such bias, Asparouhova, Bessembinder 
and Kalcheva (2012), in particular, assess the effects of value-weighted returns, when weights 
are based on prior-month market values and on prior-December market values. Their analysis 
provides strong reason to prefer the weighting by the prior-month size to the weighting by prior-
December size, since “the latter method does not correct for bias in months other than the first 
month after portfolio formation” (Asparouhova, Bessembinder and Kalcheva, 2012). Given the 
possibility of noise existence in portfolios sorted on extreme liquidity risk, I focus on the value-
weighted returns in which weights are based on prior-month market values19.  
Table 2.3 illustrates the systematic differences in the average returns of portfolios sorted on the 
extreme liquidity risk loadings. From 1973 through 2011, stocks in the highest quintile of 
extreme liquidity risk loadings earned value-weighted average returns 6.6% per year higher than 
stocks in the lowest quintile, with a t-statistic of 2.73. The equal-weighted average return on the 
high-minus-low extreme liquidity risk portfolio was 5.52% per annum (t = 3.15). Average 
portfolio returns demonstrate a stable monotonic pattern that increases in tail risk. Table 2.3 also 
reports the regression alphas for the value-weighted (and equal-weighted) portfolios: 1) alphas 
with respect to the Fama and French three-factor model; 2) alphas with respect to the Carhart 
four-factor model; 3) alphas with respect to the Carhart four-factor plus Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003) traded liquidity factor as a fifth control; 4) alphas after considering Kelly’s (2011) tail 
risk factor as a sixth control beyond the Carhart four-factor and the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) 
                                                 
18  Asparouhova, Bessembinder and Kalcheva (2010) follow Blume and Stambaugh (1983) in referring to the 
underlying security value as the true price, and interpret noise to mean any temporary deviation of transaction prices 
from true prices. The sources of noise in price, in their study, include, but are not limited to, microstructure-based 
frictions, the presence of irrational traders, and the inelasticity of short-run liquidity supply. 
19 The results for the value-weighted returns in which weights are based on prior-December market value, available 
in an appendix, are similar to those reported in Tables 2-8.  
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traded liquidity factor. Alphas of the high-minus-low quintile portfolio are large and statistically 
significant for all of the models: in terms of value-weighted returns, the Fama-French alpha is 
8.40%20 per year ( t = 3.56), the four-factor alpha is 6.72% per year ( t = 2.84), the five-factor 
alpha is 7.32% per year ( t = 3.05), and the six-factor alpha is 6.60% per year ( t = 2.81). When 
Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity-adjusted CAPM is used as the benchmark model, the 
alpha is still significantly positive and economically large, with the value of 7.92% (t = 3.39) per 
year. Adding more factors, such as SMB, HML, and MOM, to Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) 
liquidity-adjusted CAPM doesn’t change the magnitudes and statistical significances of the 
alphas, which remain 6.72% (t = 2.84) per year for the “5–1” spread and 9.72% (t = 3.15) per 
year for the “10–1” spread. The same is true for equal-weighted returns, for example, in which 
the “5–1” spread alpha is 5.40% (t = 3.28) for the six-factor model. Regression alphas retain the 
same stable monotonicity that is observed for the raw average portfolio returns.  
Panel B of Table 2.3 presents the results under alternative portfolio construction, monthly 
rebalance. These results show that monthly-rebalancing portfolio returns have the same 
qualitative behavior with the annual-rebalancing portfolio returns. Value-weighted return for the 
“5–1” spread portfolio is 0.44% per month (5.28% annualized, t = 2.39), and equal-weighted 
return yields 0.38% per month (4.56% annualized, t = 2.13). Compared with the results when 
portfolios are value-weighted, evidence of the extreme liquidity risk premium is slightly stronger 
for equally-weighted portfolios. When portfolios are monthly rebalanced, the regression alphas 
of the “5–1” spread portfolio are 0.49% (5.88% annualized, t = 3.01) per month for the Fama and 
French three-factor model, 0.44% (5.28% annualized, t = 2.66) per month for the Carhart four-
factor model, 0.39% (4.68% annualized, t = 2.47) per month for the extended six-factor model, 
                                                 
20 Annual alphas are computed as 12 times the monthly estimates.  
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and 0.52% (6.24% annualized, t = 3.00) per month for Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity-
adjusted CAPM, respectively. 
Table 2.4 reports Fama-MacBeth regression results of excess (risk-unadjusted) returns on 
characteristics best known to be associated with expected returns: SIZE, B/M, Mom, Volatility, 
Turnover, Amihud (2002) liquidity measure, and betas on both normal liquidity risk constructed 
by Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) and tail risk in return by Kelly (2011). The average slopes on 
the extreme liquidity risk beta are all economically large (varies from 0.23 to 0.66) and always 
highly significant (t-statistics all above 2.15). In contrast, the average slopes on normal liquidity 
risk beta are rather small (around 0.17) and not statistically distinguishable from zero for most of 
the scenarios listed in Table 2.4, especially when the factor of turnover or the beta on extreme 
liquidity risk is considered. The coefficients of SIZE, B/M, Mom, and Volatility are, 
respectively, negative, and positive, positive, and negative, corresponding with similar studies 
such as Fama and French (1992), Ang et al. (2006), Lewellen (2012). Lee and Swaminathan 
(2000) show that the turnover of the past 3 to 12 months is negatively related to subsequent 
returns, especially among stocks that performed poorly over the same past 3 to 12 months. The 
effect persists after controlling for size and B/M factors and the negative coefficients for the lag 
of turnover confirms their findings. The positive coefficients for the lag of Amihud (2002) 
liquidity measure confirm Spiegel and Wang (2005).  
Results from two-way portfolio sorts are reported in Appendix II. Stocks are independently 
sorted by size21 and their preceding extreme liquidity risk loadings. Portfolios are rebalanced at 
the end of each year. Value-weighted returns for the one month post-formation portfolios are 
                                                 
21The size breakpoints come from Prof. Kenneth R. French’s data library. The breakpoints use all NYSE stocks with 
available market equity.  
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reported in Panel A and equal-weighted returns are presented in Panel B. Within each size 
quintile I calculate the average returns (value-weighted and equal-weighted) on the high-minus-
low portfolio on extreme liquidity risk. Value-weighted “5–1” spreads within size quintiles range 
from 0.37% to 0.72% per month (t-statistics are 2.49 and 3.63, respectively). All of the alphas 
are significant with respect to a variety of benchmark models. Using the alphas corresponding to 
the Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity-adjusted CAPM as an example, the alphas (per 
month) of the “5–1” spreads are 0.47% for the smallest stocks, 0.72% for the second smallest 
stocks, 0.69% for the middle size stocks, 0.82% for the second biggest stocks, and 0.57% for the 
biggest stocks. The extreme liquidity risk premium retains economically large in big stocks and 
there is only weak evidence of size effect for the premium. In Panel B, equal-weighted returns on 
high-minus-low extreme liquidity risk loading portfolio are slightly smaller than the value-
weighted returns, but still more than 0.30% per month in all cases. Almost all of the alphas are 
significant, robust to considering alternative priced factors.  
Appendix III summarizes the mean returns for the 80 (4×4×5) triple-sorted portfolios. Sorts are 
performed sequentially, first sorting on size and then again, within each group, on the basis of 
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. Finally each of the sixteen sub-groups is subdivided into 
five portfolios according to their preceding extreme liquidity loadings. The average return 
monotonically increases from the lowest quintile of extreme liquidity loading (0.37% per month) 
to the highest quintile (0.92% per month), and so does the six-factor alpha (the results for other 
regression models, not shown, are nearly identical.) Even within each size and liquidity cost 
category, the patterns of cross-sectional returns related to the extreme liquidity risk loading are 
discernible. All of the sixteen “5–1” spread portfolios have positive mean returns and regression 
alphas. On average, the return spread of the hedge portfolio on the extreme liquidity loading is 
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54 basis points per month across the sixteen size/liquidity-cost portfolios, with its regression 
alpha for the six-factor model of 0.62% per month (t = 3.09). As shown in Panel B of Appendix 
III, the results are similar when the portfolios are equally weighted: Almost all of the “5–1” 
return spreads are beyond 0.23% per month and most of the regression alphas are above 0.21% 
per month. 
Next I test the hypothesis that all of the alphas in each set of test asset portfolios are jointly equal 
to zero, using the test of Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989). The hypothesis is always rejected 
at a 1% significant level, for both equally weighted and value-weighted portfolios; for all 
quintile, decile, double, and triple-sorted portfolios; and for all of the six benchmark models.  
The possible presence of industry clustering raises concern about the interpretation of abnormal 
returns from methods that do not explicitly account for industry effects. I then examine to what 
extent the industry rotation matters in measuring the long-term abnormal returns for extreme 
liquidity risk. An industry-neutral strategy is therefore employed: I identify all of the stocks by 
their Fama-French 30 industries, and within each industry I sort the target stocks in five quintile 
groups. I then form industry-neutral portfolios by combining the stocks in quintile 1 from all 30 
of the Fama-French industries into a single quintile 1 portfolio, and similarly with the remaining 
four groups to form the five industry-neutral portfolios. Untabulated results (available upon 
request in an internet appendix) show that the industry-neutral quintile hedge portfolio on 
extreme liquidity risk has the alpha of  39 basis points (t = 3.12) per month for the Carhart four-
factor model, the alpha of 40 basis points (t = 3.07) per month for the Carhart four-factor model 
plus both the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor and Kelly’s (2011) tail risk 
factor, and the alpha of 41 basis points (t = 3.16) per month for Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) 
liquidity-adjusted CAPM. The extreme liquidity risk premium is not driven by industry 
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clustering as industry neutrality is maintained in this strategy22.  
To better understanding the extreme liquidity risk premium, I apply the Hill (1975) estimator for 
the left tail exponent, that is, the most liquid observations, of the pooled set of daily Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity observations for all stocks month-by-month. I then test the hypothesis that the 
extreme liquidity risk measure is merely a manifestation of the fat-tail distribution underlying the 
price impact measures. If the beta based on the new Hill (1975) estimator also helps explain the 
cross section of stock returns, it will lead us not to reject the null hypothesis. The portfolios 
sorted on the betas with respect to the new estimator behaviors differently from the main 
experiment: Average raw returns neither increase nor decrease with the loadings. Although the 
“5–1” spread portfolio earns, on average, 0.11% per month throughout the sample period, it is 
with a t-statistic of only 0.59, which indicates that the spread return is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero. Moreover, the positive average return for the hedge portfolio is not 
robust to considering alternative priced factors. For example, the alpha for the Fama-French 
three-factor model is -0.01% (t = -0.05). Such weak evidence on the extreme liquid measure 
suggests us to reject the hypothesis and validates that extreme liquidity risk premium found in 
the main experiment indeed captures, to some extent, the market-wide liquidity pressure which is 
important for asset pricing.  
I next investigate whether the empirical validity of extreme liquidity risk premium is influenced 
by the purely mechanical way in which the tail threshold parameter, p*t, is chosen. I gradually 
adjust the threshold, from the 90th to the 99th percentile, and repeat the main experiment above. 
When the thresholds are set to be between the 91th and 99th percentiles, the empirical results are 
                                                 
22 Another experiment I investigated was to exclude financial firms when quintile/decile portfolios are constructed. 
The results (available upon request) are quantitatively similar to those reported in Table 2 and 3.  
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very similar with those for the 95th percentile. On the other hand, if the threshold is at the 90th 
percentile, the average value-weighted return of the “10–1” spread portfolio becomes statistically 
insignificant at the 95% confidence level although both the average return and regression alphas 
of the quintile spread are statistically significant. This examination suggests that an 
inappropriately low threshold is more likely to contaminate the estimation of extreme liquidity 
risk.  
In consideration of the practical use of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure on real data, two 
additional experiments are conducted: 1) I winsorize the effect of outliers by excluding all of the 
most illiquid observations beyond 99th percentile, reset the 95th-percentile threshold for the new 
winsorized distribution before constructing the extreme liquidity risk estimate, the results 
(available upon request) based on the new extreme liquidity risk measure are very close to those 
reported in Table 2.2 and 2.3; 2) I artificially implement the approach using alternate days in 
order to evaluate the concern of the independence assumption for the pooled set of stock-day 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity observations. Extreme liquidity risk premium based on the new 
treatment is almost identical to that showed in Table 2.3. For example, regression alpha for the 
value-weighted quintile spread is still 6.60% per year (t = 2.67) when the six-factor model is 
employed as the benchmark model.  
In sum, there is strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that extreme liquidity risk is priced 
cross-sectionally. The premium for this risk is positive in that stocks highly sensitive to extreme 
liquidity shocks offer higher expected returns. This positive premium confirms the intuition that 
a sharp drop in extreme liquidity is undesirable for the representative investor, so that the 
investor might require compensation for holding such stocks with higher exposure to extreme 
liquidity risk.  
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2.3.2 Revisiting Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) Liquidity-adjusted CAPM 
In Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity-adjusted CAPM, the required excess return is the 
expected relative illiquidity cost plus four betas times the risk premium. As in the standard 
CAPM, the required return on an asset increases linearly with the market beta. The model yields 
three additional effects: 1) return increases with the covariance between a security’s liquidity and 
the market liquidity; 2) return decreases with the covariance between a security’s return and the 
market liquidity; 3) return decreases with the covariance between a security’s liquidity and the 
market return.  
The previous sections focus on the second effect, and this section first tests the hypothesis that 
the two other effects also help explain the cross-section of average stock returns. To capture the 
first liquidity risk effect, at the end of each year, β2 is estimated for each stock by regressing its 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity cost on the market illiquidity level, which is the same with Acharya 
and Pedersen (2005). Similarly, I calculate β4, corresponding to the third liquidity risk effect, for 
each stock using the regression in which the independent variable is the return of market 
portfolio, measured by the return on the CRSP value-weighted index. I find a return premium 
associated with β4 but no return premium on β2. The lack of the return premium with respect to 
β2 confirms the small magnitude of the first liquidity risk effect documented in Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005)23. Across quintile portfolios sorted on β4, the return difference between the 
                                                 
23 As in Acharya and Pedersen (2005), β2 is related to the return premium due to commonality in liquidity. I 
therefore follow Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2011) and use the R2 of regressions of the liquidity of individual stocks 
on market liquidity to obtain a measure of commonality in liquidity. Each month, I estimate the R2 for each stock 
and then construct quintile portfolios based on the sorting on the level of R2s. In this experiment, the value-weighted 
return premium monotonically increases from the lowest R2 quintile (0.82%) to the highest quintile (1.07%). Both 
the “5–1” spread and “10–1” spread are robust to considering alternative priced factors. The results are close when 
the portfolios are equally weighted, but slightly weaker when the portfolios are rebalanced annually.  
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highest loading quintile and the lowest loading quintile is -19 basis points per month24, with a t-
statistic of -1.85. Compared with quintile portfolios, decile portfolios provide stronger evidence: 
Alphas of the high-minus-low β4-sorted portfolio, for example, are statistically significant for all 
of the benchmark models. The risk-adjusted premium for the decile spread remains -15 basis 
points per month (t = -2.10) for the extended six-factor model. Even in terms of value-weighted 
returns, the decile spread alpha yields -29 basis points per month (t = -2.24) for the same model. 
Table 2.5 presents the testing results for the hypothesis that the overall liquidity-related net beta 
is correlated with the difference of expected return cross-sectionally. Here I implement Acharya 
and Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity-adjusted CAPM, using the extreme liquidity risk25, and find 
consistent evidence for return premium on the liquidity-related net beta. Table 2.5 reports mean 
returns and regression alphas for the portfolios sorted on the liquidity-related net beta26, βnet, 
against all of the six benchmark models. For the quintile portfolios, stocks in the highest quintile 
earn higher returns and have higher Amihud (2002) illiquidity cost than those in the lowest 
quintile. The mean return of the “5-1”spread is 0.79% per month in terms of value weighting (t = 
3.84) and 0.37% per month in terms of equal weighting (t = 3.44). After controlling a variety of 
common risk factors, risk-adjusted premiums still increase with the liquidity-related net beta. For 
example, when portfolios are annually rebalanced, stocks in quintile 5 outperform stocks in 
quintile 1 by earning an additional 0.78% per month (9.36% per year) after benchmarking the 
raw returns against the Carhart four-factor model plus the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded 
liquidity factor as the fifth control. Again, both the “5–1” spread and the “10–1” spread are 
                                                 
24 Note that this effect stems from the willingness of investors to accept a lower expected return on a security that is 
liquid in a down market. 
25 I also estimate the liquidity-related net beta by using the innovation in aggregate market illiquidity as the proxy 
for market illiquidity, and construct quintile portfolios in a similar way with previous experiments. However it is 
hard to find clear evidence in the way that Acharya and Pedersen (2005) predicts. 
26 𝛽𝑛𝑒𝑡 = 𝛽2 − 𝛽3 − 𝛽4 
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significant at the 10% level.  
To conclude, I implement Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity-adjusted CAPM, using my 
extreme liquidity risk measures, and find consistent evidence that the liquidity-related net beta 
helps explain the cross-sectional differences in expected returns across stocks.  
 
2.4 Robustness Check 
Appendix IV indicates that extreme liquidity traded factor has low correlations with other 
common risk factors. The correlations between the extreme liquidity traded factor and the market 
return, the size factor, the value factor, and the momentum factor are -0.26, -0.20, 0.10, and 0.19, 
respectively. We can also notice that the extreme liquidity traded factor is weakly correlated with 
the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor and Kelly’s (2011) tail risk factor, which 
again suggests that extreme liquidity risk is a separate and distinct type of risk compared to the 
aggregate liquidity risk and the tail risk in return. 
 
2.4.1 Sub-period Analysis 
Given the evidence above that market-wide extreme liquidity risk is a state variable important for 
asset pricing, a logical question is whether the magnitude of extreme liquidity risk premium 
varies over time. Section II notes extreme liquidity risk measure goes up during recessions. A 
natural comparative sub-period analysis reveals the difference of extreme liquidity risk 
premiums between normal times and times of crisis.  
I first separate the whole sample period into two sub-periods and Table 2.6 distinguishes the 
return premiums on extreme liquidity risk during economic recessions and those in the economic 
 35 
 
expansions. There is a noticeable decrease in the regression alphas for the recession sub-period. 
In terms of value-weighted returns and annual rebalance, the risk-adjusted return of the spread 
falls sharply from 0.61% per month to 0.37% per month when using the extended six-factor 
model as the benchmark model.  
I next look into another set of two sub-periods, one with sudden market downturns and the other 
without market downturns. The alphas decrease more obviously in this experiment. All of the 
risk-adjusted returns of the quintile spreads, either value-weighted or equal-weighted, are 
negative during the times with sudden market downturns, and the magnitudes are large. For 
instance, the alpha of the “5–1” spread portfolios is -1.12% per month during the downturn 
period, much lower than the 0.65% per month for the period without downturns, and here the 
benchmark model includes Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity-adjusted CAPM and three 
additional factors (SMB, HML, and MOM).  
Another example for the financial crisis is a liquidity dry-up event. I then check the periods with 
liquidity dry-ups and those without liquidity dry-ups. Here liquidity dry-ups includes months 
when the average liquidity is at least two standard deviations below its means measured by 
Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity innovations or the average illiquidity is at least two 
standard deviations above its means evaluated by Acharya and Pedersen (2005). The spread 
portfolio, which longs stocks with higher beta of extreme liquidity risk and shorts stocks with 
lower beta, performs also worse among the months of liquidity dry-ups.  
 
2.4.2 Out of Sample Test 
Given the positive evidence on the pricing of extreme liquidity risk, I try to pin down the positive 
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risk premium more precisely into two sub-samples traded on different exchanges: 
NYSE&AMEX, and NASDAQ. After all, my extreme liquidity estimate is based on the 
information extracted from the NYSE stocks while the portfolios incorporate all 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAD stocks. The experiment on the NASDAQ stock serves as an out-of-
sample test27 and Table 2.7 provides another indication of the robustness of my results. 
Both the NASDAQ sample and the NYSE/AMEX sample deliver strong results not only for the 
average returns of spread portfolios but also for the regression alphas estimated under different 
factor specifications. With annual rebalancing, the “5–1” spread from the sample of NASDAQ 
stocks earn value-weighted average return 0.71% per month, with a t-statistic of 3.15, higher 
than the 0.52% per month (t = 2.81) for the NYSE/AMEX sample. The equal-weighted “5–1” 
spread portfolio earns average returns of 0.58% (t = 3.23) per month for the NASDAQ sample 
and 0.46% (t = 3.59) per month for the NYSE/AMEX sample. Both of the sub-samples have 
large and statistically significant alphas of the value-weighted “5–1” spread portfolio. When the 
extended six-factor model is considered, the quintile spread for the NYSE/AMEX stocks earns a 
risk-adjusted return of 0.55% per month (t = 3.05) while the NASDAQ stocks yield a risk-
adjusted return of 0.60% per month (t = 2.69). In terms of equal-weighted returns, the regression 
alphas are 0.42% per month (t = 3.35) for NYSE/AMEX stocks and 0.46% per month (t = 2.72) 
for NASDAQ stocks, using the same benchmark model.   
 
2.4.3 Alternative Liquidity Measure 
My extreme liquidity risk estimate in the previous analyses is based on the Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity measure. In this section I try another proxy for the price impact, the Roll Impact, 
                                                 
27 I also check another set of two sub-samples: NYSE, and NASDAQ/AMEX, and it produces almost identical 
results.  
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which is “a close second behind Amihud” suggested by Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka (2009). 
The Roll Impact for time interval t is defined as follows: 
           Roll Impactt = Rollt / Average Daily Dollar Volumet                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
(7) 
where Rollt takes the form  
𝑅𝑜𝑙𝑙 = {
2√−𝑐𝑜𝑣(∆𝑃𝑡, ∆𝑃𝑡−1)                                           𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑣(∆𝑃𝑡, ∆𝑃𝑡−1) < 0 
0                                                                               𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑣(∆𝑃𝑡, ∆𝑃𝑡−1) ≥ 0
                                                                                                                                                        
(8) 
There is one problem with using the Roll Impact as the basis for the estimation of extreme 
liquidity risk. It is measured over a number of day observations, which are then averaged, while 
my estimate requires a large panel of day-stock observations within each month. To solve this 
problem, I make an adjustment on the measure of the Roll Impact: for each stock i and each day 
d in month t, I select a reference period which consists of the preceding 22 days (d-22, d-21, …, 
d-1) and the day d. The reference period is used to measure the Roll Impact for the stock on that 
day. On a given trading day d, the stock i’s daily trading dollar volumes in the reference period 
are used to measure the average daily dollar volume in the denominator of the Roll Impact. The 
serial covariance of the trade prices, which appears in the numerator of the Roll Impact, is also 
based on the trading data during the same reference period. For each stock with valid 
observations in month t, its trailing 23-day measure of the Roll Impact is accordingly estimated 
for each day in month t. Similar to the previous sections, I apply Hill’s (1975) estimator to the 
cross section of illiquidity observations in terms of the Roll Impact for all of the qualified NYSE 
stocks month-by-month. I acknowledge several limitations in the implementation. It might not be 
able to incorporate the new information promptly by the trailing method. I also cannot disregard 
the fact that the Roll Impact is set to be zero whenever the serial covariance of traded price is 
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larger than or equal to zero. I expect that the noisy estimates built on the Roll Impact most likely 
will fail to provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis that extreme liquidity risk is priced 
cross-sectionally in the U.S. stock market, and interpret this experiment as a sensitivity test to 
gauge the robustness of my results.  
When portfolios are annually rebalanced and the stocks within each portfolio are equally-
weighted, stocks in the highest decile of extreme liquidity risk loading earn value-weighted 
average return 0.45% per month higher than stocks in the lowest decile, with the t-statistic of 
3.31. The equal-weighted “5–1” spread portfolio average return is 0.36% per month (t = 3.23). I 
next test if the risk premium survives a number of common risk factors. Taking the “5–1” spread 
as an example, the alphas are 0.30% per month (t = 2.65) for the Fama-French three-factor 
model, 0.24% per month (t = 2.07) for the Carhart four-factor model, 0.21% per month (t = 1.82) 
for the Carhart four-factor model plus the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity risk 
factor, 0.35% per month (t = 3.08) for the Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity-adjusted 
CAPM, and 0.23% per month (t = 1.98) for the Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity-adjusted 
CAPM plus three additional common risk factors. The alpha with respect to the most extensive 
six-factor model, however, is less statistically significant, with the t-statistic of just 1.73, despite 
that it is large, 0.20% per month. When stocks within each portfolio are value-weighted, the high 
average return for the “10–1” spread is robust to controlling for a variety of risk factors while the 
performances on the “5–1” spread get less desirable. Compared to extreme liquidity measure 
based on the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure, the Roll Impact appears more related to the 
level of illiquidity cost. The value-weighted Amihud (2002) illiquidity is 0.13% for the highest 
loading quintile, much higher than 0.06% reported in Table 2.2 for the quintile 5. The same is 
also true for equal-weighted portfolios. In addition, the high loading portfolios contain stocks of 
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small size and growth tilt. The complete set of portfolio properties and returns are reported in 
Table 2.8.  
Overall, the experiment on the alternative price impact measure produces the most disappointing 
results among all of the robustness tests. But, even with this challenge, there is still evidence 
suggesting that stocks more exposed to extreme liquidity risk tend to be more heavily 
discounted.  
 
 
2.5 Conclusions  
I propose a direct measure of market-wide extreme liquidity risk and find that the cross-section 
of expected stock returns reflects a premium for extreme liquidity risk. From 1973 through 2011, 
stocks in the highest quintile of extreme liquidity risk loadings earned value-weighted average 
returns 0.55% per month higher than stocks in the lowest quintile. The extreme liquidity risk 
premium is robust to common risk factors related to size, value and momentum. The premium is 
different from that on aggregate liquidity risk documented in Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) as 
well as that based on the extreme market-wide return of Kelly (2011). Predictive regressions 
show that my extreme liquidity measure reliably outperforms aggregate liquidity measures in 
predicting future market returns. Finally, I incorporate the extreme liquidity risk into Acharya 
and Pedersen’s (2005) framework and find new supporting evidence for their liquidity-adjusted 
capital asset pricing model. 
My findings underscore the empirical relevance of extreme liquidity risk for the U.S. equity 
market. One direction for future research is to construct the higher frequency measures of 
extreme liquidity risk by utilizing high frequency liquidity benchmarks. Future work could 
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investigate how the pricing of aggregate liquidity risk documented in Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003) is related to the pricing of extreme liquidity risk in this study. It would also be useful to 
explore whether extreme liquidity risk is priced in other financial markets, such as international 
equity markets or fixed income markets, and whether information on the extreme liquidity risk of 
other non equity securities is helpful for the study of equity returns. 
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Figure 2.1  
Number of Stocks for the Estimation of Extreme Liquidity Risk: 1950-2011 
 
 
This figure plots the number of stocks each month used for the estimation of market-wide extreme 
liquidity risk from 1950 to 2011. Daily returns and volumes are taken from the CRSP daily stock file. I 
exclude NASDAQ in constructing the aggregate extreme liquidity measure because NASDAQ return and 
volume data are available from CRSP for only part of this period (beginning in 1982). Also, reported 
volume on NASDAQ includes interdealer trades, unlike the volumes reported on the NYSE and the 
AMEX. To exclude NASDAQ, I omit stocks with exchange codes of 3 or 33 as of the end of the previous 
year. Also, the CRSP sample covers all size groups, and indeed very small, microcap stocks produce 
challenging results (Fama and French, 2008), especially those with strong idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. 
Incorporating them into the estimation of market-wide extreme liquidity risk will make my estimate much 
noisy. I therefore control for the potential influence of microcap stocks by excluding AMEX stocks. I use 
only stocks classified as ordinary common shares (CRSP share codes 10 and 11), excluding American 
depository receipts, shares of beneficial interest, certificates, units, real estate investment trusts, closed-
end funds, companies incorporated outside the United States, and Americus trust companies.  
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Figure 2.2  
Extreme Liquidity Risk Estimates: 1968-2011 
 
 
This figure plots the monthly estimated extreme liquidity risk time series. The extreme liquidity risk 
estimates are calculated month-by-month by pooling all daily Amihud (2002) illiquidity observations for 
the NYSE stocks. The tail series has been scaled to have mean zero and variance one. Shaded areas 
denote NBER recessions. 
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Table 2.1  
Summary Statistics: 1973-2011 
 
Group 𝐸(𝑟𝑚) 𝐸(𝑟𝑑) 𝜎(𝑟) 𝐸(𝑐𝑚) 𝐸(𝑐𝑑) 𝜎(𝑐) size trn price 
shares 
outstanding 
 
monthly daily monthly monthly daily monthly per stock monthly monthly monthly 
 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
 
($billion) (%) ($) (million) 
<5th 1.60 0.02 1.89 0.01 0.00 0.01 11.77 11.39 115.58 264.15 
5th~10th 1.55 0.04 1.92 0.01 0.00 0.01 8.57 11.19 105.85 206.64 
10th~15th 1.54 0.06 1.96 0.01 0.00 0.02 6.10 11.14 101.62 156.64 
15th~20th 1.53 0.08 1.99 0.02 0.01 0.02 4.68 11.08 98.21 127.95 
20th~25th 1.51 0.09 2.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 3.68 11.02 93.09 106.51 
25th~30th 1.54 0.10 2.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 2.94 10.87 89.60 90.10 
30th~35th 1.50 0.10 2.08 0.04 0.01 0.04 2.38 10.73 80.67 77.20 
35th~40th 1.50 0.11 2.11 0.04 0.02 0.05 1.93 10.56 72.11 66.28 
40th~45th 1.50 0.11 2.14 0.06 0.03 0.07 1.57 10.31 57.61 57.20 
45th~50th 1.50 0.11 2.18 0.07 0.03 0.08 1.28 10.01 47.22 49.64 
50th~55th 1.47 0.10 2.22 0.09 0.05 0.11 1.05 9.67 38.49 43.46 
55th~60th 1.46 0.11 2.26 0.11 0.06 0.13 0.87 9.29 31.31 38.32 
60th~65th 1.44 0.10 2.30 0.14 0.08 0.17 0.73 8.86 27.13 33.96 
65th~70th 1.40 0.10 2.35 0.18 0.11 0.22 0.60 8.40 24.17 30.15 
70th~75th 1.35 0.09 2.42 0.22 0.16 0.29 0.49 7.90 21.32 26.82 
75th~80th 1.28 0.08 2.51 0.29 0.22 0.39 0.40 7.34 19.64 24.13 
80th~85th 1.19 0.06 2.60 0.39 0.33 0.54 0.32 6.74 17.47 21.59 
85th~90th 1.05 0.04 2.74 0.56 0.53 0.81 0.25 6.00 15.50 19.36 
90th~95th 0.86 -0.01 2.96 0.97 1.03 1.52 0.18 5.17 13.25 17.23 
>95th 0.51 -0.05 3.46 6.99 20.43 13.43 0.12 4.10 10.21 15.17 
 
 
 
 
This table reports the properties of twenty equal-weighted portfolios based on the cross-section distribution of extreme liquidity risk involved in 
each stock on the NYSE each month during 1973-2011. The average monthly return 𝐸(𝑟𝑚), the average daily return 𝐸(𝑟𝑑), the average monthly 
illiquidity 𝐸(𝑐𝑚), the average daily illiquidity 𝐸(𝑐𝑑), the market capitalization (Size), the turnover (trn), the trading volume (volume), the price 
(Price), and the shares outstanding (Shares Outstanding) are computed for each group as time-series averages of the respective characteristics. 
Finally, 𝜎(𝑟) is the average of the standard deviation of daily returns for the group’s constitute stocks computed each month, and 𝜎(𝑐) is the 
average of the standard deviation of daily illiquidity for the group’s constitute stocks computed each month.  
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Table 2.2 
Properties of Extreme Liquidity Loading-sorted Portfolios: 1973-2011 
  
Extreme Liquidity Loading Low 
   
High 
    
 
1 2 3 4 5 5–1 t-stat. 10–1 t-stat. 
Panel A: Annual Rebalance 
         
Value-weighted 
         Preceding loadings -0.12 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.22 9.69 0.30 9.65 
Post-ranking loadings -0.46 -0.01 0.05 0.11 0.12 0.58 2.33 0.61 1.90 
          
Additional Properties          
Market cap 22.93 35.96 34.01 31.83 27.70 4.77 2.37 3.57 1.85 
(Il)liquidity 0.09 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.06 -0.04 -8.50 -0.08 -8.71 
MKT beta 1.17 1.06 0.95 0.94 0.94 -0.24 -5.16 -0.31 -5.36 
SMB beta 0.22 -0.09 -0.12 -0.15 -0.04 -0.26 -4.00 -0.43 -5.21 
HML beta -0.09 0.10 0.22 0.12 -0.03 0.07 0.98 0.04 0.51 
MOM beta -0.15 -0.05 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.22 4.87 0.19 3.32 
PS-Liquidity beta 0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -1.50 -0.10 -1.53 
K-Tail beta -0.06 -0.05 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.21 4.17 0.37 5.80 
          
          
Equal-weighted 
         
Preceding loadings -0.12 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.22 10.06 0.30 9.91 
Post-ranking loadings -0.47 -0.07 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.55 3.08 0.59 2.61 
          
Additional Properties 
         Market cap 1.28 2.22 2.38 2.45 1.85 0.58 5.06 0.59 5.74 
(Il)liquidity 1.50 1.57 1.13 1.06 0.98 -0.75 -11.81 -0.81 -12.17 
MKT beta 1.05 0.93 0.87 0.83 0.90 -0.15 -4.62 -0.15 -3.67 
SMB beta 0.85 0.51 0.39 0.43 0.54 -0.31 -7.07 -0.39 -6.93 
HML beta 0.09 0.36 0.41 0.33 0.24 0.14 3.10 0.22 3.71 
MOM beta -0.17 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.17 5.44 0.18 4.73 
PS-Liquidity beta 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.05 -1.51 -0.09 -1.91 
K-Tail beta 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.14 4.08 0.17 3.86 
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Table 2.2, continued 
 
 
Extreme Liquidity Loading Low 
   
High 
    
 
1 2 3 4 5 5–1 t-stat. 10–1 t-stat. 
Panel B: Monthly Rebalance          
Value-weighted          
Preceding loadings -0.13 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.22 33.01 0.31 32.65 
Post-ranking loadings -0.53 -0.02 0.03 0.13 0.16 0.68 2.45 0.71 2.13 
          
Additional Properties          
Market cap 21.75 35.42 34.87 30.69 29.88 8.13 3.94 6.38 3.21 
(Il)liquidity 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 -0.03 -6.43 -0.06 -7.28 
MKT beta 1.25 1.05 0.96 0.89 0.90 -0.35 -7.20 -0.40 -6.82 
SMB beta 0.37 -0.03 -0.16 -0.17 -0.09 -0.46 -6.71 -0.56 -6.86 
HML beta -0.16 0.04 0.25 0.13 0.01 0.17 2.37 0.18 2.09 
MOM beta -0.15 -0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.08 0.22 4.64 0.20 3.55 
PS-Liquidity beta 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.05 -0.97 -0.05 -0.80 
K-Tail beta -0.18 -0.06 0.05 0.09 0.23 0.41 7.58 0.56 8.81 
          
          
Equal-weighted          
Preceding loadings -0.13 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.22 34.15 0.30 33.68 
Post-ranking loadings -0.46 -0.02 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.57 2.57 0.63 2.28 
          
Additional Properties          
Market cap 1.25 2.25 2.48 2.37 1.90 0.64 5.46 0.63 5.83 
(Il)liquidity 1.41 1.27 1.15 1.08 1.00 -0.41 -8.44 -0.49 -8.36 
MKT beta 1.11 0.94 0.88 0.85 0.92 -0.19 -5.13 -0.21 -4.53 
SMB beta 1.02 0.55 0.41 0.40 0.50 -0.52 -10.06 -0.64 -9.91 
HML beta 0.03 0.34 0.39 0.36 0.28 0.25 4.61 0.33 4.87 
MOM beta -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.03 0.14 3.78 0.14 3.20 
PS-Liquidity beta 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -1.05 -0.06 -1.15 
K-Tail beta -0.07 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.21 0.28 6.90 0.35 6.85 
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Table 2.2, continued 
 
 
 
The table shows the properties for the extreme liquidity risk beta-sorted portfolios. At each year end 
between 1972 and 2010, I estimate extreme liquidity risk sensitivities of individual stocks with respect to 
extreme liquidity risk by the form  
Et [ri,t+1 ]=μi + βi ELRt 
 
Here the regression uses only data available at that time. And eligible stocks are defined as ordinary 
common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with at least four years of non-missing 
monthly returns out of five years and with stock prices between $5 and $1,000. Stocks are then sorted into 
quintile portfolios and decile portfolios based on their estimated extreme liquidity risk loadings. The post-
formation returns on these portfolios during the next 12 months are linked across years to form a single 
return series for each quintile portfolio and decile portfolio covering the period from July 1973 to 
December 2011. Panel A reports the quintile portfolios’ preceding extreme liquidity loadings (“preceding 
loadings” in the table) and post-ranking extreme liquidity loadings (“post-ranking loadings” in the table). 
The post-ranking extreme liquidity loadings are estimated by regressing the portfolio excess returns on 
the extreme liquidity risk estimate and the market excess return factor over the sample period. Panel B 
reports the time-series averages of the quintile portfolios’ market capitalization and liquidity, obtained as 
the average of the corresponding Amihud (2002) illiquidity measures across the stocks within each 
quintile. Market capitalization is reported in billions of U.S. dollars. A stock’s liquidity in any given 
month is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. Also reported are post-ranking betas with respect to the 
three Fama-French factors, the momentum factor, the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor 
(“PS-Liquidity” in the table) and Kelly’s (2011) tail risk factor (“K-Tail” in the table). The four right-
most columns report results for two high-minus-low zero net investment portfolio, one that longs quintile 
portfolio 5 and shorts quintile 1 and the other longs decile 10 and shorts decile 1, as well as t-statistics for 
the hedge portfolios' corresponding measures.  
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Table 2.3 
Extreme Liquidity Loading-sorted Portfolio Returns: 1973-2011 
  
Extreme Liquidity Loading Low 
   
High 
    
 
1 2 3 4 5 5–1 t-stat. 10–1 t-stat. 
Panel A: Annual Rebalance 
         
Value-weighted 
         
Mean 0.74 0.84 0.94 1.12 1.29 0.55 2.73 0.68 2.64 
Alpha: FF -0.32 -0.13 -0.02 0.22 0.39 0.70 3.56 0.89 3.49 
Alpha: FF + Mom -0.19 -0.10 -0.01 0.19 0.37 0.56 2.84 0.81 3.14 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity -0.21 -0.10 -0.02 0.19 0.40 0.61 3.05 0.87 3.35 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity + K-Tail -0.20 -0.08 -0.03 0.18 0.36 0.55 2.81 0.77 3.06 
Alpha: AP-CAPM -0.29 -0.09 0.07 0.25 0.37 0.66 3.39 0.82 3.23 
Alpha: AP-CAPM + FF + Mom -0.19 -0.09 -0.01 0.19 0.37 0.56 2.84 0.81 3.15 
          
Equal-weighted 
         
Mean 0.97 1.13 1.24 1.33 1.43 0.46 3.15 0.58 3.19 
Alpha: FF -0.30 -0.06 0.09 0.22 0.26 0.56 4.13 0.68 3.94 
Alpha: FF + Mom -0.14 0.01 0.14 0.25 0.31 0.45 3.31 0.56 3.22 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity -0.15 0.01 0.14 0.25 0.33 0.48 3.51 0.61 3.48 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity + K-Tail -0.16 0.01 0.12 0.24 0.29 0.45 3.28 0.56 3.26 
Alpha: AP-CAPM -0.15 0.13 0.29 0.39 0.42 0.58 4.12 0.71 4.01 
Alpha: AP-CAPM + FF + Mom -0.24 -0.09 0.05 0.17 0.24 0.48 3.49 0.58 3.38 
          
Panel B: Monthly Rebalance          
Value-weighted          
Mean 0.75 0.91 0.91 1.08 1.19 0.44 2.39 0.42 2.02 
Alpha: FF -0.33 -0.05 -0.06 0.18 0.29 0.62 2.84 0.6 2.27 
Alpha: FF + Mom -0.25 0.00 -0.04 0.18 0.28 0.53 2.38 0.56 2.10 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity -0.25 -0.02 -0.05 0.18 0.31 0.57 2.53 0.6 2.23 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity + K-Tail -0.20 0.00 -0.06 0.16 0.25 0.46 2.15 0.45 1.80 
Alpha: AP-CAPM -0.32 -0.03 0.03 0.21 0.28 0.60 2.73 0.58 2.18 
Alpha: AP-CAPM + FF + Mom -0.25 0.00 -0.04 0.18 0.28 0.53 2.38 0.56 2.10 
          
Equal-weighted          
Mean 1.04 1.24 1.26 1.35 1.43 0.38 2.13 0.46 2.05 
Alpha: FF -0.24 0.04 0.11 0.22 0.24 0.49 3.01 0.56 2.77 
Alpha: FF + Mom -0.17 0.09 0.13 0.23 0.27 0.44 2.66 0.52 2.53 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity -0.17 0.09 0.14 0.23 0.30 0.47 2.81 0.56 2.70 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity + K-Tail -0.15 0.09 0.13 0.21 0.24 0.39 2.47 0.47 2.35 
Alpha: AP-CAPM -0.11 0.23 0.30 0.39 0.41 0.52 3.00 0.62 2.83 
Alpha: AP-CAPM + FF + Mom -0.26 0.00 0.05 0.15 0.20 0.46 2.80 0.55 2.67 
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Table 2.3, continued 
 
 
 
 
The table shows the statistics for the extreme liquidity risk beta-sorted portfolios. At each year end 
between 1972 and 2010, I estimate extreme liquidity risk sensitivities of individual stocks with respect to 
extreme liquidity risk by the form 
Et [ri,t+1 ]= μi + βi ELRt 
 
Here the regression uses only data available at that time. And eligible stocks are defined as ordinary 
common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with at least four years of non-missing 
monthly returns out of five years and with stock prices between $5 and $1,000. Stocks are then sorted into 
quintile portfolios and decile portfolios based on their estimated extreme liquidity risk loadings. The post-
formation returns on these portfolios during the next 12 months are linked across years to form a single 
return series for each quintile portfolio and decile portfolio covering the period from July 1973 to 
December 2011. Panel A reports monthly portfolio returns when portfolios are rebalanced annually and 
Panel B reports monthly returns when portfolios are rebalanced monthly. The table also reports portfolio 
regression alphas from regressions of portfolio returns using the Fama-French three-factor model as well 
as its extended four-, five- and six-factor models considering the momentum factor, the Pástor and 
Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor (“PS-Liquidity” in the table), and Kelly’s (2011) tail risk factor 
(“K-Tail” in the table) as additional controls. In addition, the table shows regression alphas from 
regressions of portfolio returns using Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity-adjusted CAPM (“AP-
CAPM” in the table) as well as extended model controlling size, value and momentum factors. The four 
right-most columns report results for two high-minus-low zero net investment portfolios, one that longs 
quintile 5 and short quintile 1 and the other longs decile 10 and shorts decile 1, as well as t-statistics for 
the hedge portfolios' average returns and factor model alphas.  
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Table 2.4 
Fama-Macbeth Regression Estimates Using Individual Security Data: 1973-2011 
 
Panel A: Models with Extreme Liquidity Risk Betas 
Model I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  IX  X  XI  XII  XIII  XIV  XV  XVI  
Beta_Extreme 
Liquidity Risk 
0.66 ** 0.57 ** 0.51 ** 0.47 ** 0.59 ** 0.63 ** 0.30 ** 0.45 ** 0.47 ** 0.24 ** 0.42 ** 0.49 ** 0.42 ** 0.23 ** 0.23 ** 0.23 ** 
(2.61)  (2.39)  (2.17)  (2.78)  (2.23)  (2.42) (2.15)  (2.22)  (2.41)  (2.15)  (2.48)  (2.62)  (2.55)  (2.22)  (2.28)  (2.25)  
SIZE 
-0.16 *           -0.30 ** -0.10  -0.14  -0.26 ** -0.14  0.14  -0.15  -0.24 ** -0.08  -0.15  
(-1.93)            (-4.44)  (-1.30)  (-1.64)  (-4.02)  (-1.63)  (0.79)  (-1.14)  (-3.74)  (-0.68)  (-1.26)  
B/M 
  0.62 **         0.29 ** 0.48 ** 0.47 ** 0.30 ** 0.41 ** 0.50 ** 0.43 ** 0.30 ** 0.32 ** 0.32 ** 
  (3.81)          (2.19)  (3.04)  (2.88)  (2.28)  (2.90)  (3.29)  (3.09)  (2.44)  (2.57)  (2.62)  
Mom 
    0.78 **       0.71 ** 0.66 ** 0.66 ** 0.70 ** 0.67 ** 0.64 ** 0.70 ** 0.70 ** 0.70 ** 0.72 ** 
    (4.01)        (4.25)  (3.56)  (3.57)  (4.31)  (3.64)  (3.41)  (3.85)  (4.29)  (4.33)  (4.48)  
Volatility 
      -0.14      -0.26 **     -0.27 **       -0.23 ** -0.27 ** -0.25 ** 
      (1.37)      (-2.90)      (-3.08)        (-2.89)  (-3.18)  (-2.99)  
Beta_ K- 
Tail Risk 
        0.44 **     0.28 **   0.36 **       0.35 ** 0.34 ** 0.33 ** 
        (2.61)      (2.25)    (3.42)        (3.38)  (3.27)  (3.18)  
Beta_PS- 
Liquidity Risk 
          0.32 **     0.23  0.12        0.10  0.13  0.12  
          (2.20)     (1.61)  (0.89)        (0.74)  (0.94)  (0.90)  
Turnover 
_NYSE/AMEX 
                    -0.35 **   -0.26 * -0.22 **   -0.08    
                    (-2.83)    (-1.71)  (-2.37)    (-0.75)  
Turnover 
_NASDAQ 
                    -1.07    -0.20 ** -0.97    -1.15  
                    (-1.50)    (-2.73)  (-1.36)    (-1.62)  
Amihud_ 
NYSE/AMEX 
                      0.24 ** 0.01    0.16 * 0.10  
                      (2.31)  (0.09)    (1.82)  (1.06)  
Amihud 
_ NASDAQ 
                      0.42  0.26    0.38  -0.07  
                      (0.73)  (0.45)    (0.68)  (-0.88)  
Intercept 
1.09 ** 0.79 ** 0.58 ** 1.02 ** 0.71 ** 0.75 ** 1.86 ** 0.84 ** 0.94 ** 1.77 ** 1.08 ** 0.54  1.08 ** 1.72 ** 1.52 ** 1.59 ** 
(2.72)  (2.93)  (2.25)  (5.23)  (2.76)  (2.78) (6.77)  (2.29)  (2.43)  (6.62)  (2.96)  (1.05)  (2.78)  (6.50)  (5.13)  (5.68)  
                                 
Months 468                 
Observations 1,003,683                 
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Table 2.4, continued 
 
Panel B: Models without Extreme Liquidity Risk Betas 
Model I'  II'  III'  IV'  V'  VI'  VII'  VIII'  IX'  X'  XI'  XII'  XIII'  XIV'  XV'  XVI'  
SIZE 
-0.15 *           -0.30 ** -0.08  -0.12  -0.26 ** -0.12  0.18  -0.12  -0.23 ** -0.07  -0.13  
(-1.76)            (-4.38)  (-0.95)  (-1.36)  (-3.93)  (-1.39)  (1.01)  (-0.91)  (-3.65)  (-0.58)  (-1.10)  
B/M 
  0.67 **         0.30 ** 0.53 ** 0.52 ** 0.30 ** 0.44 ** 0.54 ** 0.46 ** 0.30 ** 0.33 ** 0.33 ** 
  (3.84)          (2.23)  (3.11)  (2.98)  (2.29)  (2.99)  (3.40)  (3.20)  (2.45)  (2.58)  (2.63)  
Mom 
    0.79 **       0.71 ** 0.67 ** 0.67 ** 0.70 ** 0.67 ** 0.64 ** 0.70 ** 0.70 ** 0.70 ** 0.71 ** 
    (3.95)        (4.21)  (3.51)  (3.45)  (4.26)  (3.61)  (3.38)  (3.82)  (4.24)  (4.28)  (4.42)  
Volatility 
      -0.17      -0.28 **     -0.28 **       -0.24 ** -0.28 ** -0.26 ** 
      (-1.61)      (-2.97)      (-3.09)        (-2.91)  (-3.19)  (-3.02)  
Beta_ K- 
Tail Risk 
        0.53 **     0.34 **   0.38 **       0.37 ** 0.37 ** 0.35 ** 
        (2.97)      (2.67)    (3.55)        (3.53)  (3.43)  (3.34)  
Beta_PS- 
Liquidity Risk 
          0.44 **     0.30 ** 0.17        0.14  0.17  0.16  
          (2.83)     (2.06)  (1.17)        (1.01)  (1.21)  (1.17)  
Turnover 
_NYSE/AMEX 
                    -0.36 **   -0.25 * -0.22 **   -0.07    
                    (-2.91)    (-1.66)  (-2.35)    (-0.61)  
Turnover 
_NASDAQ 
                    -1.05    -0.20 ** -0.94    -1.12  
                    (-1.47)    (-2.73)  (-1.32)    (-1.58)  
Amihud_ 
NYSE/AMEX 
                      0.26 ** 0.02    0.17 * 0.11  
                      (2.42)  (0.20)    (1.86)  (1.17)  
Amihud 
_ NASDAQ 
                      0.44  0.26    0.38  -0.07  
                      (0.77)  (0.45)    (0.68)  (-0.88)  
Intercept 
1.03 ** 0.79 ** 0.55 ** 1.08 ** 0.67 ** 0.72 ** 1.88 ** 0.76 ** 0.89 ** 1.77 ** 1.04 ** 0.45  1.01 ** 1.72 ** 1.51 ** 1.57 ** 
(2.51)  (2.86)  (2.13)  (5.31)  (2.54)  (2.65) (6.66)  (1.99)  (2.22)  (6.51)  (2.78)  (0.85)  (2.56)  (6.40)  (5.08)  (5.58)  
                                 
Months 468                 
Observations 1,003,683                 
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Table 2.4, continued 
 
This table summarizes Fama-MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-section regressions. Coefficient estimates are time-series averages of cross-sectional 
OLS regressions. And the t-statistics (in parenthesis) are computed for the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions using the Newey-West (1987) 
adjustment for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. In the Newey-West procedure, I use a lag of three. In all regressions, the dependent variable 
is the monthly individual stock return in excess of the risk-free rate. Eligible stocks are defined as ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, 
AMEX, or NASDAQ with at least four years of non-missing monthly returns out of five years and with stock prices between $5 and $1,000. Then, 
at each year end between 1972 and 2010, I estimate extreme liquidity risk sensitivities of individual stocks with respect to extreme liquidity risk 
(ELR) by the form  
 
Et [ri,t+1 ]= μi + βi ELRt 
 
Stocks are then sorted into decile value-weighted portfolios based on their preceding extreme liquidity risk loadings. Beta is estimated for each of 
the ten portfolios over the sample period (post-ranking loading). The post-ranking beta of portfolio p is assigned to an individual stock i, which 
belongs to portfolio p in the given year. Betas for the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) aggregate liquidity risk (“Beta PS-Liqidity Risk” in the table) 
and those for Kelly’s (2011) tail risk (“Beta K-Tail Risk” in the table) are constructed in a similar way. The independent variables also include: 
SIZE represents logarithm of the market capitalization of firms as defined in Fama and French (1992); B/M is the logarithm of the ratio of book 
value of equity plus deferred taxes to market capitalization as defined in Fama and French (1992); Mom is the stock return from month -12 to 
month -2; Volatility is the monthly standard deviation that is estimated from daily returns from month -12 to month -1; Turnover_NYSE/AMEX is 
the average monthly turnover from month -12 to month -1 at each year end if stocks trade on NYSE/AMEX, and zero otherwise; 
Turnover_NASDAQ is the average monthly turnover from month -12 to month -1 at each year end if stocks trade on NASDAQ, and zero 
otherwise. Amihud_NYSE/AMEX is the liquidity measure in Amihud (2002) based upon the prior calendar year's data at each year end if stocks 
trade on NYSE/AMEX, and zero otherwise; Amihud_NASDAQ is the liquidity measure in Amihud (2002) based upon the prior calendar year's 
data at each year end if stocks trade on NASDAQ, and zero otherwise. * and ** denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.5 
Liquidity-related Net Beta-Sorted Portfolio Returns: 1973-2011 
 
Extreme Liquidity Loading Low 
   
High 
    
 
1 2 3 4 5 5–1 t-stat. 10–1 t-stat. 
Panel A: Properties 
Value-weighted 
         Preceding loadings -3.65 -0.13 0.11 0.37 2.72 6.37 4.61 12.51 4.15 
Post-ranking loadings -0.43 -0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.26 0.70 2.66 0.63 2.00 
Market cap 20.74 35.51 34.12 30.18 17.67 -3.07 -1.56 -4.91 -7.35 
(Il)liquidity 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.35 0.24 11.20 0.57 12.19 
MKT beta 1.14 1.05 0.95 0.93 0.93 -0.21 -4.32 -0.32 -5.40 
SMB beta 0.29 -0.12 -0.12 -0.07 0.24 -0.05 -0.79 -0.04 -0.49 
HML beta -0.13 0.08 0.19 0.08 -0.04 0.10 1.40 0.16 1.88 
MOM beta -0.17 -0.04 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.20 4.24 0.16 2.75 
PS-Liquidity beta 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.08 -1.46 0.07 1.10 
K-Tail beta -0.10 -0.01 0.12 0.11 0.18 0.28 5.36 0.36 5.56 
          
Equal-weighted 
         Preceding loadings -4.31 -0.12 0.11 0.37 4.51 8.82 7.00 16.29 6.57 
Post-ranking loadings -0.30 -0.09 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.00 2.66 0.00 1.94 
Market cap 1.00 2.80 3.06 2.55 0.76 -0.24 -3.71 -0.27 -18.07 
(Il)liquidity 2.28 0.37 0.44 0.52 2.63 0.35 2.92 0.35 1.52 
MKT beta 0.97 0.98 0.92 0.88 0.82 -0.15 -6.40 -0.15 -5.91 
SMB beta 0.75 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.64 -0.10 -3.10 -0.16 -4.63 
HML beta 0.13 0.32 0.38 0.34 0.26 0.13 3.82 0.16 4.56 
MOM beta -0.15 -0.10 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.14 6.05 0.13 5.48 
PS-Liquidity beta 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -1.07 -0.02 -0.88 
K-Tail beta 0.01 -0.01 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 3.84 0.06 2.18 
          
Panel B: Returns 
Value-weighted          
Mean 0.68 0.87 1.11 1.12 1.47 0.79 3.84 0.58 2.31 
Alpha: FF -0.36 -0.08 0.15 0.20 0.48 0.84 4.02 0.63 2.49 
Alpha: FF + Mom -0.24 -0.06 0.12 0.17 0.50 0.74 3.48 0.58 2.27 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity -0.26 -0.05 0.14 0.19 0.52 0.78 3.68 0.55 2.11 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity + K-Tail -0.24 -0.04 0.11 0.16 0.47 0.71 3.41 0.45 1.80 
Alpha: AP-CAPM -0.35 -0.06 0.22 0.22 0.49 0.84 4.11 0.65 2.62 
Alpha: AP-CAPM + FF + Mom -0.24 -0.05 0.13 0.17 0.48 0.71 3.38 0.54 2.08 
          
Equal-weighted          
Mean 0.98 1.11 1.32 1.35 1.35 0.37 3.44 0.30 2.61 
Alpha: FF -0.23 -0.09 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.43 4.19 0.37 3.48 
Alpha: FF + Mom -0.10 0.00 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.33 3.25 0.27 2.53 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity -0.10 0.00 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.35 3.39 0.28 2.64 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity + K-Tail -0.10 0.00 0.17 0.21 0.22 0.32 3.17 0.27 2.50 
Alpha: AP-CAPM -0.14 0.14 0.39 0.41 0.28 0.42 4.15 0.36 3.32 
Alpha: AP-CAPM + FF + Mom -0.24 -0.03 0.17 0.19 0.05 0.30 2.92 0.23 2.13 
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Table 2.5, continued 
 
The table shows the statistics for the liquidity-related net beta-sorted portfolios. At each year end between 
1972 and 2010, I estimate the three liquidity betas in Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) liquididity-adjusted 
CAPM using extreme liquidity risk. Here the regressions use only data available at that time. And eligible 
stocks are defined as ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with at least 
four years of non-missing monthly returns out of five years and with stock prices between $5 and $1,000. 
Stocks are then sorted into quintile portfolios and decile portfolios based on their estimated liquidity-
related net betas.The post-formation returns on these portfolios during the next 12 months are linked 
across years to form a single return series for each quintile portfolio and decile portfolio covering the 
period from July 1973 to December 2011. Panel A reports the preceding liquidity-related net loadings 
(“preceding loadings” in the table) and post-ranking liquidity-related net loadings (“post-ranking 
loadings” in the table) of the quintile portfolios and spread portfolios. The post-ranking liquidity-related 
net loadings are estimated by regressing the portfolio excess returns on the extreme liquidity risk estimate 
and the market excess return factor over the sample period. In addition, Panel A reports the time-series 
averages of the quintile portfolios’ market capitalization and (il)liquidity, obtained as the average of the 
corresponding measures across the stocks within each quintile. Market capitalization is reported in 
billions of dollars. A stock’s liquidity in any given month is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. Also 
reported are post-ranking betas with respect to the three Fama-French factors, the momentum factor, the 
Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor (“PS-Liquidity” in the table) and Kelly’s (2011) tail 
risk factor (“K-Tail” in the table). The four right-most columns report results for two high-minus-low 
zero net investment portfolio, one that longs quintile 5 and shorts quintile 1 and the other longs decile 10 
and shorts decile 1, as well as t-statistics for the hedge portfolios' corresponding measures. Panel B shows 
the monthly mean returns for the liquidity-related net beta-sorted portfolios that are rebalanced annually. 
The panel also reports portfolio alphas from regressions of portfolio returns using the Fama-French three-
factor model as well as its extended four-, five- and six-factor models considering the momentum factor, 
the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor (“PS-Liquidity” in the table), and Kelly’s (2011) 
tail risk factor (“K-Tail” in the table) as additional controls. In addition, the table shows portfolio alphas 
from regressions of portfolio returns using Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity-adjusted CAPM 
(“AP-CAPM” in the table) as well as its extended model controlling the size, value and momentum 
factors. The four right-most columns report results for two high-minus-low zero net investment portfolios, 
one that longs quintile 5 and shorts quintile 1 and the other longs decile 10 and shorts decile 1, as well as 
t-statistics for the hedge portfolios' average returns and factor model alphas.  
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Table 2.6 
Extreme Liquidity Loading-sorted Portfolio Returns: Normal Times and Times of Crisis 
 
 
 
CASE I CASE II CASE III 
 
Expansion 
Period 
Contraction 
Period 
Diff. 
Period w/o 
Market 
Downturn 
Sudden 
Market 
Downturn 
Diff. 
Period w/o 
Liquidity 
Dry-ups 
Liquidity 
Dry-ups 
Diff. 
 
(32 Years) (6.5 Years) in (29.5 Years) (9 Years) in (35.5 Years) (3 Years) in 
 
5–1 t-stat. 5–1 t-stat. 5–1 5–1 t-stat. 5–1 t-stat. 5–1 5–1 t-stat. 5–1 t-stat. 5–1 
Panel A: Value-weighted 
    
           
Mean 0.54 2.63 0.60 0.94 0.07 0.49 2.08 0.75 1.95 0.26 0.51 2.61 0.97 0.85 0.46 
Alpha: FF 0.68 3.25 0.64 1.10 -0.04 0.87 3.64 -1.59 -2.75 -2.46 0.89 4.43 -0.25 -0.20 -1.13 
Alpha: FF + Mom 0.62 2.95 0.54 0.97 -0.09 0.74 3.07 -1.64 -2.98 -2.38 0.70 3.42 -0.26 -0.21 -0.96 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity 0.65 3.03 0.63 1.13 -0.02 0.80 3.32 -1.66 -3.01 -2.46 0.71 3.46 -0.25 -0.20 -0.96 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity + K-Tail 0.61 2.91 0.37 0.68 -0.24 0.73 3.07 -1.62 -2.99 -2.36 0.66 3.27 -0.02 -0.01 -0.68 
Alpha: AP-CAPM 0.69 3.38 0.34 0.55 -0.35 0.85 3.57 -1.51 -2.65 -2.36 0.73 3.72 -0.72 -0.56 -1.45 
Alpha: AP-CAPM + FF + Mom 0.62 2.95 0.54 0.97 -0.08 0.74 3.07 -1.64 -2.97 -2.38 0.70 3.41 -0.26 -0.21 -0.96 
                
Panel B: Equal-weighted 
    
           
Mean 0.44 2.88 0.55 1.31 0.11 0.38 2.24 0.74 2.54 0.36 0.41 2.88 1.13 1.29 0.72 
Alpha: FF 0.54 3.65 0.57 1.50 0.03 0.67 4.13 -0.80 -1.84 -1.47 0.70 5.08 0.43 0.52 -0.27 
Alpha: FF + Mom 0.47 3.14 0.49 1.38 0.02 0.56 3.44 -0.83 -2.01 -1.39 0.55 3.91 0.43 0.51 -0.12 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity 0.49 3.27 0.54 1.53 0.05 0.61 3.73 -0.86 -2.10 -1.47 0.56 4.00 0.42 0.49 -0.14 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity + K-Tail 0.47 3.15 0.43 1.18 -0.04 0.56 3.48 -0.84 -2.06 -1.40 0.53 3.82 0.55 0.68 0.02 
Alpha: AP-CAPM 0.61 4.05 0.39 0.98 -0.22 0.70 4.16 -0.62 -1.40 -1.32 0.61 4.41 0.01 0.01 -0.60 
Alpha: AP-CAPM + FF + Mom 0.50 3.33 0.50 1.42 0.00 0.58 3.58 -0.79 -1.91 -1.37 0.57 4.10 0.43 0.52 -0.14 
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Table 2.6, continued 
 
 
 
 
The table shows the statistics for extreme liquidity beta-sorted portfolios during normal times and times of crisis. At each year end between 1972 
and 2010, I estimate extreme liquidity risk sensitivities of individual stocks with respect to extreme liquidity risk by the form 
 
Et [ri,t+1 ]= μi + βi ELRt 
 
Here the regression uses only data available at that time. And eligible stocks are defined as ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, 
or NASDAQ with at least four years of non-missing monthly returns out of five years and with stock prices between $5 and $1,000. Stocks are 
then sorted into quintile portfolios and decile portfolios based on their extreme liquidity risk loadings. Panel A reports monthly value-weighted 
portfolio returns and Panel B reports monthly equally weighted portfolio returns. The panels also reports portfolio alphas from regressions of 
portfolio returns using the Fama-French three-factor (FF) model as well as its extended four-, five- and six-factor models considering the 
momentum factor, the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor (“PS-Liquidity” in the table), and Kelly’s (2011) tail risk factor (“K-
Tail” in the table) as additional controls. In addition, the table shows portfolio alphas from regressions of portfolio returns using Acharya and 
Pedersen (2005)’s liquidity-adjusted CAPM (“AP-CAPM” in the table) as well as its extended model controlling the size, value and momentum 
factors. The left-most five columns of the table report the results for quintile extreme liquidity beta-sorted portfolios during the NBER recession 
periods and during the NBER expansion periods, respectively, which is denoted as CASE I. The statistics include the average returns of the “5–1” 
spread portfolio that longs quintile 5 and shorts quintile 1, as well as the t-statistic for the hedge portfolios' average returns. The factor model 
alphas and their t-statistics are also reported. The last column for CASE I reports results for differences between the two “5–1” spread portfolios, 
including the differences in mean returns and regression alphas. Similarly, CASE II, which is shown in the next five columns in the table, reports 
the results for quintile extreme liquidity beta-sorted portfolios during periods without market downturns and those with sudden market downturns. 
Here sudden market downturn refers to the case when the market return suddenly turns to be negative. Case III, which is reported in the right-most 
five column in the tables, shows the results for quintile extreme liquidity beta-sorted portfolios during periods without liquidity dry-ups and those 
with liquidity dry-ups. Here liquidity dry-ups includes months when the average liquidity is at least two standard deviations below its means 
measured by Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity innovations or the average illiquidity is at least two standard deviations above its means 
evaluated by Acharya and Pedersen (2005). 
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Table 2.7 
Extreme Liquidity Loading-sorted Portfolio Returns: NYSE&AMEX only and NASDAQ only 
  
 
NYSE &AMEX Only 
 
NASDAQ Only 
Extreme Liquidity Loading 5–1 t-stat. 10–1 t-stat. 
 
5–1 t-stat. 10–1 t-stat. 
Panel A: Annual Rebalance 
         
Value-weighted 
         
Mean 0.52 2.81 0.58 2.50 
 
0.71 3.15 1.07 3.66 
Alpha: FF 0.50 2.65 0.53 2.26 
 
0.78 3.42 1.17 3.97 
Alpha: FF + Mom 0.41 2.17 0.46 1.92 
 
0.72 3.13 1.17 3.88 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity 0.43 2.25 0.47 1.92 
 
0.72 3.1 1.19 3.91 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity + K-Tail 0.47 2.43 0.52 2.15  0.60 2.69 1.09 3.62 
Alpha: AP-CAPM 0.67 3.65 0.75 3.28 
 
0.83 3.65 1.19 4.08 
Alpha: AP-CAPM + FF + Mom 0.59 3.18 0.7 2.96  0.71 3.04 1.16 3.84 
          
Equal-weighted 
         
Mean 0.46 3.59 0.52 3.17 
 
0.58 3.23 0.78 3.52 
Alpha: FF 0.56 4.42 0.63 3.87 
 
0.61 3.62 0.77 3.65 
Alpha: FF + Mom 0.47 3.73 0.51 3.13 
 
0.48 2.83 0.65 3.04 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity 0.47 3.63 0.50 3.06 
 
0.52 3.02 0.69 3.19 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity + K-Tail 0.42 3.35 0.45 2.78  0.46 2.72 0.62 2.91 
Alpha: AP-CAPM 0.54 4.35 0.62 3.89  0.76 4.30 0.96 4.38 
Alpha: AP-CAPM + FF + Mom 0.49 3.85 0.52 3.21 
 
0.48 2.81 0.65 3.04 
          
Panel B: Monthly Rebalance          
Value-weighted          
Mean 0.45 2.15 0.38 1.49  0.52 1.98 0.83 2.39 
Alpha: FF 0.64 3.15 0.61 2.47  0.58 2.23 0.93 2.69 
Alpha: FF + Mom 0.58 2.81 0.57 2.26  0.60 2.25 1.07 3.04 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity 0.59 2.82 0.57 2.26  0.60 2.23 1.08 3.04 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity + K-Tail 0.51 2.47 0.45 1.84  0.44 1.75 0.89 2.62 
Alpha: AP-CAPM 0.61 3.01 0.54 2.21  0.67 2.55 0.98 2.80 
Alpha: AP-CAPM + FF + Mom 0.58 2.79 0.56 2.25  0.56 2.08 1.02 2.89 
          
Equal-weighted          
Mean 0.44 2.91 0.53 2.75  0.45 2.01 0.66 2.45 
Alpha: FF 0.57 3.93 0.68 3.64  0.46 2.30 0.64 2.61 
Alpha: FF + Mom 0.51 3.45 0.61 3.21  0.45 2.17 0.64 2.58 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity 0.50 3.35 0.60 3.12  0.48 2.31 0.67 2.66 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity + K-Tail 0.44 3.01 0.51 2.76  0.38 1.91 0.55 2.26 
Alpha: AP-CAPM 0.54 3.74 0.65 3.48  0.65 2.95 0.87 3.28 
Alpha: AP-CAPM + FF + Mom 0.52 3.52 0.62 3.27   0.42 2.05 0.62 2.50 
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Table 2.7, continued 
 
 
 
 
The table shows the statistics for two groups of the extreme liquidity beta-sorted portfolios, in which one 
is based on NYSE&AMEX stocks only and the other is based on NASDAQ stocks only. At each year end 
between 1972 and 2010, I estimate extreme liquidity risk sensitivities of individual stocks with respect to 
extreme liquidity risk by the form 
Et [ri,t+1 ] = μi + βi ELRt 
 
Here the regression uses only data available at that time. And eligible stocks are defined as ordinary 
common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with at least four years of non-missing 
monthly returns out of five years and with stock prices between $5 and $1,000. Stocks are then sorted into 
quintile portfolios and decile portfolios based on their extreme liquidity risk loadings. Panel A reports 
monthly portfolio returns when portfolios are rebalanced annually and Panel B reports monthly returns 
when portfolios are rebalanced monthly. The table also reports portfolio alphas from regressions of 
portfolio returns using the Fama-French three-factor model as well as its extended four-, five- and six-
factor models considering the momentum factor, the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor 
(“PS-Liquidity” in the table), and Kelly’s (2011) tail risk factor (“K-Tail” in the table) as additional 
controls. In addition, the table shows portfolio alphas from regressions of portfolio returns using Acharya 
and Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity-adjusted CAPM (“AP-CAPM” in the table) as well as its extended model 
controlling the size, value and momentum factors. The first four columns report results on the group of 
NYSE&AMEX stocks for two high-minus-low zero net investment portfolios, one that longs quintile 5 
and shorts quintile 1 and the other longs decile 10 and shorts decile 1, as well as t-statistics for the hedge 
portfolios' average returns and factor model alphas. The next four columns report results on the group of 
NASDAQ stocks for two high-minus-low zero net investment portfolios, one that longs quintile 5 and 
shorts quintile 1 and the other longs decile 10 and shorts decile 1, as well as t-statistics for the hedge 
portfolios' average returns and factor model alphas.  
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Table 2.8 
Properties and Returns of Extreme Liquidity Loading-sorted Portfolios Based on Roll Impact: 
1973-2011 
 
Extreme Liquidity Loading Low 
   
High 
    
 
1 2 3 4 5 5–1 t-stat. 10–1 t-stat. 
Panel A: Properties 
Value-weighted 
         Market cap 26.82 39.92 36.07 29.64 20.42 -6.40 -3.53 -7.53 -4.08 
(Il)liquidity 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.13 0.08 5.67 0.13 4.94 
MKT beta 0.98 0.97 0.96 1.03 1.05 0.07 1.63 0.09 1.80 
SMB beta -0.02 -0.12 -0.13 -0.02 0.27 0.29 5.09 0.33 4.77 
HML beta 0.10 0.14 0.06 -0.01 -0.16 -0.26 -4.18 -0.03 -0.42 
MOM beta 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.01 0.33 0.12 2.48 
PS-Liquidity beta -0.04 -0.06 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.11 2.38 0.08 1.36 
K-Tail beta 0.11 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.08 -0.03 -0.63 0.00 0.09 
          
Equal-weighted          
Market cap 1.57 2.72 2.44 2.11 1.34 -0.23 -2.78 -0.07 -1.54 
(Il)liquidity 1.05 1.22 1.37 1.24 1.35 0.30 4.72 0.37 4.39 
MKT beta 0.96 0.89 0.87 0.89 0.97 0.01 0.36 0.02 0.57 
SMB beta 0.64 0.45 0.44 0.51 0.74 0.10 2.70 0.11 2.40 
HML beta 0.15 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.26 0.10 2.61 0.20 4.20 
MOM beta -0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 0.08 3.04 0.10 3.30 
PS-Liquidity beta -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.05 1.59 0.06 1.56 
K-Tail beta 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.88 0.06 1.96 
          
          
Panel B: Returns 
Value-weighted          
Mean 0.97 0.88 0.90 0.99 1.22 0.25 1.36 0.64 2.92 
Alpha: FF 0.00 -0.06 0.01 0.06 0.24 0.24 1.36 0.53 2.47 
Alpha: FF + Mom 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.08 0.23 0.22 1.24 0.43 1.96 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity 0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.19 0.16 0.90 0.38 1.74 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity + K-Tail -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.09 0.15 0.17 0.96 0.38 1.73 
Alpha: AP-CAPM 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.22 0.17 0.95 0.56 2.59 
Alpha: AP-CAPM + FF + Mom 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.10 0.24 0.22 1.23 0.42 1.94 
          
Equal-weighted          
Mean 1.00 1.18 1.26 1.30 1.36 0.36 3.23 0.45 3.31 
Alpha: FF -0.19 0.03 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.30 2.65 0.34 2.51 
Alpha: FF + Mom -0.08 0.10 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.24 2.07 0.27 1.94 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity -0.06 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.21 1.82 0.24 1.69 
Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity + K-Tail -0.08 0.11 0.18 0.17 0.12 0.20 1.73 0.21 1.50 
Alpha: AP-CAPM 0.00 0.26 0.35 0.38 0.35 0.35 3.08 0.43 3.13 
Alpha: AP-CAPM + FF + Mom -0.10 0.07 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.23 1.98 0.26 1.84 
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Table 2.8, continued 
 
 
 
The table shows the properties and returns for the extreme liquidity beta-sorted portfolios, in which the 
measure of extreme liquidity index is based on alternative proxy of the price impact, Roll Impact 
(Goyenko, Holden and Trzcinka, 2009). At each year end between 1972 and 2010, I estimate extreme 
liquidity risk sensitivities of individual stocks with respect to extreme liquidity risk by the form 
 
Et [ri,t+1 ]= μi + βi ELRt 
 
Here the regression uses only data available at that time. And eligible stocks are defined as ordinary 
common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ with at least four years of non-missing 
monthly returns out of five years and with stock prices between $5 and $1,000. Stocks are then sorted into 
quintile portfolios and decile portfolios based on their extreme liquidity risk loadings. The post-formation 
returns on these portfolios during the next 12 months are linked across years to form a single return series 
for each quintile portfolio and decile portfolio covering the period from July 1973 to December 2011. 
Panel A reports the time-series averages of the quintile portfolios’ market capitalization and liquidity, 
obtained as the average of the corresponding measures across the stocks within each quintile. Market 
capitalization is reported in billions of dollars. A stock’s liquidity in any given month is the Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity measure. Also reported are post-ranking betas with respect to the three Fama-French 
factors, a momentum factor, the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor (“PS-Liquidity” in 
the table) and Kelly’s (2011) tail risk factor (“K-Tail” in the table). The four right-most columns report 
results for two high-minus-low zero net investment portfolio, one that longs quintile 5 and shorts quintile 
1 and the other longs decile 10 and shorts decile 1, as well as t-statistics for the hedge portfolios' 
corresponding measures. Panel B shows the monthly mean return for the extreme liquidity beta-sorted 
portfolios. The panel also reports portfolio alphas from regressions of portfolio returns using the Fama-
French three-factor model as well as its extended four-, five- and six-factor models considering the 
momentum factor, the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor (“PS-Liquidity” in the table), 
and Kelly’s (2011) tail risk factor (“K-Tail” in the table) as additional controls. In addition, the table 
shows portfolio alphas from regressions of portfolio returns using the Acharya and Pedersen (2005)’s 
liquidity-adjusted CAPM (“AP-CAPM” in the table) as well as its extended model controlling the size, 
value and momentum factors. The four right-most columns report results for two high-minus-low zero net 
investment portfolios, one that longs quintile 5 and shorts quintile 1 and the other longs decile 10 and 
shorts decile 1, as well as t-statistics for the hedge portfolios' average returns and factor model alphas.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix I 
Correlations of Extreme Liquidity Index with Other Related Variables: 1973 – 2011 
 
  I II III IV V VI VII 
Panel A: Liquidity Variables 
I Extreme Liquidity 1       
II PS-Liquidity Innovation 0.12 1      
III AP-Illiquidity Innovation -0.07 -0.23 1     
IV HPW-Noise Measure 0.15 -0.17 0.05 1    
V S-Transitory Factor 0.03 0.08 -0.17 -0.10 1   
VI S-Permanent Factor 0.01 0.21 -0.28 -0.15 0.16 1  
VII Commonality in Liquidity 0.48 -0.15 -0.06 0.48 -0.11 -0.19 1 
         
Panel B: Demand-side Factors 
I Extreme Liquidity 1       
II Commonality in Turnover 0.40 1      
III Sentiment Index 0.20 -0.03 1     
IV ETFs Volume 0.63 0.60 -0.15 1    
V Global Country Fund Discount -0.43 -0.01 0.44 -0.11 1   
VI U.S. Local Country Fund Discount -0.20 -0.20 -0.12 -0.06 0.21 1  
         
Panel C: Supply-side Factors 
I Extreme Liquidity 1       
II Term Spread 0.41 1      
III Default Spread -0.22 0.11 1     
IV Commercial Paper Spread 0.03 -0.39 0.06 1    
V TED Spread -0.01 -0.16 0.36 0.76 1   
VI Margin Debt Outstanding 0.50 0.12 -0.17 0.35 -0.03 1  
VII Local Bank Returns -0.05 -0.04 -0.18 -0.11 -0.15 -0.18 1 
         
Panel D: Other Macro Variables 
I Extreme Liquidity 1       
II Dividend-Price Ratio -0.52 1      
III Unemployment -0.14 0.52 1     
IV Inflation -0.48 0.39 -0.02 1    
V CFNAI -0.17 -0.05 -0.10 0.05 1   
VI Market Volatility 0.06 -0.17 -0.01 -0.21 -0.38 1  
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Appendix I, continued 
 
 
Panel A of this table reports correlations between extreme liquidity risk estimates and a variety of 
aggregate (il)liquidity measures. They are considered as follow; Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) monthly 
aggregate liquidity measure (“PS-Liquidity Innovation” in the table) captures a dimension of liquidity 
associated with the strength of volume-related return reversals. It is an average of individual-stock 
measures estimated with daily data and relies on the principle that order flow induces greater return 
reversals when liquidity is lower. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) monthly liquidity measure (“AP-
Illiquidity Innovation” in the table) captures the innovation in equally-weighted illiquidity cost for the 
market portfolio. As suggested in Acharya and Pedersen (2005), I form market portfolio for each month 
based on NYSE/AMEX stocks with beginning-of-month price between $5 and $1,000, and with at least 
15 days of return and volume data in that month. For each stock in the market portfolio, I estimate its 
Amihud (2002) illiquidity cost for each month and normalize it to make it stationary and to put it on a 
scale corresponding to the cost of a single trade. Then I run a regression using equation (22) in Acharya 
and Pedersen (2005), to predict market illiquidity, and the residual of the regression is interpreted as the 
market illiquidity innovation. Hu, Pan, and Wang (2012) propose a market-wide liquidity measure 
(“HPW-Noise Measure” in the table) by exploiting the connection between the amount of arbitrage 
capital in the market and observed price deviations in U.S. treasury bonds. Data is from Prof. Jun Pan’s 
website. Sadka’s (2006) liquidity factors are based on the transitory-fixed (“S-Transitory Factor” in the 
table) and permanent-variable components (“S-Permanent Factor” in the table) of price impact, as 
measured from intraday data. The data is from CRSP database. Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012) 
construct monthly measures of commonality in liquidity (“Commonality in Liquidity” in the table) and 
the data is from Journal of Financial Economics website. Panels B and C of the table consider a set of 
both supply-side and demand-side sources of the commonality in liquidity. Proxies of demand-side forces 
include the average commonality in turnover, a comprehensive measure of the degree of correlated 
trading, which is denoted as “Commonality in Turnover” in the table, the U.S. investor sentiment index of 
Baker and Wurgler (2006) (“Sentiment Index” in the table), ETF volume in Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk 
(2012), which is defined as dollar trading volume in exchange traded country funds for 28 countries 
traded on U.S. markets, Global country fund discount in Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012) and U.S. local 
country fund discount in Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012). Proxies of supply-side forces include term 
spread (the difference between yields on long and short term government bonds), default spread (the 
difference in yields on BAA and AAA corporate bonds), commercial paper spread (difference between 
the percentage 90-Day AA nonfinancial commercial paper interest rate and the three-month T-bill rate), 
TED spread (difference between the three-month EuroDollar LIBOR rate on the three-month U.S. 
Treasuries rate, the data is from Bloomberg), the amount of NYSE margin debt outstanding (“Margin 
Debt Outstanding” in the table), local bank returns in Karolyi, Lee, and van Dijk (2012). Panel D of the 
table reports correlations between extreme liquidity risk estimates and other macroeconomic variables. 
Macroeconomic variables include the S&P 500 log dividend-price ratio, the unemployment rate, inflation 
rate, the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI), and market volatility. Sample horizon depends 
on availability of each variable.  
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Appendix II 
Double-Sorted Portfolio Returns on Size and Extreme Liquidity Loading: 1973-2011 
 
Extreme Liquidity Loading  Low 
   
High 
  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 5–1 t-stat. 
Panel A: Value-Weighted  
       Mean  
       All  0.74 0.84 0.94 1.12 1.29 0.55 2.73 
Small                                                             1 1.18 1.27 1.34 1.38 1.55 0.37 2.49 
                                                                       2 0.94 1.19 1.40 1.46 1.57 0.62 3.53 
                                                                       3 0.82 1.06 1.30 1.42 1.44 0.61 3.43 
                                                                       4 0.77 1.12 1.14 1.30 1.48 0.72 3.63 
Big                                                                 5 0.70 0.76 0.88 1.06 1.16 0.46 2.00 
 
 
       Alpha: FF + Mom   
       All  -0.19 -0.10 -0.01 0.19 0.37 0.56 2.84 
Small                                                             1 -0.12 -0.02 0.11 0.14 0.28 0.41 2.81 
                                                                       2 -0.28 -0.04 0.19 0.22 0.30 0.58 3.52 
                                                                       3 -0.35 -0.13 0.13 0.28 0.28 0.62 3.52 
                                                                       4 -0.30 0.02 0.03 0.26 0.41 0.71 3.71 
Big                                                                 5 -0.14 -0.13 -0.03 0.18 0.35 0.50 2.16 
 
 
       Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity + K-Tail  
All  -0.20 -0.08 -0.03 0.18 0.36 0.55 2.81 
Small                                                             1 -0.14 -0.01 0.11 0.13 0.27 0.41 2.87 
                                                                       2 -0.28 -0.05 0.19 0.22 0.29 0.58 3.50 
                                                                       3 -0.34 -0.14 0.10 0.26 0.25 0.58 3.32 
                                                                       4 -0.26 0.03 0.02 0.22 0.36 0.63 3.38 
Big                                                                 5 -0.14 -0.10 -0.05 0.17 0.34 0.49 2.10 
 
 
       Alpha: AP-CAPM  
       All  -0.29 -0.09 0.07 0.25 0.37 0.66 3.39 
Small                                                             1 0.05 0.24 0.34 0.40 0.52 0.47 3.28 
                                                                       2 -0.14 0.23 0.48 0.55 0.58 0.72 4.24 
                                                                       3 -0.24 0.11 0.40 0.52 0.46 0.69 3.94 
                                                                       4 -0.30 0.18 0.24 0.39 0.52 0.82 4.23 
Big                                                                 5 -0.30 -0.16 0.01 0.19 0.27 0.57 2.52 
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Appendix II, continue 
 
Extreme Liquidity Loading  Low 
   
High 
  
 
 1 2 3 4 5 5–1 t-stat. 
Panel B: Equal-Weighted  
       Mean  
       All  0.97 1.13 1.24 1.33 1.43 0.46 3.15 
Small                                                             1 1.10 1.20 1.29 1.38 1.44 0.34 2.53 
                                                                       2 0.91 1.22 1.40 1.43 1.49 0.58 3.49 
                                                                       3 0.82 1.11 1.28 1.39 1.42 0.59 3.29 
                                                                       4 0.82 1.12 1.14 1.24 1.46 0.64 3.15 
Big                                                                 5 0.91 0.90 0.99 1.11 1.21 0.30 1.41 
 
 
       Alpha: FF + Mom  
       All  -0.14 0.01 0.14 0.25 0.31 0.45 3.31 
Small                                                             1 -0.09 0.03 0.16 0.25 0.25 0.34 2.74 
                                                                       2 -0.23 0.02 0.21 0.23 0.29 0.52 3.33 
                                                                       3 -0.29 -0.04 0.14 0.29 0.32 0.61 3.41 
                                                                       4 -0.18 0.05 0.08 0.22 0.42 0.60 3.01 
Big                                                                 5 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.20 0.35 0.35 1.66 
 
 
       Alpha: FF + Mom + PS-Liquidity + K-Tail 
All  -0.16 0.01 0.12 0.24 0.29 0.45 3.28 
Small                                                             1 -0.12 0.04 0.14 0.23 0.22 0.35 2.75 
                                                                       2 -0.25 0.01 0.20 0.22 0.28 0.53 3.36 
                                                                       3 -0.27 -0.05 0.12 0.27 0.29 0.57 3.20 
                                                                       4 -0.14 0.04 0.07 0.19 0.37 0.52 2.68 
Big                                                                 5 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.18 0.33 0.33 1.58 
 
 
       Alpha: AP-CAPM  
       All  -0.15 0.13 0.29 0.39 0.42 0.58 4.12 
Small                                                             1 -0.07 0.13 0.25 0.35 0.38 0.45 3.50 
                                                                       2 -0.17 0.26 0.48 0.53 0.52 0.68 4.22 
                                                                       3 -0.25 0.17 0.38 0.49 0.44 0.68 3.86 
                                                                       4 -0.24 0.19 0.25 0.33 0.49 0.74 3.70 
Big                                                                 5 -0.14 -0.01 0.11 0.23 0.29 0.43 2.06 
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Appendix II, continued 
 
 
This table reports average returns for double-sorted portfolios that are formed on the basis of extreme 
liquidity risk loading and size. At the end of each year, stocks are independently sorted by size and the 
preceding extreme liquidity loading. Portfolios are rebalanced annually. The size breakpoints come from 
Prof. Kenneth R. French data library. The breakpoints use all NYSE stocks with available market equity. 
Here eligible stocks are defined as ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ 
with at least four years of non-missing monthly returns out of five years and with stock prices between $5 
and $1,000. Panel A reports value-weighted portfolio returns and Panel B reports equal-weighted returns. 
In each panel, it also reports alphas from regressions of portfolio returns using the Carhart (1997)’s four-
factor model, the extended six-factor model controlling the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity 
factor (“PS-Liquidity” in the table) and Kelly’s (2011) tail risk factor (“K-Tail” in the table), and  
Acharya and Pedersen’s (2005) liquidity-adjusted CAPM (“AP-CAPM” in the table). The four right-most 
columns report results for two high-minus-low zero net investment portfolios, one that longs quintile 5 
and shorts quintile 1 and the other longs decile 10 and shorts decile 1, as well as t-statistics for the hedge 
portfolios' average returns and factor model alphas.  
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Appendix III 
Triple-Sorted Portfolio Returns on Size, liquidity and Extreme Liquidity Loading, 1973-2011 
Extreme Liquidity Loading  Low 
   
High 
  
Size 
Amihud 
Illiquidity  1 2 3 4 5 5–1 t-stat. 
Panel A: Value-Weighted 
Mean 
Small Low  0.11 0.41 0.39 0.53 0.81 0.70 3.03 
Small 2  0.33 0.47 0.43 0.74 0.90 0.57 2.24 
Small 3  0.22 0.44 0.56 0.67 0.87 0.65 2.65 
Small High  0.32 0.59 0.57 0.69 0.88 0.56 2.12 
2 Low  0.44 0.56 0.52 0.93 0.92 0.48 1.57 
2 2  0.34 0.32 0.52 0.75 0.61 0.27 0.87 
2 3  0.53 0.51 0.47 0.50 0.55 0.03 0.09 
2 High  0.27 0.36 0.45 1.07 1.05 0.79 2.46 
3 Low  0.43 0.67 0.51 0.73 1.05 0.63 1.80 
3 2  0.34 0.51 0.68 1.18 1.13 0.79 2.46 
3 3  0.66 0.61 0.50 0.71 0.98 0.32 0.96 
3 High  0.32 0.64 0.11 1.39 0.75 0.43 1.42 
Large Low  0.46 0.57 0.67 0.70 0.94 0.48 1.44 
Large 2  0.62 0.33 0.72 0.76 1.17 0.55 1.62 
Large 3  0.35 0.57 0.34 0.92 0.82 0.46 1.49 
Large High  0.25 0.69 0.51 0.85 1.20 0.95 2.38 
AVERAGE  0.37 0.52 0.50 0.82 0.92 0.54 2.63 
          
Alpha 
Small Low  -0.57 -0.06 -0.15 0.01 0.35 0.92 3.93 
Small 2  -0.23 0.01 -0.12 0.35 0.46 0.70 2.74 
Small 3  -0.17 -0.05 0.04 0.18 0.40 0.57 2.33 
Small High  -0.23 0.08 0.04 0.24 0.42 0.65 2.41 
2 Low  -0.20 0.14 0.01 0.51 0.47 0.67 2.14 
2 2  -0.15 -0.20 0.03 0.21 0.20 0.34 1.08 
2 3  -0.14 0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.06 0.19 0.63 
2 High  -0.23 -0.08 -0.03 0.71 0.72 0.94 2.91 
3 Low  0.02 0.08 -0.09 0.27 0.46 0.44 1.27 
3 2  -0.12 -0.03 0.26 0.84 0.68 0.79 2.43 
3 3  0.11 0.09 -0.05 0.24 0.53 0.41 1.21 
3 High  -0.33 0.23 -0.33 0.90 0.24 0.57 1.84 
Large Low  -0.10 0.12 0.22 0.17 0.36 0.46 1.37 
Large 2  0.02 -0.14 0.34 0.25 0.68 0.66 1.89 
Large 3  -0.16 0.07 -0.04 0.50 0.40 0.56 1.82 
Large High  -0.14 0.30 -0.04 0.40 0.89 1.02 2.50 
AVERAGE  -0.16 0.04 0.01 0.36 0.46 0.62 3.09 
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Appendix III, continued 
 
Extreme Liquidity Loading  Low 
   
High 
  
Size 
Amihud 
Illiquidity  1 2 3 4 5 5–1 t-stat. 
Panel B: Equal-Weighted 
Mean   
       Small Low  0.65 0.74 0.85 0.92 0.90 0.25 1.53 
Small 2  0.52 0.74 0.66 0.85 0.92 0.40 2.49 
Small 3  0.56 0.76 0.86 0.81 1.09 0.52 3.15 
Small High  0.74 0.67 0.73 0.92 0.99 0.25 1.54 
2 Low  0.67 0.85 0.82 0.93 0.94 0.27 1.25 
2 2  0.41 0.61 0.74 0.92 0.86 0.45 2.56 
2 3  0.54 0.84 0.85 0.84 1.07 0.52 2.77 
2 High  0.72 0.78 0.74 1.00 0.95 0.23 1.15 
3 Low  0.66 0.88 0.76 0.90 1.02 0.36 1.77 
3 2  0.59 0.63 0.69 0.93 1.07 0.48 2.27 
3 3  0.45 0.76 0.85 1.04 0.89 0.44 1.78 
3 High  0.57 0.87 0.72 0.97 0.96 0.39 1.92 
Large Low  0.57 0.93 0.81 0.87 1.03 0.46 2.02 
Large 2  0.53 0.78 0.80 0.84 0.93 0.40 1.77 
Large 3  0.58 0.65 0.69 0.95 0.90 0.32 1.46 
Large High  0.62 0.75 0.91 1.04 0.95 0.33 1.47 
AVERAGE  0.59 0.77 0.78 0.92 0.97 0.38 2.57 
          
Alpha          
Small Low  -0.05 0.05 0.15 0.24 0.25 0.30 1.91 
Small 2  -0.18 0.05 0.01 0.26 0.25 0.42 2.60 
Small 3  -0.13 0.11 0.19 0.21 0.43 0.56 3.43 
Small High  0.01 0.01 0.08 0.27 0.30 0.30 1.83 
2 Low  0.02 0.20 0.22 0.31 0.31 0.30 1.38 
2 2  -0.23 -0.06 0.12 0.33 0.20 0.42 2.34 
2 3  -0.17 0.22 0.29 0.19 0.40 0.57 2.98 
2 High  0.09 0.14 0.12 0.43 0.31 0.22 1.12 
3 Low  0.07 0.24 0.13 0.32 0.39 0.32 1.52 
3 2  -0.04 0.01 0.08 0.34 0.51 0.56 2.64 
3 3  -0.28 0.09 0.24 0.45 0.25 0.53 2.16 
3 High  -0.08 0.25 0.14 0.37 0.29 0.37 1.83 
Large Low  -0.12 0.31 0.25 0.31 0.36 0.47 2.10 
Large 2  -0.13 0.13 0.22 0.26 0.40 0.53 2.33 
Large 3  0.00 0.04 0.09 0.34 0.21 0.21 0.93 
Large High  -0.03 0.11 0.29 0.44 0.30 0.33 1.45 
AVERAGE  -0.08 0.12 0.16 0.32 0.32 0.40 2.82 
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Appendix III, continued 
 
 
 
 
This table reports average returns for the 80 (4×4×5) triple-sorted portfolios. Sorts are performed 
sequentially, first sorting on size and then again, within each group, on the basis of the Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity cost. Finally each of sixteen sub-groups is subdivided into five portfolios according to their 
estimated extreme liquidity loadings. Portfolios are rebalanced annually. The size breakpoints come from 
Prof. Kenneth R. French data library. The breakpoints use all NYSE stocks with available market equity. 
Here eligible stocks are defined as ordinary common shares traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ 
with at least four years of non-missing monthly returns out of five years and with stock prices between $5 
and $1,000. Panel A reports value-weighted portfolio returns and Panel B reports equal-weighted returns. 
In each panel, it also reports portfolio alphas from regressions of portfolio returns using the extended six-
factor model, which considers Kelly’s (2011) tail risk factor as a sixth control beyond the Carhart (1997) 
four factors and the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded liquidity factor. The two right-most columns 
report results for the high-minus-low zero net investment portfolio that longs quintile 5 and shorts quintile 
1, as well as t-statistics for the hedge portfolios' average returns and factor model alphas.  
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Appendix IV 
Correlation of Extreme Liquidity Traded Factor with Other Priced Factors: 1973-2011 
 
 
 
MKT SMB HML MOM PS-Liquidity K-Tail Extreme Liquidity 
MKT 1 0.28 -0.32 -0.13 -0.03 0.42 -0.26 
SMB 
 
1 -0.23 0.01 -0.03 0.31 -0.20 
HML 
  
1 -0.16 0.05 -0.16 0.10 
MOM 
   
1 -0.03 -0.33 0.19 
PS-Liquidity 
    
1 -0.04 -0.07 
K-Tail 
     
1 -0.03 
Extreme Liquidity 
      
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This table reports the monthly correlations between extreme liquidity traded factor and other priced factors, including the Fama and French 
three factors (“MKT”, “SMB”, “HML” in the table), the momentum factor (“MOM” in the table), the Pástor and Stambaugh (2003) traded 
liquidity factor (“PS-Liquidity” in the table), and Kelly’s (2011) tail risk factor (“K-Tail” in the table).  
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Appendix V 
Replication Report for Acharya and Pedersen (2005, Journal of Financial Economics) 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix V Figure 1 Standardized innovations in market illiquidity (similar to Figure 1 in AP, 2005) 
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Appendix V, continued 
 
Average Illiquidity Average Excess Return 
  
Turnover Size 
  
 
Appendix V Figure 2 Properties of illiquidity portfolios (similar to Table 1 in AP, 2005) 
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Appendix V, continued 
 
𝛽1𝑝 𝛽2𝑝 
  
𝛽3𝑝 𝛽4𝑝 
  
 
Appendix V Figure 2 (continued) Properties of illiquidity portfolios (similar to Table 1 in AP, 2005) 
50.00
60.00
70.00
80.00
90.00
100.00
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Replication AP (2005)
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
1.20
1.40
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Replication AP (2005)
-2.00
-1.80
-1.60
-1.40
-1.20
-1.00
-0.80
-0.60
-0.40
-0.20
0.00
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Replication AP (2005)
-10.00
-9.00
-8.00
-7.00
-6.00
-5.00
-4.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25
Replication AP (2005)
 76 
 
Appendix V, continued 
 
Appendix V Table 1 Summary statistics of the innovations in market illiquidity  
 
R2 Standard Deviation Autocorrelation 
AP (2005) 78% 0.17% -0.03 
Replication 77% 0.13% -0.00 
 
Appendix V Table 2 Properties of illiquidity portfolios (similar to Table 1 in AP, 2005) 
Portfolio 𝛽1𝑝 𝛽2𝑝 𝛽3𝑝 𝛽4𝑝 𝐸(𝑐𝑝) 𝜎(∆𝑐𝑝) 𝐸(𝑟𝑒,𝑝) trn Size 
 
(*100) (*100) (*100) (*100) (%) (%) (%) (%) (bl$) 
AP (2005)  
1 55.10 0.00 -0.80 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.48 3.25 12.50 
3 67.70 0.00 -1.05 -0.03 0.26 0.00 0.39 4.19 2.26 
5 74.67 0.00 -1.24 -0.07 0.27 0.01 0.6 4.17 1.20 
7 76.25 0.00 -1.27 -0.10 0.29 0.01 0.57 4.14 0.74 
9 81.93 0.01 -1.37 -0.18 0.32 0.02 0.71 3.82 0.48 
11 84.59 0.01 -1.41 -0.33 0.36 0.04 0.73 3.87 0.33 
13 85.29 0.01 -1.47 -0.40 0.43 0.05 0.77 3.47 0.24 
15 88.99 0.02 -1.61 -0.70 0.53 0.08 0.85 3.20 0.17 
17 87.89 0.04 -1.59 -0.98 0.71 0.13 0.8 2.96 0.13 
19 87.50 0.05 -1.58 -1.53 1.01 0.21 0.83 2.68 0.09 
21 92.73 0.09 -1.69 -2.10 1.61 0.34 1.13 2.97 0.06 
23 94.76 0.19 -1.71 -3.35 3.02 0.62 1.12 2.75 0.04 
25 84.54 0.42 -1.69 -4.52 8.83 1.46 1.1 2.60 0.02 
Replication 
1 60.41 0.00 -0.74 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.48 3.30 10.44 
3 74.24 0.00 -0.94 -0.02 0.26 0.01 0.47 4.21 1.98 
5 79.62 0.00 -1.06 -0.07 0.27 0.01 0.59 4.33 1.06 
7 81.65 0.00 -1.09 -0.10 0.29 0.01 0.69 4.25 0.66 
9 86.85 0.01 -1.17 -0.22 0.33 0.02 0.64 3.89 0.43 
11 91.47 0.01 -1.27 -0.37 0.39 0.10 0.65 3.98 0.29 
13 89.67 0.01 -1.26 -0.47 0.44 0.05 0.67 3.66 0.20 
15 90.94 0.02 -1.33 -0.78 0.56 0.10 0.66 3.35 0.16 
17 90.70 0.04 -1.37 -1.22 0.76 0.14 0.70 2.95 0.11 
19 89.77 0.05 -1.37 -1.49 1.03 0.18 0.97 2.80 0.08 
21 90.59 0.08 -1.39 -2.16 1.69 0.35 0.85 2.46 0.06 
23 90.99 0.14 -1.38 -4.52 3.00 0.70 0.90 2.67 0.04 
25 87.31 0.32 -1.39 -8.45 7.38 1.54 0.93 2.28 0.02 
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Appendix V, continued 
 
 
This table reports the replication results for Acharya and Pedersen (AP, 2005) and the comparison between my replication results and major 
empirical results in AP (2005). Appendix Figure 1 corresponds to Figure 1 in AP (2005), and Appendix Figure 2 compares key variables in Table 
1 of AP (2005), including the average illiquidity, the average excess return, the turnover and the market capitalization, together with the market 
beta(𝛽1𝑝)and the liquidity beta (𝛽2𝑝, 𝛽3𝑝, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛽4𝑝). Appendix Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the innovation in market illiquidity, which 
is employed in this study. And Appendix Table 2 reports the properties of illiquidity portfolios, corresponding to Table 1 in AP (2005).  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE ROLE OF INVESTABILITY RESTRICTIONS ON SIZE, VALUE, AND MOMENTUM 
IN INTERNATIONAL STOCK RETURNS 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Whether securities are priced locally in segmented markets or globally in a single integrated 
market is an enduring question in international asset pricing, and one that has been reviewed by 
Karolyi and Stulz (2003). The liberalization of financial markets around the world has increased 
market accessibility for global investors, but many indirect barriers, such as political risk, 
differences in information quality, legal protections for private investors and market regulations, 
can still inhibit full market integration.  
Early empirical tests focused on whether market or consumption risks are priced locally or 
globally, following predictions made by the seminal international asset pricing models of Solnik 
(1974), Grauer, Litzenberger and Stehle (1976), Sercu (1980), Stulz (1981), and Errunza and 
Losq (1985). In the past decade, however, focus has shifted to the role of firm characteristics, 
such as size, book-to-market-equity ratios, cash-flow-to-price ratios, and momentum, in pricing 
securities in global markets. And an important debate has emerged over whether the explanatory 
power of these characteristics arises locally or globally. Griffin (2002) studies a global variant of 
the three-factor model similar to that of Fama and French (1993, 1998), which includes a market 
factor, a size factor and a book-to-market-equity factor for four countries (U.S., U.K., Canada, 
and Japan). He finds that only the local, country-specific components of the global factors are 
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able to explain the time-series variations in the stock returns and multi-factor models built from 
local factors only outperform those built from global factors with lower pricing errors. These 
findings are important because studies advocate for models that incorporate both local and 
foreign components of factors based on firm characteristics (Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang, 
2009).  
The debate has further advanced with newer, more broad-based evidence in two recent studies. 
Hou, Karolyi, and Kho (HKK, 2011) examine the relative performance of global, local, and what 
they call “international” versions of various multifactor models to explain the returns of industry 
and characteristics-sorted test portfolios in each country. The international versions of their 
models represent a “hybrid” factor structure that includes separately local, country-specific 
factors as well as foreign factors built from stocks outside the country of interest. They find that 
the international versions of these multifactor models have much lower pricing errors than the 
purely local and global versions.28 They recommend that the foreign components of these 
factors are as important as local components for pricing global stocks. Fama and French (2012), 
however, show that a global multi-factor model performs only passably for average returns on 
global size/book-to-market ratios (“B/M” hereafter) and size/momentum portfolios, and it works 
poorly when asked to explain average returns on regional (for North America, Europe, Japan, 
Asia-Pacific) size/B/M or size/momentum portfolios. They test hybrid models following the 
methods in Griffin (2002) and HKK (2011) but find that the improved performance in terms of 
explanatory power and lower pricing errors over the strictly local versions of the model (for 
which they deem the performance only passable) is negligible. 
                                                 
28 HKK (2011) also show that the international version of their proposed multifactor model with the market factor, a 
value factor constructed from cash-flow-to-price ratios, and a momentum factor (following Jegadeesh and Titman, 
1993; Rouwenhorst, 1998; Griffin, Ji, and Martin, 2003; and Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen, 2009) provides 
the lowest average pricing error and rejection rates among various versions of competing multifactor models. 
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In this chapter, we make an important contribution to this debate. We propose and test a new 
multi-factor model based on firm characteristics that builds separate factor portfolios comprised 
of only globally-accessible stocks, which we call “global factors,” and of locally-accessible 
stocks, which we call “local factors.” Our new “hybrid” multi-factor model with both global and 
local factors not only captures strong common variation in global stock returns, but also achieves 
low pricing errors and rejection rates using conventional testing procedures for a variety of 
regional and global test asset portfolios formed on size, value, and momentum. Relative to a 
purely global factor model for global test asset portfolios, the increase in explanatory power is 
substantial and the reduction in average absolute pricing errors can be large; these gains are even 
larger for tests that include microcap stocks, that focus on global test asset portfolios that exclude 
North America and that include a momentum factor in the model. Relative to purely local factor 
models for regional test asset portfolios, the pricing errors and model rejection rates for the 
hybrid model are similar, except for emerging market test asset portfolios for which the hybrid 
model’s pricing errors and rejection rates are much lower. 
Our experiment examines monthly returns for over 37,000 stocks from 46 countries over a two-
decade period. The intuition for this novel multi-factor structure comes from international asset 
pricing models that account for barriers to international investment and from the empirical 
studies that validate them.29 In particular, Errunza and Losq (1985) define a two-country world 
with two sets of securities: all securities traded in the “foreign” market are eligible for 
investment by all investors (“globally accessible”), but those traded in the “domestic” market are 
ineligible and can only be held by domestic investors (“locally accessible”). These restrictions 
                                                 
29 Among many others, we include Stulz (1981), Adler and Dumas (1983), Errunza and Losq (1985), Eun and 
Janakiramanan (1986), Bodurtha (1999), Chaieb and Errunza (2007), and Errunza and Ta (2011), and extensive 
empirical evidence in Harvey (1991), Bekaert and Harvey (1995), Errunza, Hogan, and Hung (1999), de Jong and 
de Roon (2005), Carrieri, Errunza, and Hogan (2007), Pukthuanthong and Roll (2009), Eun, Lai, de Roon, and 
Zhang (2010), and Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and Siegel (2011).  
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define the expected return on one of the ineligible securities as a function of a global market risk 
premium (i.e., a global CAPM) plus a “super risk premium” which is proportional to the 
conditional local market risk. The condition under which local market risk is priced depends on 
the availability of substitute assets that may offer the same diversification opportunities as with 
the ineligible securities. The model can reduce to the two polar cases of full integration or full 
segmentation and, most importantly, allows for intermediate cases in between so that both global 
and local risks can be priced. Though this model is derived in the context of the CAPM, we seek 
to extend the same intuition (without formal theoretical justification) to extra-market factors 
based on firm-specific attributes like size, value and momentum.  
How we define the set of globally-accessible (“eligible”) and locally-accessible (“ineligible”) 
stocks is critical for our exercise. Accessibility, or investability, refers to the ability of global 
investors to access certain markets and securities in those markets, so any definition should 
include consideration of openness (limits on foreign equity holdings), as well as liquidity, size, 
and float at the market and individual security level. We choose to define globally-accessible 
stocks in our equity universe as those for which shares are actively traded in the markets fully 
open to global investors, whether they are listed in their domestic exchange or secondarily cross-
listed on exchanges outside of their main listing in their country of domicile. Locally-accessible 
stocks are, therefore, those that are only traded in their respective home markets.  Again, our 
inspiration for this particular experimental choice comes from extensive research on risk and 
return attributes and institutional features of internationally cross-listed stocks.30 Some studies 
(Foerster and Karolyi, 1993, 1999; Errunza and Miller, 2000) show that the systematic risk 
                                                 
30 Consider, among many others, studies by Foerster and Karolyi (1993, 1999), Bodurtha (1994), Errunza, Hogan, 
and Hung (1999), Errunza and Miller (2000), Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine (2002), Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz 
(2004), Carrieri, Errunza, and Hogan (2007), and Carrieri, Chaieb, and Errunza (2011). Karolyi (2006) provides a 
survey of the cross-listing literature.    
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exposures of these stocks change dramatically and permanently around their secondary listings: 
local market betas (measured relative to local market proxies) decline and foreign market betas 
(measured relative to global market proxies) rise. Newly globally accessible, these cross-listed 
stocks are much more likely to be held and traded by institutional investors around the world 
(Ferreira and Matos, 2008).  
In our hybrid multi-factor model, global factor portfolios for the market, size, value and 
momentum are constructed from globally-accessible stocks, while local factor portfolios for the 
market, size, value and momentum are constructed from locally-accessible stocks that are listed 
and traded only in their home markets.31 The locally-accessible stocks are constructed from 
among the stocks that are not globally accessible in the region in which our model is seeking to 
explain the cross-section of average returns. That is, they include only those that are listed and 
traded in their home markets. This is different from the construction of factors for the 
international models in Griffin (2002), HKK (2011), as we reassign what would be local stocks 
in their local factors to the global factors if those stocks are deemed globally accessible by our 
definition. 
There are, of course, other ways in which stocks can become globally accessible, such as being 
included in a closed-end country fund, or in one of Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
or Standard & Poor’s (S&P) global indexes (especially, in their investable indexes for emerging 
markets). Indeed, if they do not face insurmountable or costly foreign investment restrictions that 
preclude them from doing so, many institutions do hold shares of foreign stocks in their home 
                                                 
31 We will define the globally accessible set to include stocks that secondarily cross-list their shares on one of seven 
different target markets: the U.S. on one of the major exchanges, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) or Nasdaq, or on the over-the-counter (OTC) markets, the U.K. on the London Stock 
Exchange, London OTC, or SEAQ International, Euronext Europe, Germany, Luxembourg, Singapore, or Hong 
Kong. We later discuss the rationale behind this set of target markets. 
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markets even if they are not secondarily cross-listed elsewhere. Though narrow in its definition, 
we prefer to consider only those stocks in fully-open markets and among secondary cross-listings 
for our globally-accessible set because of clear identification as well as the timing of the listing 
event. We also explore the robustness of our findings to several alternative definitions of global 
accessibility, such as additional restrictions that account for how actively the cross-listed shares 
are traded. 
Our study differs from that of Fama and French (2012) in that we incorporate into our analysis 
more than 11,000 stocks from 23 emerging markets. In fact, we include the emerging markets as 
one of the regions in which we evaluate how well our hybrid multi-factor model performs for 
size, value, and momentum test asset portfolios. Expanding our analysis into emerging markets is 
important because it is there that investability restrictions are most likely to bind. We expect that 
this is where a global or hybrid model is likely to face the greater challenge relative to a purely-
local factor model. It turns out that this is the case, but our hybrid model also performs well in 
developed markets. Like Fama and French (2012), we provide evidence for size groups. Our 
sample, like theirs, covers all size groups, and indeed very small, microcap stocks produce 
challenging results (Fama and French, 2008). We control for the potential influence of microcap 
stocks globally and in each region by performing our tests with and without the extremely-small 
test asset portfolios and also by building the factor portfolios using value and momentum 
breakpoints using the top 90% of market capitalization in each region to limit their influence.  
 
3.2 The Design of the Experiment 
Fama and French (1993) propose a three-factor model to capture the patterns in U.S. average 
returns associated with size and value versus growth,  
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Rit – Rft = αi + βi (Rmt – Rft) + si FSize,t + hi FB/M,t + εi,t    (1) 
In this regression, Rit  is the return on asset i in month t, Rf is the risk free rate, Rmt is the market 
return, FSize,t is the difference between the returns of diversified portfolios of small stocks and big 
stocks (F denotes a factor portfolio), and FB/M,t is the difference between the returns on 
diversified portfolios of high B/M (value) stocks and low B/M (growth) stocks. Model (1) is 
motivated by observed patterns in returns and the authors (Fama and French), as well as those of 
us who follow their lead, readily acknowledge that they try to capture the cross-section of 
expected returns without specifying the underlying economic model that governs asset pricing. 
The null hypothesis is that the slope coefficients (𝛽𝑖, si, hi) and the associated factor portfolio 
returns capture the cross-section of returns, so we test whether the intercepts equal zero for all 
test assets. This test is akin to the mean-variance spanning tests of Huberman and Kandel (1987). 
For a given set of test asset portfolios, we judge each model based on its explanatory power, the 
magnitude of model pricing errors (the absolute magnitude of the intercepts), and the Gibbons, 
Ross, and Shanken (GRS, 1989) F-test statistic for the hypothesis that the intercepts are jointly 
equal to zero across the test assets of interest. We also follow Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken 
(2010) by computing the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) cross-sectional regression (CSR) R2 
and a core component of the GRS statistic, denoted SR(α),  
 SR(α) = [α’S-1α]1/2         (2) 
where α is the vector of regression intercepts produced by Model (1) across a set of test asset 
portfolios. S is the covariance matrix of regression residuals.32  
Fama and French (2012) build the global and local versions of model (1) for global and local 
                                                 
32 Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) relate SR(α)2 to the difference between the square of the maximum Sharpe 
ratio for the portfolios constructed from the test asset portfolios and factor portfolios and that constructed from the 
factor portfolios alone. As Fama and French (2011) argue, the advantage of this statistic is that it combines the 
regression intercepts with a measure of their precision captured by the covariance matrix of the regression 
residuals. 
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stock returns, respectively: 
Rit – Rft = αGi + βGi (RGmt – Rft) + sGi FGSize,t + hGi FGB/M,t + εi,t   (3a) 
Rit – Rft = αLi + βLi (RLmt – Rft) + sLi FLSize,t + hLi FLB/M,t + εi,t.   (3b) 
The superscript “G” on the market and factor portfolios implies that they are constructed from all 
stocks around the world and the superscript designation of “L” on the market and factor 
portfolios implies that they are constructed only from local - or regional, in our experiments - 
stocks. Extending the experiment in this way is naturally complicated by the fact that asset 
pricing globally or even in a particular region may not be fully integrated.  
To capture the impact of investability restrictions on global investing, we propose a new hybrid 
model based on the Fama-French three-factor model,  
Rit – Rft = αHi + βAi (RAmt – Rft) + sAi FASize,t + hAi FAB/M,t  
                      + β Ā- Ai R Ā- Amt + s Ā- Ai F Ā- ASize,t + h Ā- Ai F Ā- AB/M,t + εi,t, 
 (4) 
where the superscript “H” denotes the intercept for the hybrid model, the superscript “A” denotes 
a market or factor portfolio comprised of stocks only in the globally-accessible sample, and the 
superscript “Ā-A” denotes a spread factor portfolio that consists of a long position in purely-
local stocks in a given region (represented by “Ā”) and a short position in the globally-accessible 
sample (“A”). The spread factor portfolio is built in the spirit of a “hedged portfolio” in Errunza 
and Losq (1985). For example, F Ā- ASize,t is the difference between the size-based factor portfolio 
of purely-local stocks in a region and that of the globally-accessible stocks. Each of the size-
based factor portfolios are constructed as returns of diversified portfolios of small stocks and big 
stocks among the respective samples of stocks. The spread portfolios for the market factor (R Ā- 
A
mt) and the value-based factor (F
 Ā- A
B/M,t) are built in a similar fashion.  
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Our second experiment examines whether the empirical validity of the hybrid model is 
influenced by the purely mechanical way in which we construct the globally-accessible and 
purely-local subsamples. We adjust the investment opportunity set by gradually imposing a 
variety of “viability constraints” on the globally accessible sample. That is, we require that the 
stocks in the globally accessible sample qualify by meeting certain minimum thresholds of 
trading volume in the target markets for the secondary cross-listing. In comparing the 
performance of the hybrid model in which the global factors are built in different ways, we still 
find reliable evidence about the explanatory power of the hybrid model in explaining returns in 
both global and regional test asset portfolios.  
In our third and final experiment, we investigate whether the cross-sectional explanatory power 
of the hybrid model is specific to the Fama-French three-factor model in explaining the 
portfolios sorts on size and B/M. Carhart (1997) proposes a four-factor model for U.S. return in 
order to capture momentum,  
Rit – Rft = αi + βi (Rmt – Rft) + si FSize,t + hi FB/M,t + mi FMom,t + εi,t,   (5) 
which is Model (1) enhanced with a momentum return, FMom,t is the difference between the 
month t returns on a diversified portfolios of the winners and losers of the past year. Similarly, 
we test a hybrid model based on the Carhart’s four-factor model,  
Rit – Rft = αHi + βAi (RAmt – Rft) + sAi FASize,t + hAi FAB/M,t+ mAi FAMom,t  
                     + β Ā- Ai R Ā- Amt + s Ā- Ai F Ā- ASize,t + h Ā- Ai F Ā- AB/M,t + mĀ- Ai FĀ- AMom,t + 
εi,t    (6) 
which is Model (4) extended by two momentum factor portfolio returns, FAMom,t for the globally-
accessible stocks and FĀ- AMom,t, for the spread portfolio of locally-accessible stocks net of those 
for the globally-accessible stocks.  
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3.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
3.3.1 The Global Equity Universe 
We obtain U.S. dollar-denominated stock returns and accounting data from Datastream and 
Worldscope. To ensure that we have a reasonable number of firm-level observations in each 
country, the sample period begins in November 1989 and ends in December 2010, which 
encompasses the widest coverage in the Worldscope database. Our final sample of the global 
equity universe includes 37,399 stocks from 46 countries. To ensure that there are sufficient 
numbers of stocks in each test asset portfolio, as in Fama and French (2012), 23 developed 
markets are combined into four regions: (i) North America (NA), including the U.S. and Canada; 
(ii) Japan; (iii) Asia Pacific, including Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, and Singapore (but 
not Japan); and (iv) Europe, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
U.K. And the remaining 23 countries are combined into Emerging Markets, the fifth region in 
our tests; it includes Israel, Turkey, Pakistan, South Africa, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, 
Russia, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. We construct test asset 
portfolios for each of these five regions and for four global experiments: all global markets, 
developed markets, global markets excluding North America, and developed markets excluding 
North America. 
We require each firm’s home country to be clearly identified in the database. Financial firms are 
excluded from the study due to their different characteristics. We also exclude depositary 
receipts (DRs), real estate investment trusts (REITs), preferred stocks, and other stocks with 
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special features.33 For most countries, we restrict the sample to stocks from major exchanges, 
which we define as the exchanges on which the majority of stocks in that country are listed. 
However, multiple exchanges are included in samples for China (Shanghai Stock Exchange and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange), Japan (Osaka Stock Exchange, Tokyo Stock Exchange, and 
JASDAQ), Russia (MICEX and Russian Trading System), South Korea (Korea Stock Exchange 
and KOSDAQ), Canada (Toronto Stock Exchange and TSX Ventures Exchange), and 
U.S.(NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ). To limit the effect of survivorship bias, we include dead 
stocks in the sample. 
To reduce errors in Datastream, we follow several screening procedures for monthly returns as 
suggested by Ince and Porter (2003) and HKK (2011). First, any return above 300% that is 
reversed within one month is set to missing. Specifically, if Rt or Rt-1 is greater than 300%, and if 
(1+ Rt) × (1+ Rt-1) - 1 ≤ 50%, then both Rt and Rt-1 are set to missing. Second, in order to 
exclude remaining outliers in returns that cannot be identified as stock splits or mergers, we treat 
as missing the monthly returns that fall out of the 0.1% and 99.9% percentile ranges in each 
country. Third, included firms are required to have at least 12 monthly returns during the sample 
period. 
Additionally, we require the availability of the following financial variables for at least one firm-
year observation: market value of equity (“Size” hereafter), B/M, and cash flow to price (“C/P” 
hereafter). To make sure that the accounting ratios are known before the returns, we match the 
financial statement data for fiscal year-end in year t-1 with monthly returns from July of year t to 
                                                 
33 We drop stocks with name including “REIT”, “REAL EST”, “GDR”, “PF”, “PREF”, or “PRF” as these terms 
may represent REITs, GDRs, or preferred stocks. We drop stocks with name including “ADS”, 
“CERTIFICATES”, “RESPT”, “Rights”, “Paid in”, “UNIT”, and a host of others due to various special features. 
A number of additional country-specific screening rules are applied, a list of which can be obtained from the 
authors. 
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June of year t+1. We take the inverse of the price-to-book ratio (WC09304) and the price-to-cash 
flow ratio (WC09604) to calculate the ratios of B/M and C/P, respectively. We do not use 
negative B/M (or C/P) stocks when calculating the breakpoints for B/M (or C/P) or when 
forming the size/B/M (or size/C/P) portfolios. 
Figure 3.1 exhibits the distribution of our global equity universe across regions over the period 
from 1990 to 2010, reported by total market capitalization. On average, North America, Europe, 
Japan, Asia Pacific, and the Emerging Markets account for 43.13%, 25.50%, 13.44%, 4.45%, 
and 13.49% of global market capitalization. Figure 3.2 offers a slightly different picture based on 
the total number of stocks. North America constitutes one-quarter of the sample population, 
higher than Europe (23.08%), Japan (11.50%), and Asia Pacific (10.47%) but lower than the 
Emerging Markets (29.72%).  Proportionally more large-cap stocks are concentrated in North 
America, especially the U.S. In contrast, proportionally more of the stocks from Asia Pacific and 
Emerging Markets are small cap stocks. In addition, Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of our 
global equity universe across countries within each region. Among the countries in Europe, the 
average size of stocks in the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland are larger than those in Greece, 
Sweden, and the U.K. Hong Kong accounts for 40.62% of all market capitalization in Asia 
Pacific but only constitutes 24.96% of the sample population in the region. Most of the stocks in 
Emerging Markets are from Asia, either by count or by total market capitalization. The average 
size of stocks varies substantially across emerging market countries, with greater values for 
Mexico, Brazil, Russia, and China.  
Figure 3.3 shows the sample over time and breaks it down by regions. There are some 
differences in the evolution of counts and total market capitalization. The counts steadily 
increase from around 10,000 in 1990 to a peak of almost 28,000 in 2008. Especially, the count in 
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Emerging Markets has jumped from less than 2,000 in 1990 to nearly 9,500 in 2009. In contrast 
to these counts, global market capitalization has less steady growth. It rises from US$7 trillion in 
1990 to a peak of US$26 trillion in 2000. It falls after 2000 before reaching another peak of 
almost US$40 trillion in 2007. In the most recent two years, it rises again to reach US$34 trillion 
in 2010.  
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics of total counts and other firm-level characteristics for each 
country. We report the time-series averages of median size, B/M, C/P, and momentum (“Mom” 
hereafter). There is considerable cross-country variation in the average median B/M, but much 
less for C/P. Mom for month t is the cumulative return for t-11 to t-1, skipping the sort month t. 
The first momentum sort absorbs one year of data, so the sample period for Mom is November 
1990 through December 2010. Among all the countries in our sample, Mom ranges from a low 
of -2.19% (Japan) to highs of 40.97% (Poland), 37.17% (Russia), and 26.48% (China).  
 
3.3.2 The Globally-Accessible and Purely-Local Samples  
We categorize stocks into two subsets based on accessibility or investability constraints as 
defined by whether or not the stock is actively traded in the markets fully open to global 
investors. Ultimately, we identify a set of over 5,700 stocks accessible to global investors by 
being cross-listed in major developed markets; another group of around 32,000 individual stocks 
are locally accessible to domestic investors. We acknowledge that previous studies have used 
global industry portfolios, closed-end country funds, and the investable indices in emerging 
markets as globally-accessible assets used to replicate returns on only locally accessible assets 
(e.g., Bekaert and Urias, 1996; Carrieri, Chaieb and Errunza, 2008, 2011; Errunza and Ta, 2011). 
In this study, by contrast, we focus on the impact of the market openness and the secondary 
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cross-listing on the size, value, and momentum patterns in international stock returns to keep the 
accessibility criteria as transparent as possible.  
We require that the stocks in the globally accessible sample need to be listed in the markets 
which are fully open to global investors or to be secondarily cross-listed in those as target 
markets. Within those target markets, we include secondary listings from overseas that can trade 
on many different venues or platforms. We confine the list to seven target markets: (i) the U.S., 
which includes NYSE/AMEX, NASDAQ, and the Non-NASDAQ OTC markets;34 (ii) the U.K., 
which includes the London Stock Exchange, London OTC Exchange, London Plus Market, and 
SEAQ International;35 (iii) Europe, which includes Euronext at Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, 
Paris, and EASDAQ;36 (iv) Germany in which the Frankfurt Stock Exchange is located; (v) 
Luxembourg in which the Luxembourg Stock Exchange is located; (vi) Singapore, which 
includes the Singapore Stock Exchange, Singapore OTC Capital, and Singapore Catalist;37 and 
(vii) Hong Kong in which the Hong Kong Stock Exchange is located. The distinguishing feature 
of these target exchanges is that they are fully open to global investors, having minimum foreign 
investment restrictions and reasonably active trading in foreign cross-listed issues. We try to 
strike a balance between obtaining maximum breadth of stock exchange platforms accessible for 
international investors and avoiding problems related to differences in cross-listing trading 
                                                 
34 Non-Nasdaq OTC markets include both the OTC Bulletin Board and the OTC Markets Group, for which its 
OTCQX International trading platform is designed for listings from overseas. 
35 The London Plus Stock Exchange (www.plusmarketsgroup.com) is a London-based stock exchange providing 
cash trading and listing services under the auspices of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(2004/39/EC, “MiFiD”), a European Union law providing for harmonized investment services. London OTC 
trading falls under the auspices of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) Group and is done under MiFiD with the 
exchange furnishing trade reporting and publication services. The Stock Exchange Automated Quotation (SEAQ) 
International is the LSE’s electronic price quotations system for non-U.K. securities. 
36 EASDAQ was an electronic securities exchange based in Brussels founded originally as an equivalent to Nasdaq, 
was purchased by the American Stock Exchange in 2001 and then shut down in 2003. 
37 See www.sgx.com for details on main board versus Catalist listing requirements. A listing applicant must be 
sponsored by an approved sponsor of Catalist and must satisfy some disclosure and performance requirements. 
Singapore’s OTC Capital (www.otccapital.com) is an unaffiliated trading platform for unlisted public companies. 
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mechanisms and conventions. For the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and OTCQX International 
trading platforms, for example, there are “unregulated” cross-listed stocks alongside the 
“regulated” cross-listed stocks, in which trading takes place without the sponsorship of the 
company.38 We include both unregulated and regulated cross-listings in Frankfurt and OTCQX 
International. 
The appendix describes the procedure for constructing the sample of globally accessible stocks. 
Our sample construction begins with all non-domestic stocks listed in the target exchanges. From 
the list containing over 30,000 stocks, we select those with available records of home market and 
a parent code in the database so that the cross-listed stocks in the target exchanges can be 
matched with their parent stocks listed in the home market. Because there are a few mismatches 
in Datastream, we verify the matching records. We correct the mismatched records for the cross-
listed stocks if their true parent equities can be found in the global universe sample, keep those 
that have no parent equities but are only listed on the target exchanges, and drop those whose 
true parent equities are missing in the database. To ensure the validity of the sample, we drop the 
stocks whose Return Index (RI) records are not available in the database.39 Furthermore, if one 
stock is cross-listed on more than one target exchange within the same target market, these 
multiple records are consolidated into one record. The sample at this point contains 22,612 
stocks. Similar to the global equity universe, we exclude financial firms and confine the sample 
to firms from 46 countries and with available company account items from Worldscope. We then 
have 11,319 stocks secondarily cross-listed on at least one of the target markets. We then add 
                                                 
38 If a company is already listed on an approved foreign stock exchange (“Like Exchanges”), it is exempt from the 
primary registration rules and can be dual listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange without an underwriter. There 
are over 200 such “Like Exchanges” approved by the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (www.franfurtstockexchange.de).  
39 To limit the effect of survivorship bias, we include dead stocks in the sample. For both dead and active stocks, we 
confirm their effective ending months according to two criteria: (i) consecutive constant RIs from the month until 
the end of the period, December 2010; and, (ii) zero trading volume from the month until the end of the period. If 
one stock has the same month for its base month and ending month, the stock is excluded from the sample. 
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domestic stocks from the seven target markets as long as three criteria are satisfied: they are 
among those stocks in the top 75% of market capitalization for the market; they have a minimum 
price of U.S. $5 and equivalent levels in terms of percentile rank for non U.S. markets; and, they 
are among those stocks with a minimum 75% public float for listed stocks. These filters leave a 
sample of 11,057 stocks which we label as “CL1” to denote the first group of cross-listed stocks. 
To construct our final sample, we impose additional restrictions on how actively the secondarily 
cross-listed shares are traded, which we call our “viability” constraints. We only drop the cross-
listed stocks for which trading in the target markets is too limited to be viably accessible for 
global investors. For each secondarily cross-listed stock in CL1, we compare (a) its monthly 
trading in the target markets with the total trading of all secondarily cross-listed stocks from the 
same country (using VA, turnover by value, from Datastream) and (b) its monthly trading 
volume (VO, turnover by volume, from Datastream) in the target markets relative to that of the 
same stock in the home market.  The first viability constraint evaluates the annual percentage of 
its trading in target markets relative to all secondarily cross-listed stocks from the same country 
trading there. If the time-series average of the annual percentages during the sample period is 
required to be at least 0.5%, there are nearly 900 stocks that qualify, many of which are the most 
popularly traded stocks for global investors. For the stocks that fail to meet our first viability 
criterion, we use a second one based on the annual percentage of its own global trading volume 
in any of the target markets (Baruch, Karolyi, & Lemmon, 2007). If the time-series average of 
these annual percentages during the sample period is required to be at least 0.1%, there are 
around 5,300 stocks left in the sample. Merging these two cross-listed sets of stocks and 
qualified domestic set of stocks from the target markets leaves 5,747 stocks, which we call the 
"Main CL Sample."  
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Figure 3.4 presents its distribution across regions over the period from 1990 to 2010, reported by 
total market capitalization. On average, North America (47.66%) and Europe (29.56%) 
constitutes the bulk of the total market capitalization in the Main CL Sample, followed by Japan 
(10.50%), the Emerging Markets (8.49%), and Asia Pacific (3.79%). The cross-listed stocks 
constitute a significant fraction of the overall market capitalization in each home region 
(compare with Figure 3.1). By count, North America, Europe, Japan, Asia Pacific, and Emerging 
Markets represent 44.95%, 23.56%, 3.43%, 13.66%, and 14.41% of the sample population, 
respectively (shown in Figure 3.5). Figures 4 and 5 also exhibit the distribution of Main CL 
Sample stocks across countries within each region. In Europe, stocks from France, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland are more likely to have shares secondarily cross-listed overseas but 
stocks from Austria, Greece, and the U.K. tend to stay in their home markets. In Asia Pacific, 
Hong Kong stocks are over-represented in the Main CL Sample relative to the global equity 
universe. Among emerging market countries, equities from China, India, and Taiwan are more 
likely to stay at home. On the other hand, equities from Russia, Mexico, and South Africa tend to 
go abroad.  
Figure 3.6 illustrates the total market capitalization and the total number of the globally 
accessible sample, represented by the Main CL Sample, and breaks them down by regions and 
by year. The total count increases from less than 1,000 in the early 1990s to a peak of 4,123 in 
2009 and then falls to 4,088 in 2010. In contrast to the counts, total market capitalization, as well 
as the market capitalizations from each region, has experienced more volatility over the period, 
reaching peaks in 2000 and 2007. 
Figure 3.6 also shows the distribution of Main CL stocks by each target market and by year. 
Most notably, the U.S. as a target market for internationally cross-listed stocks is more resilient 
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than those in the U.K., Europe, and Germany, either by count or by market capitalization. 
Annual counts in the U.K. reach a peak of 670 in 2007 and decrease steadily to 347 in 2010. For 
Europe, the number of cross-listed stocks never goes up above 450 and it decreases steadily from 
450 in 2001 to 261 in 2010. For the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, the annual count increases 
significantly from less than 270 in the early 1990s to 2,917 in 2008, but it falls during the most 
recent two years until down to 2,845 in 2010. Distinct from these markets, NYSE/AMEX, 
Nasdaq and the Non-Nasdaq OTC markets have attracted more foreign stocks cross-listed. Even 
after the 2008 financial crisis, the count is steadily rising from 2,087 in 2007 to 2,529 in 2010 
(Iliev, Miller, and Roth, 2011). Although all target markets have shrunk in size around 2008, the 
cross-listed market capitalization in the U.S. drops by 28.01% from 2007 to 2009, much less than 
the 61.09% in the U.K., 48.31% in Europe, and 30.66% in Germany.  
In addition to the Main CL Sample, we construct and evaluate two other definitions for the 
globally accessible sample, together with CL1, to ensure the reliability of the hybrid model we 
propose. First, we introduce an absolute viability constraint: for each stock in CL1 in a given 
year, if there is at least one month of non-zero trading in the target markets, the stock is included 
in the globally accessible sample for that year. The resulting sample has 9,605 stocks and is 
labeled “CL2a.” Second, we consider more stringent screening on the two viability constraints: 
the screening ratios are up to 5% for the first relative viability constraint and 1% for the second 
one. Another new sample, denoted “CL2b,” then contains 4,058 stocks. For each globally 
accessible sample, we group the stocks left in each respective region as the purely local set. 
Summary statistics on total counts and firm-level characteristics for the Main CL Sample are 
provided in Appendix Tables 1 and 2 (appendix tables are available upon request).  
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3.4 Building Factor Portfolios and Test Assets 
We follow Fama and French (1993, 2012) in constructing proxy factors as returns on zero-
investment portfolios that go long in stocks with high values of a characteristic and short in 
stocks with low values of the characteristic. These factors are explanatory returns in our asset 
pricing regression models. We also construct 5×5 size/B/M portfolios, the 5×5 size/momentum 
portfolios, and the 5×5 size/C/P portfolios that are used as test assets in our tests.  
 
3.4.1 Building Factor Portfolios 
Our first asset pricing tests are for 5×5 size/B/M portfolios and the explanatory returns 
are for 2×3 portfolios sorted on size and B/M. At the end of each June from 1990 to 2010, we 
allocate stocks in one region to two size groups – small stocks and big stocks. Big stocks are 
those in the top 90% of market capitalization for the region, and small stocks are those in the 
bottom 10%. The only difference between our sorting breakpoints and those of Fama and French 
(2012) is related to the B/M breakpoints. Fama and French (2012) use the 30th and 70th 
percentiles of B/M for the big stocks in each given region to avoid too much weight on micro-
cap stocks. Value stocks are those with B/M ratios at or above the 70th percentile, growth stocks, 
those with B/M ratios at or below the 30th percentile, and the rest are neutral stocks. However, 
there are still differences in terms of accounting rule across countries within any one region. 
Given the fact that our globally accessible stocks are more likely to accept global standards for 
reporting that can be comparable across countries, we use B/M breakpoints based on the big 
stocks in the globally accessible sample from each region to avoid sorts that are dominated by 
the less comparable and tiny stocks in the region.  
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The global explanatory returns are constructed from the globally accessible sample. We use a 
universal size breakpoint, but use each region’s B/M breakpoints to allocate the globally 
accessible stocks. Beyond the global factor returns, the hybrid model includes local factor returns 
that are based on the purely local stocks from the region for which the test is performed relative 
to the globally accessible stocks. Fama and French (2008, 2012) document that microcap stocks 
pose a challenge for asset pricing models and suggest factor returns should not be dominated by 
small stocks. Small stocks constitute the major component of the purely local samples. So, if the 
size breakpoint is the bottom 10th percentile of market capitalization of the purely local sample 
for each region, either the size factor or the value factor will be dominated by small stocks. Thus 
we use regional size cutoffs for the purely local portfolios. In addition, we adopt the same 
regional B/M breaks as in the globally accessible portfolios to avoid the microcap effect. Then, 
for each given region, the return spread factor portfolios of purely-local stocks relative to the 
globally-accessible stocks are the differences in the respective factor portfolio returns for the set 
of purely-local stocks in the region and for the globally-accessible stocks. For example, for the 
size-related spread factor portfolio, we compute the return difference between the factor portfolio 
for the locally-accessible stocks (measured, in turn, as the difference between an equally-
weighted average of the small-growth, small-neutral, and small-value portfolios and an equally-
weighted average of the big-growth, big-neutral, and big-value portfolios) and the globally-
accessible stocks (measured similarly). The value- and momentum-related spread factor 
portfolios are built in the same way. The spread factor portfolios vary by region because the set 
of locally-accessible stocks from which they are built changes. 
Another set of explanatory returns are 2×3 factor portfolios returns sorted on size and 
momentum, which will be introduced in our second asset pricing tests on size/momentum 
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portfolios. The momentum factor, WML, is formed using a 12-month/2-month strategy where 
each month’s return is the average return on the two high prior return portfolios minus the 
average return on the two low prior return portfolios. Similar to the size/B/M portfolios, the 
momentum breakpoints for the global explanatory returns are the 30th and 70th percentiles for the 
big stocks in the globally accessible sample from each region. And we use the regional 
momentum cutoffs based on big stocks for the given region when forming local explanatory 
returns. The momentum breakpoints from each region are employed in forming global portfolios. 
In our third set of tests on size/C/P portfolios, we build the set of explanatory returns that are for 
2×3 portfolios sorted on size and C/P. The explanatory return associated with C/P is constructed 
by the same way as HML.  
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for factor portfolio returns for all stocks in the equity 
universe, for the globally-accessible stocks and for the spread factor portfolios of locally-
accessible relative to the globally-accessible stocks; they are reported separately for the global 
experiments (Panel A) and the regional experiments (Panel B). The market excess returns are 
similar in magnitude in North America and Europe, but higher for the globally-accessible 
samples in three other regions and all four global experiments. The size premiums are always 
higher for the globally accessible samples everywhere likely because of the wider differences in 
size across regions than within regions. On the other hand, higher value premiums obtain for all 
stocks than either the globally- or locally-accessible subsets regardless of the region. In addition, 
Table 3.2 displays summary statistics for the local spread factor returns for each regional and 
global experiment. There are positive local market spread premiums in North America and Asia 
Pacific, but negative local market spread discounts in Europe, Japan and Emerging Markets. The 
global value spread premium, a respectable 0.40% (for B/M) and 0.44% (for C/P) on average per 
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month, is statistically reliably different from zero over the sample period. For other global and 
most of the regional experiments, the value spread factor portfolio returns are also positive and 
statistically significant. As for momentum spread factor portfolio returns, that in Japan is as low 
as -0.96% per month (t statistic of -3.02), while that in Europe is as high as 0.35% (t statistic of 
1.90). The correlations (unreported, but available in Appendix Tables 3 and 4) between the 
spread factor portfolio returns and the respective factor portfolios for the globally-accessible are, 
as expected, relatively low, whether for the global or regional experiments and for the size-, 
value- and momentum-related factors. 
 
3.4.2 Building Test Assets 
Our first set of asset pricing tests evaluates 5×5 size/B/M portfolios. The size breakpoints for a 
region are the 3rd, 7th, 13th, and 25th percentiles of the region’s aggregate market capitalization. 
The B/M breakpoints are defined by the 20th, 40th, 60th, and 80th percentiles for big stocks in the 
region. Table 3.3 displays the average excess returns and standard deviations for each set of 5×5 
size/B/M test assets by global and regional experiment. Our results confirm the finding in Fama 
and French (2012) that the size pattern in value premiums poses a challenge for asset pricing 
models. The next two test assets are 5×5 size/momentum portfolios and 5×5 size/C/P portfolios. 
For the sake of brevity, average excess returns for these two types of test asset portfolios are 
reported in Appendix Tables 5 and 6.  
 
3.5 Time-Series Regression Tests 
Our first experiment involves time-series regression tests, as applied by Fama and French (1993, 
1996, and 2012) and others, in which test assets are 5×5 size/B/M portfolios. We compare the 
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performance of global, local, and hybrid versions of the Fama-French three-factor model. Our 
criteria for success consist of the explanatory power (average adjusted R2 across the test asset 
portfolios), the GRS statistic, the Sharpe Ratio, SR(𝛼), the GLS CSR R2, and summary statistics 
for the intercepts, including the difference between the highest and lowest regression intercepts 
(“H-L α”) and the average absolute intercepts (“|α|”).40 
 
3.5.1 Main Experiment 
Table 3.4 reports regressions to explain excess returns on the 5×5 portfolios from the sorts on 
size and B/M. Appendix Tables 7 and 8  furnish details on the intercepts and their t-statistics, as 
well as the betas for the hybrid model based on the Fama-French three-factor model. Panel A of 
Table 3.4 summarizes the results for the global version of the Fama-French three-factor model. 
The global factor model offers adequate explanatory power for the global test asset portfolios, 
but fares poorly for the returns on regional size/B/M test asset portfolios. The average R2 is 0.92 
for the global portfolios, but it is lower (only 0.83) if North America is excluded. Among the five 
regional tests asset portfolios, the average R2 reaches only as high of 0.72 for Europe and is as 
low as 0.32 for Japan. The GRS statistics for the Global portfolios (3.12 and 2.67, for Developed 
Markets only) are well into the right tail of the relevant F-distribution and the average absolute 
intercepts average 0.16% per month.  
Part of the reason for the model rejections may arise from the poor explanatory power of the 
regressions, as we see that the GRS statistics for the Global portfolios excluding North America 
are much lower (1.27 overall, 1.58 for Developed Markets only). For the regional test asset 
                                                 
40 Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2011) recommend also reporting the GLS cross-sectional R2 in second-pass 
regressions of average returns on beta loadings. It has the advantage of not only accounting for cross-correlation in 
residuals across test asset portfolios but also offering an interpretation as the distance from the minimum-variance 
boundary of the maximally-correlated combination of factor-mimicking portfolios.   
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portfolios, however, we have not only poor explanatory power, but also high GRS statistics 
beyond the 99th percentile of the F-distribution (except for Japan and the Emerging Markets). 
Another possible reason for the high model rejection rates is the presence of extremely small 
stocks. In a separate part of Panel A, we also present the same statistics for only the 4×5 global 
test asset portfolios, excluding the five in the smallest size quintile. There is modest 
improvement in average R2 but the GRS statistics and their Sharpe ratio (SR(α)) core components 
are much lower.   
Panel B of Table 3.4 reports results for the regressions of the purely local factor model in 
explaining excess returns on just the five regional test asset portfolios. The local three-factor 
model works well in Japan and Europe. Despite the fact that the GRS tests reject North America 
and Asia Pacific at the 99th percentile of the F-distribution, the purely local factor model 
performs better than the purely global factor model in all experiments, pushing up the average 
R2s and lowering the average absolute intercepts. The microcap stocks in North America are still 
a challenge for the models; the GRS statistic without them is only 1.57, but then it rises to 2.12 if 
microcap stocks are included, which would constitute a rejection at the 99% level. For Emerging 
Markets, the purely local factor model works well if only judged by the GRS test. However, 
without a presumption of integrated pricing in the region, the power loss is significant with an 
average R2 of only 0.65. The poor performance of the purely local factor model makes it useless 
for an application for which the focus is on emerging markets.  
To now, we have re-established several key inferences from Fama and French (2012) for the 
three-factor model. Panel C of Table 3.4 presents the results of the new hybrid version of the 
Fama-French three-factor model. Our hybrid model works distinctly better than the purely global 
factor model for global test asset portfolio experiments. All the average R2s are over 0.89 or even 
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higher, with and without microcap stocks. The average absolute intercepts for all the four global 
test asset portfolios are 0.14% or less, without microcap stocks, and 0.15% or less, with microcap 
stocks included. The Sharpe ratios, SR(α), for the intercepts drop for all four of the experiments. 
Consider, for example, that for the Global portfolios, the GRS statistic falls from 3.12 for the 
purely global factor model to 1.55 for the hybrid model. Excluding the microcap stocks, the 
hybrid model achieves yet a smaller GRS statistic, 0.92, below the 90th percentile of the relevant 
F-distribution. In terms of the CSR R2, the hybrid model reaches 0.46, higher than 0.21 for the 
global factor model. And when microcap stocks are excluded, it yields a much higher level of 
0.67, compared with 0.20 for the purely global factor model.41 For the Developed Markets 
portfolios, shifting to the hybrid model pushes the average R2 from 0.90 up to 0.95 without 
microcap stocks and from 0.89 to 0.95 with microcap stocks. It also lowers the average absolute 
intercepts and the GRS statistics. Diagnostics shown only in Appendix Table 7 (available upon 
request) illustrates that the only two remaining statistically significant intercepts all fall within 
the set of the smallest five quintile portfolios.  
The improved performance from the hybrid model is more notable when we turn to the 
regressions on the Global and Developed Markets test asset portfolios excluding North America. 
For the Global portfolios excluding North America, the hybrid model improves upon the 
performance of the global factor model in explaining the average excess returns, lifting the 
average R2s from 0.83 to 0.90 without microcap stocks and from 0.83 to 0.89 with microcap 
stocks, shrinking the average absolute intercepts from 0.25% to 0.14% without microcap stocks 
and from 0.24% to 0.15% with microcap stocks. In addition, the GRS statistics fall to 0.81 
without microcap stocks and 1.10 with microcap stocks, and neither of them leads to the 
                                                 
41 We also apply the model comparison tests proposed by Kan, Robotti and Shanken (2012) and the results show 
that the hybrid model outperforms the purely global model at the 10% level when microcap stocks are excluded.  
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rejection of model at conventional cutoff criteria. The hybrid model produces an even greater 
improvement over the purely global factor model when it is challenged to explain the average 
returns on the Developed Markets portfolios excluding North America. When microcap stocks 
are dropped, the average R2 rises from 0.78 for the global factor model to 0.94 for the hybrid 
model, the cross-sectional R2 goes up from 0.36 to 0.61, the average absolute intercept drops 
from 0.35% to 0.07%, the Sharpe ratio falls from 0.38 to 0.29, and the GRS is only 0.76. Even 
with microcap stocks, the hybrid model still performs well, improving on the purely global factor 
model by any of the evaluation criteria. In sum, the hybrid model is quite successful in capturing 
average returns on global portfolios.  
For the regional test asset portfolios, the hybrid model and the purely local factor model produce 
similar regression fits. In Europe, Asia Pacific, and Japan, the average absolute intercepts for the 
hybrid model are close to those for the purely local factor model, and there are no significant 
differences in terms of the Sharpe ratio and the GRS statistic. In the Emerging Markets test, 
however, the hybrid model works better than the purely local factor model in shrinking the 
average absolute intercepts. Without microcap stocks, the average absolute intercept for the 
purely local factor model is 0.42%, which is much higher than that for the hybrid model of 
0.18%. With microcap stocks, if the purely local factor model is replaced by the hybrid model, 
the average absolute intercept falls by more than half, from 0.43% to 0.23% per month. The 
superior performance of the hybrid model in the Emerging Markets is likely due to the hybrid 
model’s introduction of an important feature: the dependence of emerging markets on developed 
markets. Indeed, in Appendix Table 8 (available upon request), the betas for the test asset 
portfolios in the Emerging Markets on the market, size, and value factor portfolios for the 
globally-accessible set are economically large and usually statistically important. The only 
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exception is the North America experiment: the GRS statistics rise to 2.20 without microcap 
stocks and 2.66 with microcap stocks, both implying a rejection of the model. The poor 
performance is due to the first five years of our sample, 1991-1995. Given the somewhat slower 
pace of globalization during the earlier period, not only stocks from Europe were less correlated 
with stocks from North America, but also the correlation between Japanese stock markets and 
America stock markets was as low as just 15%. What appears to be the problem is the greater 
representation of large-cap stocks from four regions outside North America in the globally-
accessible sample, which adversely affects the performance of the global market factor in the 
hybrid model (Appendix Table 8). When the first five years are excluded, the hybrid model 
works as well as the purely local factor model in the North America experiments.42   
 
3.5.2 Robustness Checks 
We further test the reliability of the hybrid model by carrying out two rounds of robustness 
checks. We first check the hybrid versions of the Fama-French three-factor model which are 
built on other definitions of the globally-accessible sample according to the viability criteria. A 
second round of tests involves time-series regressions to see whether the inclusion of the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange and non-Nasdaq OTC market – and especially its unusually large 
number of unsponsored secondary foreign listings, respectively, in their unregulated and 
OTCQX International segments - in the list of target exchanges for the globally-accessible 
sample changes the results.  
Table 3.5 summarizes regressions to explain excess returns on size/B/M portfolios when the 
                                                 
42 Another solution we investigated for the North American experiment was to construct three sets of factors in the 
hybrid model: globally-accessible stocks from outside the U.S. only, globally-accessible stocks from the U.S. only 
and then the locally-accessible stocks from U.S. In this case, the GRS statistic was 1.35 without microcap stocks 
and 2.14 with microcap stocks.  
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Main CL Sample is replaced by threealternative definitions of the globally-accessible set of 
stocks.43 We first disregard the so-called viability constraints altogether and start with the largest 
globally accessible sample, denoted CL1. Recall that this sample represents 91% of the global 
market capitalization, so we expect this experiment is most likely to inhibit the performance of 
the hybrid model relative to the local models for regional experiments. Panel B of Table 3.5 
shows that for all four global test asset portfolios, the tight regression fits affirm that the hybrid 
model is economically meaningful, and the GRS test indicates that using CL1 for the hybrid 
model works as well as using the Main CL Sample. Taking the Global portfolios as an example, 
the GRS statistic is 1.14 for the hybrid model built on CL1, slightly higher than 0.92 for that 
built on the Main CL Sample. However, the benefit of using CL1 in the global experiments 
comes at the cost of the relatively poorer regression fits for the regional test asset portfolios, 
especially those for North America and Europe. For the North America test, the hybrid model 
produces a larger average absolute intercept of 0.21% compared to only 0.13% with the Main CL 
Sample. In Europe, the GRS statistic rises as high as 1.76. The problems (witnessed by higher 
GRS statistics, higher average absolute intercepts, and larger Sharpe ratios) result from the 
depleted local factors in the two regions which include many fewer stocks than before. The 
purely-local samples in North America or Europe in this CL1 sample accounts for less than 10% 
of total market capitalization of the region.  
Panel C of Table 3.5 reports the results for the hybrid model built on what we call “CL2a.” 
Changing from relative viability constraints (at least 0.1% of global trading volume occurs in 
target markets or at least 0.5% of total trading value in target markets relative to all secondarily 
cross-listed stocks from the same country trading there ) to an absolute viability constraint (at 
                                                 
43 Table 5 illustrates only the case when microcap stocks are excluded, but all results are available. 
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least one month in a given year with non-zero trading volume in a target cross-listing market) on 
the cross-listing does not affect the performance of the hybrid model in explaining the average 
returns for global test asset portfolios and most of the regional test asset portfolios. The North 
America sample is the only exception in which the hybrid model now has a power problem, 
possibly because the absolute viability constraint breaks the consistency of our time-series 
explanatory returns. Some companies are identified as local stocks when there are no overseas 
trading records but as globally-accessible stocks when trading actually occurs in the target 
markets. Allowing these companies to switch between the two samples at a relatively high 
frequency may alter the profile of the returns of the explanatory factor portfolios. Panel D of 
Table 3.5 reports the regression results when CL2b is used. The more stringent relative viability 
constraints (above 1% of own-stock global trading volume in target markets or above 5% of all 
secondary cross-listing trading by country) shrink the globally accessible sample down to 
account for 62% of the total market capitalization for the global equity universe. The new CL2b 
performs similarly to the Main CL sample in the regional and global experiments.44    
Given the looser secondary cross-listing rules on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and OTCQX 
International, we repeat the experiments above for the case where these two markets are 
excluded from the list of target exchanges. Our results are not driven by their inclusion. To save 
space, the regression results are only shown in Appendix Table 9 (available upon request). When 
no viability constraints are imposed on this globally-accessible sample, the hybrid model 
provides good descriptions for our four global test asset portfolios. The GRS statistics are not 
higher than 1.17 without microcap stocks and not higher than 2.06 with microcap stocks. When 
the globally-accessible sample is screened by our relative viability constraints based on target 
                                                 
44 In the Kan, Robotti, and Shanken (2012) model comparison tests (unreported), the hybrid model is the only model 
that is never statistically dominated in any of our analyses of Table 5.It outperforms the purely global model and 
the purely local model, respectively at the 5% and 10% levels, with a variety of portfolios employed as test assets. 
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markets other than Germany and OTCQX International, the hybrid model performs better than 
the purely global factor model for the global test asset portfolios, and works as well as the purely 
local factor model for most of the regional test asset portfolios. On the other hand, the hybrid 
model still fares poorly in North America. The early years of the sample appear to be the 
problem once again. In the Main CL sample, the GRS statistics increase to 2.47. If only focusing 
on the period of 1995-2010, the GRS statistics decline to 1.46. 
With different adjustments on the viability constraints for cross-listed stocks, the hybrid model 
appears quite resilient in explaining the average returns in the global and regional test asset 
portfolios. But one open question is how robust our hybrid model is to the size, liquidity and 
float screens that we apply for the stocks in the seven target markets to qualify them as globally-
accessible. After all, those stocks that are secondarily cross-listed in a target market may simply 
be those that meet those screens in their respective markets and so the extra criterion of cross-
listing may be redundant. In this additional test, we redefine the globally-accessible set of stocks 
around the world to be those that meet the same size, liquidity and float screens as for the stocks 
in the target markets.45 The new globally-accessible sample, when compared with the Main CL 
sample, has smaller counts but similar market capitalizations across five regions. However, the 
hybrid model built from this new sample, unlike that for the Main CL Sample, makes little or no 
improvement relative to the global model for the global test asset portfolios, especially where the 
focus is on Developed Markets. Consider, for instance, the case without microcap stocks for the 
Developed Markets portfolios, the average absolute intercept increases from 0.07% to 0.12%, the 
Sharpe ratio for the intercept goes up from 0.35 to 0.42, and the GRS statistic rises from 1.12 to 
1.64. For the Developed Markets portfolios excluding North America, the average absolute 
                                                 
45 The distribution of free floats varies substantially across countries outside the seven target markets. If using a 
universal float screening, there will be few or even no stocks selected for many countries as globally accessible 
stocks. Therefore, the median float (75% for U.S. and equivalent levels for other markets) is applied in this case.  
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intercept doubles from 0.07% to 0.15%, the Sharpe ratio from 0.28 to 0.42, and the GRS statistic 
from 0.76 to 1.65. In the regional experiment for North America, a hybrid model using this new 
globally-accessible sample fails to improve relative to the local factor model, instead pushing the 
GRS statistics up to 2.46, without microcap stocks, and as high as 2.84 when microcap stocks are 
included.  
We acknowledge that there exist some data issues for this alternative globally-accessible sample. 
Less than half of stocks from markets outside the seven target exchanges have float records in 
Datastream, and those stocks are automatically dropped out of the globally-accessible sample. 
But we take from this that identifying those stocks that are secondarily cross-listed on one of the 
target markets likely furnishes a more complete assessment of the investability of stocks, 
especially for those from emerging markets. 
In sum, the hybrid model not only captures strong common variation in global and regional stock 
returns, but also brings low pricing errors and rejection rates for a variety of regional and global 
test asset portfolios. Compared with the purely global factor model for global test asset 
portfolios, the hybrid model always achieves better performance: the explanatory power 
increases up to 0.89 or even higher, average absolute pricing errors have reduced to 0.14% or 
even lower, the GRS statistics are not rejected at the 90% level when microcap stocks are 
excluded. Compared with the purely local factor model for regional test asset portfolios, the 
hybrid model brings neither larger pricing errors nor higher model rejection rates, and it 
performs even better for Emerging Market test asset portfolios. 
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3.6 Some More Robustness Tests 
 
3.6.1 Time-series Regression Tests for Size/Momentum Portfolios 
Table 3.6 summarizes asset pricing tests in which the Carhart four-factor model is applied to 
explain excess returns on 4×5 size/momentum portfolios. The Fama-French three-factor model 
generally works poorly in such an experiment in terms of regression fit and GRS statistic (Fama 
and French, 2012, see their Tables 6 and 7). So, we turn to the Carhart four-factor model to build 
our hybrid model. The results are presented on the left side of the three panels in the table.  
There are power problems with the global Carhart four-factor model for the global test asset 
portfolios. Reasonable performance is only achieved in the Global portfolio tests (all reported 
tests have microcap stocks removed): the average R2 is 0.92, the average absolute intercept is 
0.12%, the CSR R2 is below 0.20, and the GRS statistic is 1.89, which is below the 99th 
percentile threshold. For the three other global test asset portfolios, the global four-factor factor 
model fares poorly, producing higher GRS statistics and large average absolute intercepts. For 
instance, for the Developed Markets portfolios, the GRS statistic is 2.05, which exceeds the 99th 
threshold of the F-distribution,. The test on the Developed Markets portfolios excluding North 
America has a relatively lower GRS statistic of 1.42, but this result is hampered by low power. 
As with earlier results on size/B/M portfolios, the global factor model fares poorly for the 
regional portfolio returns. By contrast, the local Carhart four-factor model is reasonable for 
applications in the regional test asset portfolios for North America and Japan. The regressions on 
Europe, Asia Pacific, and the Emerging Markets are relatively disappointing: the GRS test 
rejects the purely local factor model in these three regions.  
The experiment for size/momentum portfolios produces the most disappointing results among all 
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asset pricing tests for the global or purely local versions of the Carhart model. But, even with this 
challenge, the hybrid model fares reasonably well. For the Global portfolios, the hybrid model 
and the global factor model perform similarly. Each of the test statistics are similar except the 
CSR R2 which are notably higher for the hybrid model, but not statistically so by the Kan, 
Robotti, and Shanken (2012) tests. In the three other global test asset portfolios, the hybrid model 
better captures the returns than the global factor model. Using the Developed Markets portfolios 
excluding North America as an example, we see the regression fit improves from 0.77 for the 
global factor model to 0.94 for the hybrid model. The average absolute intercepts fall from 
0.32% to 0.12% and the CSR R2 jumps from 0.11 to 0.52, a statistically significant difference at 
10%by the Kan, Robotti, and Shanken (2012) tests. 
In the regional tests, the hybrid model produces high GRS statistics in Europe (2.91), Asia 
Pacific (2.12), and Emerging Markets (1.51), but these are all similar to the results for the purely 
local factor model. The regression fits and the average absolute intercepts are also close. As we 
discussed earlier, the relatively poor performance of the hybrid model in the North America 
experiment stems from the first five years of the sample, similar to the case with size/B/M test 
asset portfolios. The improvement of the hybrid model over the purely local factor model arises 
in the Emerging Markets test asset portfolios: the average absolute intercepts decline from 0.60% 
to 0.32%.  
Echoing previous robustness checks on size/B/M portfolios, we use three other globally 
accessible samples to reconstruct the explanatory factor returns and get supporting evidence on 
the resilience of the hybrid model (all shown in Appendix Table 10). Among all four cross-listed 
samples, CL2a (which includes stocks with non-zero target market trading during the year) 
produces the lowest model rejection rates for all four global test asset portfolios. Compared with 
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the Main CL Sample in the regional experiments, CL2a improves the performance of the hybrid 
model in North America and Europe. For example, it shrinks the Sharpe ratio from 0.56 to 0.46 
and the GRS statistic from 2.91 to 1.91 in the Europe experiment. In tests of other regions, the 
performance of CL2b (with more stringent viability constraints on the cross-listed stocks) comes 
close to those of the Main CL Sample. In addition, we are interested in whether the performance 
of the hybrid model is influenced by the inclusion of the unsponsored secondary foreign listings. 
Appendix Table 11 reports the regression results when the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and non-
Nasdaq OTC markets are dropped from the list of target exchanges. The results are quantitatively 
similar to those reported in Table 3.6.  
Preliminary results show that a hybrid version of the HKK (2011) three-factor model performs 
reasonably well for size/momentum portfolios.46 We compare the Carhart four-factor model and 
the extended version of the HKK (2011) three-factor model in which an SMB factor in Fama and 
French (2012) is added; the key difference is that the value-based factor is constructed from C/P 
instead of B/M as a firm characteristic. The HKK (2011) extended four-factor model performs 
similarly to the Carhart four-factor model in explaining the average returns on the global and 
regional portfolios. Like the global Carhart four-factor model, the global HKK (2011) extended 
four-factor model works well for the Global portfolios: the average R2 is 0.92, the average 
absolute intercept is 0.13%, and the GRS statistic is 1.88 (reported in Appendix Table 12). As 
before, for the three other global test asset portfolios, the global HKK (2011) extended four-
factor model produces low power and large average absolute intercepts. In the regional 
scenarios, the local HKK (2011) extended four-factor model works well for North America and 
                                                 
46 HKK (2011) propose and test a three-factor model that includes the C/P and momentum factors in addition to the 
global market portfolios and that produces the lowest pricing errors among various multifactor models in 
regressions for country, industry, and characteristic-sorted portfolios: Rit – Rft = αi + βi (Rmt – Rft) + ci FC/P,t + mi 
FMom,t + εi,t substitutes for Eqn. (1). 
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Japan, but suffers loss of power and higher model rejection rates for Europe, Asia Pacific, and 
Emerging Markets. On the other hand, the hybrid version of the HKK (2011)  extended four-
factor model increases the average R2 up to 88% and shrinks the average absolute intercepts 
down to less than 0.24% in the global tests, and it does not fare worse than the local version in 
the regional test asset portfolios.  
We repeat previous robustness checks on size/momentum portfolios, including trying several 
alternative definitions of global accessibility and dropping the unsponsored cross-listed stocks on 
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and OTCQX International. Once again, we uncover supporting 
evidence for the hybrid model. For the sake the brevity, regression results are provided in 
Appendix Tables 12 and 13.  
 
3.6.2 Time-series Regression Tests for Size/C/P Portfolios 
Table 3.6 also provides the regressions of the HKK (2011) extended four-factor model in 
explaining excess returns on 4×5 size/C/P portfolios. These are presented on the right hand side 
of the three panels in the table. As in Fama and French (2012), there is a size pattern in the 
average value premium in the sorts on C/P, but it is somewhat weaker than the sorts on B/M. For 
example, if the global HKK (2011) extended four-factor model is used in the test of the Global 
portfolios, the GRS statistics are 1.75 for the 4×5 portfolios.  
Panel C of Table 3.6 indicates that the hybrid model similarly improves the regression fit of the 
global factor model for size/C/P test assets. Moreover, the average absolute intercepts drop to at 
or below 0.15%, the CSR R2 all exceed 0.50, and the GRS statistics are all below 1.34. At the 
same time, the regressions of the hybrid model show uneven improvement relative to those of the 
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purely local factor model for the regional test asset portfolios. For example, if the purely local 
factor model is replaced by the hybrid model, the average absolute intercepts decrease 
significantly from 0.62% to 0.21% for the Emerging Markets and the CSR R2 increase from 0.35 
to 0.61. In the Europe test, however, the hybrid model fares worse than the purely local factor 
model. The average absolute intercept rises from 0.10% in the purely local factor model to 
0.13% in the hybrid model. Despite that, the GRS test is not rejected if evaluated at the 95th 
percentile of the F-distribution. As before, the hybrid model suffers in the North American 
experiment because of the first five years. 
We perform three more robustness checks with the size/C/P test asset portfolios (as reported in 
Appendix Tables 14 through 17). We first try alternative definitions for the globally-accessible 
sample for the Carhart four-factor model; there are measurable benefits to extend the global 
factor model to the hybrid model in most experiments. Second, we drop the cross-listed stocks 
from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and OTCQX International and repeat the tests. Excluding 
them does not change the results. We also find that the hybrid model maintains its good 
performance when the global factors and local factors are adjusted by different viability 
constraints and size considerations. Finally, we implement the same tests for the HKK (2011) 
extended four-factor model. The results are quantitatively similar to those in Table 3.6. To 
conserve space, we report these results in Appendix Table 16. Our test does not permit us to 
adequately distinguish the Carhart four-factor model and the HKK (2011) extended four-factor 
model when it comes to explaining the size/C/P portfolios. The HKK (2011) model is another 
reasonable choice for applications in international asset pricing.  
 
3.6.3 Time-series Regression Tests for Expanded Test Assets 
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Following a key prescription of Lewellen, Nagel, and Shanken (2010), Table 3.7 reports 
regressions employed on two expanded sets of test assets. Instead of using only 5×5 size/B/M 
portfolios (now with microcaps included), we augment them with 10 industry portfolios, which 
are constructed by using the FTSE/Dow Jones Industry Classification Benchmark (Level 1 
Industrial Classification in Datastream) for the specific region for which the test is performed. 
These tests are shown on the left hand side of the panels. Another set of test assets we build are 
just 33 industry portfolios based on the Level 4 FTSE/Dow Jones Industry Classification 
Benchmark. These are shown on the right hand side of the three panels in the table.  
The first thing to note is that adding industry portfolios worsens the performance of all the 
models, in terms of the regression fit, the average absolute intercepts, and the GRS statistics. But 
our choice of industry portfolios is based on the notion that they should provide a higher hurdle 
for the proposed model. And the superior performance of the hybrid model is a fairly robust 
empirical finding even in these new experiments. Specifically, for the 33 industry portfolios, the 
average absolute intercepts in the four sets of global portfolios are 0.16%, 0.16%, 0.19%, and 
0.22%, respectively, for the hybrid model, whereas the global factor model gets higher levels of 
0.27%, 0.28%, 0.30%, and 0.32%. The CSR R2 more than double from around 0.15 for the 
global models in the 5×5 Size/B/M plus 10 industry portfolios to around 0.25 for the hybrid 
model. The magnitude of the improvement in CSR R2 is even greater for the 33 Industry 
portfolios. With the 33 Industry portfolios in the five regional experiments, we see a notable 
jump in the CSR R2 in Europe and the Asia Pacific. But in terms of the average absolute 
intercepts, the biggest improvement of the hybrid model over the local factor model still arises in 
the Emerging Markets among the regional experiments.  
3.6.4 Time-series Regression Tests for Additional Portfolios and Individual Securities 
 115 
 
In this section, we first build global test-asset portfolios that include just globally accessible 
stocks. Intuitively, we expect many global asset managers would impose such accessibility 
constraints to define their investment universe. In this setting, we further expect the traditional 
global factor model is most likely to succeed, so we propose a test to compare the ability of the 
traditional global factor and our new global factor model, in which the factor portfolios are built 
only from the globally accessible stocks, to explain the portfolio returns. Here, we mainly check 
the experiments on the Global portfolios and the Developed Markets portfolios.47  
When compared to the traditional global factor model, the new global factor model yields lower 
average absolute intercepts, lower Sharpe ratios, smaller GRS statistics and higher R2s. The 
results hold for all three sets of 5×5 test asset portfolios sorted on size/B/M, size/momentum, and 
size/C/P. Taking the size/B/M Developed Markets portfolios as an example, we find the average 
absolute intercept falls from 0.23% for the traditional global factor model to 0.12% for the new 
global factor model. In terms of SR(a), the new global factor model produces smaller values: 
0.36 compared to 0.48 for the traditional global factor model. Accompanied with similar or even 
tighter regression fits, the GRS statistics drop from 2.36 for the traditional global factor model to 
1.33 for the new global factor model. We cannot reject at the 90% level. The complete set of 
regression results is available in Appendix Tables 18.  
We next move to supplementary tests using regressions on individual stocks to assess the 
explanatory powers of the local factor model and the hybrid model for their returns. Each month, 
beginning with November 1990, individual security regressions are estimated over 180 rolling 
60-month periods. The last period ends in December 2010. In all regions, the hybrid Fama-
                                                 
47 If North America is excluded in the global test asset portfolios, there are only 2,333 stocks for the Developed 
Markets portfolios excluding North America and around 3,100 stocks for the Global portfolios excluding North 
America. Technically, the numbers of stocks are insufficient to construct portfolios. 
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French three-factor models achieve statistically significant increases in the average adjusted R2. 
The incremental R2s account for, on average over time, 11.73%, 8.39%, 6.76%, 2.58%, and 
17.04% of the R2s by the corresponding local models in the North America, Europe, Asia 
Pacific, Japan, and Emerging Markets tests. Furthermore, we decompose our hybrid model in 
order to evaluate the incremental R2 from adding the global factors to the local factors. The 
global factors in the hybrid model increase the average adjusted R2 by 2.29%, 1.22%, 1.00%, 
0.81%, and 2.22% in North America, Europe, Asia Pacific, Japan, and Emerging Markets, 
respectively. The increase in the average adjusted R2 due to the addition of global factors can be 
expressed relative to the total average adjusted R2 for the hybrid model. The proportion of the 
explained variance attributable to global factors is 15.03%, 6.84%, 5.07%, 2.29%, and 15.03% in 
North America, Europe, Asia Pacific, Japan, and Emerging Markets, respectively, indicating the 
importance of global factors in the hybrid model.  
One concern is that much of the success of the hybrid model is mechanical in that additional 
three (or four) factors are built over and above the base three (or four) factors in the global and 
local models. Most test statistics (such as, GRS and CSR R2) for our model comparisons account 
for this fact in terms of different degrees of freedom, but they may still be inadequate in finite 
samples. To take on this challenge in another experiment we compare the hybrid model against a 
competing model in which local factors are constructed not based on fundamental factors such as 
size, B/M, C/P, or Momentum, but using principal component analysis (PCA).  These factors 
are purely statistical and are designed to maximally capture the common variation among the 
stocks. To this end, we first orthogonalize all the stock returns for the specific region for which 
the test is performed relative to the global factors of the globally-accessible set. We next identify 
up to three principal components of the residuals and build local factor portfolios as determined 
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by the extracted principal factors, using portfolio weights given by the scaled eigenvectors.  
Table 3.8 presents the results for the 4×5 Size/B/M test asset portfolios for each of the global and 
regional experiments. Our findings suggest that it is very hard, using the PCA local factors in 
addition to the global factors, to explain the common variation in returns as well as using the 
hybrid model by any of the evaluation criteria. For example, the average R2s in North America, 
Europe, Asia Pacific, Japan, and Emerging Markets are 0.74, 0.77, 0.67, 0.76, and 0.60, 
respectively, for the PCA-based alternative model, compared with those of 0.90, 0.90, 0.81, 0.92, 
and 0.68 for the hybrid model.  The GRS statistics and the average absolute intercepts are 
notably higher for the PCA-based alternative model and the CSR R2 are much lower, in turn, 
among the global experiments.  
 
3.6.5 Disaggregating Emerging Markets and Europe 
Given the comparatively strong performance of the hybrid model in Emerging Markets, Panel A 
in Table 3.9 tries to pin down the improvement more precisely into three sub-areas by region of 
the world: Europe, the Middle East and Africa (EMEA), Latin America, and Southeast Asia. 
After all, there is considerable heterogeneity among countries that constitute Emerging Markets, 
which means that a “local” model may not be a fair benchmark against which to show 
improvement for our hybrid model.  
The hybrid version of the Fama-French model dominates the equivalent global factor model in 
each of the three sub-areas with lower GRS statistics, lower average absolute intercepts, higher 
time-series and CSR R2. In the comparisons between the local factor model and the hybrid model 
by sub-area, the differences are less clear. There is a notable decrease in the GRS statistics in the 
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EMEA region as well as in the average absolute intercepts: the average absolute intercepts shrink 
from 0.71% to 0.30%. In the test on Latin America the hybrid model furnishes similar GRS 
statistics and intercepts, but the CSR R2 increases substantially from 0.17 to 0.44. The model 
comparisons for Southeast Asia yield almost equivalent results. 
A similar argument about the heterogeneity of countries can be made in Europe in which global 
integration may have been facilitated by the introduction of a common currency among a subset 
of its members (Hardouvelis, Malliaropulos, and Priestley, 2006; Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, 
and Siegel, 2012). A logical question is whether our hybrid model can improve upon a local 
model redefined in Europe separately only among the original 11 members of the Euro bloc and 
only among those that remained outside the currency bloc. Panel B of Table 3.9 provides 
evidence using the Fama-French three-factor model and even distinguishes between the original 
Eurozone members before and after January 1999 when the new currency was launched.  
Several observations emerge. First, the global factor model delivers relatively poor regression fit 
compared to the local and hybrid models. This obtains not only for the non-Eurozone members, 
but also those countries in the Euro bloc. Interestingly, among the Euro bloc countries, the global 
models experience a large decline in the GRS statistics and an increase in the time-series R2. 
Second, we see considerable advantages using the hybrid model over the local model for the 
whole sample period and especially after January 1999 for the original Eurozone members. 
Specifically, the average absolute intercepts decrease from 0.18% for the local factor model to 
0.11% for the hybrid model, the Sharpe ratio for the intercepts goes down from 0.45 to 0.32, and 
the GRS statistics drop sharply from 1.21 to 0.50. The hybrid model shows in a preliminary way 
some flexibility over a purely global and purely local model as it allows for an evolving role of 
financial globalization.  
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3.7 Conclusions  
Using monthly returns for over 37,000 stocks from 46 developed and emerging market countries 
over a two-decade period, we test whether empirical asset pricing models capture the size, value, 
and momentum patterns in international stock returns. We specifically propose and test a new 
multi-factor model that includes factor portfolios based on firm characteristics and that builds 
separate factors comprised of globally-accessible stocks, which we call “global factors,” and of 
locally-accessible stocks, which we call “local factors.” Our new “hybrid” multi-factor model 
with both global and local factors not only captures strong common variation in global stock 
returns, but also achieves low pricing errors and rejection rates using conventional testing 
procedures for a variety of regional and global test asset portfolios formed on size, value, and 
momentum. 
A critical ingredient of our analysis is how we categorize the equity universe into two subsets - 
the globally-accessible sample and purely-local sample of stocks – based on constraints as 
defined by whether or not the stock has shares actively traded in the markets fully open to global 
investors. To capture the impact of investability constraints on the size, value, and momentum 
patterns in international stock returns, we then build separate factor portfolios – global factors 
comprised of stocks only in the globally-accessible sample, and local factors comprised of the 
purely-local stocks from the specific region for which the test is perform – and propose a new 
“hybrid” multifactor model. We find that neither a purely global factor model nor a purely local 
factor model can work as well as the new “hybrid” when asked to explain average returns on 
global and regional size/value and size/momentum portfolios. The new “hybrid” model does not 
encounter the problems of the purely global factor models, such as high rates of rejections with 
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GRS tests and large average absolute intercepts. Rather, it improves the regression fit and 
reduces the pricing errors, with or without microcap stocks. And, at the same time, the new 
“hybrid” model fares reasonably relative to a purely local factor model, and works even better 
for emerging markets, in terms of explanatory power, model pricing errors and rejection rates. 
The robustness of the new “hybrid” model is confirmed by tests conducted with a variety of 
definitions of global accessibility, other double-sorted test portfolios, and other asset pricing 
models.  
We interpret our findings in this study as a step forward in the international asset pricing 
literature with important implications for practitioners in guiding cost-of-capital calculations and 
risk control and performance evaluation analysis of global portfolios. Of course, we 
acknowledge several limitations in the scope of our work as well as in the implementation. There 
may be alternative ways in which stocks become globally accessible beyond secondarily cross-
listing on overseas exchanges that we have not considered. Including other mechanisms for 
global investor accessibility, such as being included in one of MSCI or S&P global indexes 
(especially, in their investable indices in emerging markets), emerging market ETFs and closed-
end country funds, would be valuable to explore how the returns of global factor portfolios have 
changed over time. We also cannot disregard the fact that simply being accessible does not 
necessarily mean global investors will actually pursue these opportunities. Although this fact is 
taken into consideration to a certain extent by imposing additional viability restrictions on how 
actively the cross-listed shares are traded in our experiments, a more comprehensive picture of 
institutional trading around the world would reveal the varying preferences and constraints face 
by different groups of institutional investors. One would also hope for a more reliable proxy for 
the measure of viability consideration than the relative (and absolute) criteria in this study. Third, 
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one could criticize our reliance on conventional test procedures, which is necessarily limiting. 
Finally, it also remains to be seen whether the new proposed “hybrid” model works for country, 
industry, and other characteristic-sorted test asset portfolios, as evaluated in HKK (2011).   
There are also other possible avenues for future work. We can study the effect of exchange rate 
risks on the relative performance of global factors and local factors in the new “hybrid” model. 
All of our returns are U.S. dollar denominated at prevailing exchange rates. Because what 
constitutes globally-accessible stocks and purely-local stocks vary for investors by country of 
domicile, the need to hedge exchange rates varies and exchange rate risks are expected to play 
different roles in the risk prices of global factors and local factors. Exchange rate risk is certainly 
a potential problem in global asset pricing. A key contribution of Solnik’s (1974) influential 
international asset pricing model is that currency risk can be priced and there is also growing 
evidence that the magnitude of currency-risk exposures can be quite large (Dumas and Solnik, 
1995; De Santis and Gerard, 1997, 1998; Griffin and Stulz, 2001). Second, we can push the new 
“hybrid” structure to incorporate cross-sectional variation in real estate, commodities and bonds, 
which comprise a significant portion of global investment activity. Third, we can extend our 
unconditional testing framework for the hybrid model to a conditional one allowing for time 
variation in expected returns, variances and covariances, a potentially important factor for the 
transitioning emerging markets (Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and 
Siegel, 2011) for which our hybrid model performs especially well. 
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Figure 3.1 
Global Equity Universe, reported by Total Market Capitalization, 1990-2010 
 
The figure shows the distribution of the global equity universe by region. Beside each region name is the 
time series average market capitalization from that region that qualifies for analysis, which is in U.S. 
dollars trillion, and its percentage of global market capitalization. The sample selection criteria are 
described in Table 3.1. 
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Canada, 0.41, 2.02%
Europe, 5.18, 25.50%
Asia Pacific, 0.903, 
4.45%
Japan, 2.73, 13.44%
Emerging Markets, 2.74, 
13.49%
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Figure 3.1, continued 
Global Equity Universe, reported by Total Market Capitalization, 1990-2010 
 
The figures show the distributions of Europe, Asia Pacific and Emerging Markets equity universes by 
country. Beside each country name is the average market capitalization from that country, which is in 
U.S. dollars billion, and the percentage of regional market capitalization. The sample selection criteria are 
described in Table 3.1. 
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Figure 3.2 
Global Equity Universe, reported by Total Number of Stocks, 1990-2010 
 
The figure shows the distribution of the global equity universe by region. Beside each region name is the 
total number of sample stocks from that region that qualifies for analysis and the percentage of the total 
number that this count represents. The sample selection criteria are described in Table 3.1.  
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Figure 3.2, continued 
Global Equity Universe, reported by Total Number of Stocks, 1990-2010 
 
The figures show the distributions of Europe, Asia Pacific and Emerging Markets equity universes by 
region. Beside each country name is the total number of sample stocks from that country that qualifies for 
analysis and the percentage of the total number that this count represents. The sample selection criteria 
are described in Table 3.1. 
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Figure 3.3 
Global Equity Universe by Year, reported by Total Number of Stocks (above) and by Market 
Capitalization (below), 1990-2010 
 
The figures show the distribution of our sample stocks from each region by year. The sample selection 
criteria are described in Table 3.1.  
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   Figure 3.4 
Globally Accessible Sample, reported by Total Market Capitalization, 1990-2010 
 
The figure shows the distribution of the globally accessible sample by region. Beside each region name is 
the average market capitalization from that region, which is in U.S. dollars trillion, and its percentage of 
market capitalization. Here the sample is represented by the Main CL Sample and the sample selection 
criteria are described in the Appendix. 
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 132 
 
Figure 3.4, continued 
Globally Accessible Sample, reported by Total Market Capitalization, 1990-2010 
 
The figures show the distributions of Europe, Asia Pacific and Emerging Markets globally accessible 
samples by country. Beside each country name is the average market capitalization from that country, 
which is in U.S. dollars billion, and its percentage of market capitalization. Here the sample is represented 
by the Main CL Sample and the selection criteria are described in the Appendix. 
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Figure 3.5 
Globally Accessible Sample, reported by Total Number of Stocks, 1990-2010 
 
The figure shows the distribution of the globally accessible sample by region. Beside each region name is 
the total number of sample stocks from that region that qualifies for analysis and the percentage of the 
total number that this count represents. Here the sample is represented by the Main CL Sample and the 
sample selection criteria are described in the Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
United States, 951, 16.55%
Canada, 1,632, 28.40%
Europe, 1,354, 23.56%
Asia Pacific, 785, 13.66%
Japan, 197, 3.43%
Emerging Markets, 828, 
14.41%
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Figure 3.5, continued 
Globally Accessible Sample, reported by Total Number of Stocks, 1990-2010 
  
The figures show the distributions of Europe, Asia Pacific and Emerging Markets globally accessible 
samples by country. Beside each country name is the total number of sample stocks from that country that 
qualifies for analysis and the percentage of the total number that this count represents. Here the sample is 
represented by the Main CL Sample and the selection criteria are described in the Appendix. 
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Figure 3.6 
Globally Accessible Sample by Year, reported by Total Number of Stocks (above) and by 
Market Capitalization (below), 1990-2010 
 
The figures show the distribution of globally accessible sample from each region by year. Here the 
sample is represented by the Main CL Sample and the sample selection criteria are described in the 
Appendix.  
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Figure 3.6, continued 
Globally Accessible Sample by Year, reported by Total Number of Stocks (above) and by 
Market Capitalization (below), 1990-2010 
 
The figures show the distribution of globally accessible sample from each target markets by year. Here 
the sample is represented by the Main CL Sample and the sample selection criteria are described in the 
Appendix.  
 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
5,500
6,000
6,500
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
St
o
ck
s
Germany
Hong Kong
Singapore
Luxembourg
Europe
United Kingdom
United States
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
M
ar
ke
t 
C
ap
it
al
iz
at
io
n
, U
.S
. t
ri
lli
o
n
Germany
Hong Kong
Singapore
Luxembourg
Europe
United Kingdom
 137 
 
 
Table 3.1 
Summary Statistics of Global Equity Universe by Country, Nov. 1989 – Dec. 2010 
 
Country 
Beginning 
Date 
Total 
Number of 
Stocks 
Size 
(U.S. $ 
mills.) 
Book-to-
Market 
(B/M) 
Cash flow-
to-Price  
(C/P) 
Momentum 
(Mom, %) 
North America 
 
9,438 
    United States 1989/11 6,494 256.70 0.47 0.09 6.60 
Canada 1989/11 2,944 9.86 0.61 0.07 0.61 
       Europe 
 
8,630 
    Austria 1989/11 240 185.30 0.62 0.15 3.13 
Belgium 1989/11 178 106.47 0.64 0.14 4.93 
Denmark 1989/11 205 66.88 0.73 0.12 5.69 
Finland 1989/11 157 133.66 0.83 0.14 10.81 
France 1989/11 1,170 71.55 0.59 0.12 3.44 
Germany 1989/11 1,109 78.98 0.51 0.10 -0.41 
Greece 1989/11 332 45.31 0.64 0.09 12.45 
Ireland 1989/11 78 184.90 0.57 0.10 7.71 
Italy 1989/11 351 184.86 0.75 0.13 -0.92 
Netherland 1989/11 203 228.09 0.55 0.14 7.10 
Norway 1989/11 347 103.29 0.69 0.11 6.77 
Portugal 1989/11 100 76.45 0.85 0.12 0.99 
Spain 1989/11 169 430.65 0.68 0.12 6.57 
Sweden 1989/11 571 50.14 0.61 0.10 5.55 
Switzerland 1989/11 265 195.75 0.70 0.13 8.13 
UK 1989/11 3,155 54.25 0.51 0.09 2.51 
       Asia Pacific 
 
3,914 
    Hong Kong 1989/11 977 70.57 0.91 0.09 3.89 
Australia 1989/11 2,012 19.54 0.61 0.05 2.28 
New Zealand 1989/11 170 49.80 0.71 0.11 10.79 
Singapore 1989/11 755 71.72 0.77 0.10 6.07 
       Japan 1989/11 4,301 174.90 0.82 0.08 -2.19 
       Emerging Markets 11,116 
    Israel 1989/11 326 21.18 0.71 0.12 6.43 
Turkey 1989/11 241 57.24 0.56 0.15 12.13 
Pakistan 1989/11 129 34.79 0.77 0.19 9.53 
South Africa 1989/11 567 57.83 0.61 0.13 8.02 
Czech Republic 1993/08 76 0.98 1.34 0.23 5.34 
Poland 1992/01 348 30.50 0.74 0.10 40.97 
Hungary 1991/02 45 37.57 0.86 0.14 4.21 
Russia 1994/07 292 104.54 2.30 0.23 37.17 
China 1991/02 1,550 247.05 0.62 0.08 26.48 
India 1989/11 1,455 37.50 0.71 0.12 11.86 
Indonesia 1990/05 312 40.90 0.76 0.12 5.42 
Malaysia 1989/11 993 58.70 0.79 0.09 5.84 
Philippines 1989/11 158 30.97 0.94 0.10 1.20 
South Korea 1989/11 1,757 41.55 1.22 0.21 3.48 
Taiwan 1989/11 1,344 156.80 0.64 0.08 -0.16 
Thailand 1989/11 483 36.72 0.86 0.16 1.59 
Argentina 1989/11 84 69.24 1.10 0.17 16.30 
Brazil 1993/01 404 97.29 1.54 0.20 32.76 
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Table 3.1, continued 
 
Country 
Beginning 
date 
Total 
number of 
Stocks 
Size 
(U.S. $ 
mills.) 
Book-to-
Market 
(B/M) 
Cash flow-
to-Price  
(C/P) 
Momentum 
(Mom) 
Chile 1990/12 179 115.76 0.77 0.12 11.31 
Colombia 1992/02 85 58.78 1.51 0.15 6.99 
Mexico 1989/11 150 327.45 0.80 0.13 10.86 
Peru 1991/02 111 10.59 1.10 0.15 11.93 
Venezuela 1990/02 27 46.54 2.29 0.23 10.50 
Total All 
 
37,399 
    
 
This table reports summary statistics of our sample stocks for each country over the 198911-201112. We 
exclude financial firms and to be included in the analysis, each stocks has to have at least 12 monthly returns, 
is listed in its country’s major exchange(s), and has sufficient information to calculate at least one of the 
characteristics including market value of equity (Size), book-to-market (B/M), cash flow-to-price (C/P). We 
also apply several screening procedures for Datastream data errors in monthly returns as suggested by Ince 
and Porter (2003) and others, as detailed in the text. The beginning date for each country is as shown. The 
total numbers of unique stocks are reported for each country. Mom is the time series average of the median 
lagged cumulative returns from t-11 to t-1 (skipping the most recent month). Also reported are the time-series 
average of annual medians for size, B/M, and C/P. 
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Table 3.2 
Summary Statistics for Factor Portfolio Returns, Nov. 1990 – Dec. 2010 
 
Panel A: Return Distributions of Factor Portfolios in the Global Experiments 
 
Attributes Market Size B/M Mom C/P 
 
Equity 
Universe 
Accessible 
Local 
Spread 
Equity 
Universe 
Accessible 
Local 
Spread 
Equity 
Universe 
Accessible 
Local 
Spread 
Equity 
Universe 
Accessible 
Local 
Spread 
Equity 
Universe 
Accessible 
Local 
Spread 
Global   
              
Mean 0.46 0.53 -0.24 0.09 0.48 -0.19 0.54 0.25 0.40 0.52 0.54 -0.04 0.60 0.36 0.44 
Std Dev 4.47 4.29 1.78 2.45 2.69 2.28 2.50 2.89 2.04 4.37 4.98 2.44 3.03 2.90 2.11 
t-Mean 1.59 1.93 -2.12 0.59 2.80 -1.28 3.39 1.35 3.06 1.84 1.68 -0.25 3.07 1.91 3.22 
 
Developed Markets Only 
Mean 0.47 0.52 -0.23 0.04 0.51 -0.25 0.53 0.21 0.38 0.60 0.48 -0.22 0.64 0.26 0.42 
Std Dev 4.46 4.22 1.72 2.38 2.43 2.21 2.39 2.90 1.67 4.13 5.26 1.86 2.67 3.02 1.86 
t-Mean 1.62 1.91 -2.10 0.25 3.23 -1.78 3.42 1.12 3.58 2.26 1.42 -1.85 3.71 1.34 3.54 
 
Global excl. North America  
Mean 0.33 0.46 -0.41 0.15 0.43 -0.29 0.73 0.42 0.37 0.60 0.50 0.05 0.73 0.50 0.42 
Std Dev 4.79 4.81 2.76 2.17 2.66 2.81 4.32 2.43 2.56 4.13 4.39 3.73 3.42 2.15 2.85 
t-Mean 1.06 1.49 -2.31    1.09 0.86 -1.63 2.62 2.70 2.26 2.26 1.76 0.21 3.34 3.64 2.30 
 
Developed Markets Only excl. North America  
Mean 0.32 0.43 -0.43 0.05 0.42 -0.41 0.80 0.37 0.32 0.39 0.33 -0.21 0.72 0.35 0.35 
Std Dev 4.85 4.76 2.97 2.29 2.30 2.73 4.31 2.60 2.17 4.27 4.59 3.06 2.59 2.35 2.34 
t-Mean 1.04 1.41 -2.27 0.35 2.83 -2.36 2.88 2.23 2.27 1.43 1.13 -1.08 4.36 2.34 2.36 
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Table 3.2, continued 
 
Panel B: Return Distributions of Factor Portfolios in the Regional Experiments 
 
Attributes Market Size B/M Mom C/P 
 
Equity 
Universe 
Accessible 
Local 
Spread 
Equity 
Universe 
Accessible 
Local 
Spread 
Equity 
Universe 
Accessible 
Local 
Spread 
Equity 
Universe 
Accessible 
Local 
Spread 
Equity 
Universe 
Accessible 
Local 
Spread 
North America 
Mean 0.68 0.66 0.11 0.33 0.79 -0.02 0.26 -0.06 0.17 0.40 0.68 -0.18 0.35 -0.02 0.12 
Std Dev 4.58 4.16 2.53 3.67 3.79 2.47 3.34 4.23 2.04 5.99 6.53 2.65 3.85 4.36 2.09 
t-Mean 2.32 2.48 0.70 1.39 3.23 -0.12 1.22 -0.23 1.28 1.03 1.63 -1.05 1.43 -0.06 0.93 
 Europe  
Mean 0.58 0.56 -0.11 -0.16 0.23 -0.54 0.64 0.31 0.38 0.83 0.49 0.35 0.67 0.37 0.47 
Std Dev 4.91 4.82 2.68 2.48 2.44 3.02 2.68 3.10 2.16 4.59 5.21 2.90 2.33 2.79 2.30 
t-Mean 1.83 1.81 -0.61 -1.00 1.47 -2.78 3.70 1.58 2.72 2.80 1.46 1.90 4.51 2.09 3.21 
 Asia Pacific  
Mean 0.74 0.85 0.19 -0.11 0.37 -0.59 0.65 0.19 0.49 1.07 0.91 0.40 0.63 0.43 0.40 
Std Dev 5.87 6.22 3.85 3.38 4.37 2.97 3.21 5.15 3.38 5.14 5.32 4.48 2.98 3.96 3.14 
t-Mean 1.96 2.12 0.78 -0.52 1.31 -3.10 3.18 0.57 2.26 3.23 2.67 1.40 3.27 1.70 1.97 
 Japan  
Mean -0.04 0.12 -0.72 -0.15 0.30 -0.51 0.48 0.40 0.20 -0.44 -0.12 -0.96 0.32 0.33 -0.08 
Std Dev 6.07 6.07 5.24 4.29 3.40 3.83 2.72 3.53 2.86 5.38 6.23 4.95 2.32 3.53 2.70 
t-Mean -0.10 0.30 -2.14 -0.53 1.38 -2.06 2.77 1.76 1.09 -1.29 -0.31 -3.02 2.17 1.47 -0.45 
 Emerging Markets  
Mean 0.32 0.77 -0.34 0.37 0.41 0.16 0.64 0.64 0.43 1.05 0.96 0.56 0.95 0.95 0.72 
Std Dev 6.33 6.71 5.30 3.45 3.61 4.07 3.95 4.40 4.45 7.38 5.99 8.67 4.96 4.28 5.72 
t-Mean 0.79 1.78 -1.00 1.66 1.75 0.60 2.53 2.26 1.51 2.22 2.50 1.00 2.99 3.46 1.97 
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Table 3.2, continued 
 
This table shows the summary statistics for explanatory returns. It includes five regional portfolios for North America, Europe, Japan, Asia Pacific 
(excluding Japan) and Emerging Markets. Four sets of global portfolios are also reported, including Global portfolios that combine all the five regions, 
Developed Markets portfolios that combine the first four regions, Global portfolios excluding North America, Developed Markets portfolios excluding 
North America. For each scenario, it shows the explanatory returns for three samples, the whole sample (“Equity Universe” in the table), the subset of 
globally-accessible stocks, the Main CL Sample, which stands for the globally accessible sample (“Accessible” in the table) and the subset of locally-
accessible stocks relative to the globally-accessible stocks (“Local Spread” in the table). We form portfolios at the end of June of each year t by sorting 
stocks in a region into two market cap and three book-to-market (B/M) or cash flow-to-price (C/P) groups. Big stocks are those in the top 90% of 
market cap for the region, and small stocks are those in the bottom 10% (Fama and French, 2011). The B/M or C/P breakpoints for the five regions are 
the 30th and 70th percentiles of B/M for the big stocks from the globally accessible sample for each given region. The global portfolios use global size 
breaks, but we use the B/M or C/P breakpoints for the five regions to allocate the stocks of these regions to the global portfolios. The independent 2×3 
sorts on size and B/M (or C/P) produce six value-weighted portfolios, SG, SN, SV, BG, BN and BV, where S and B indicate small or big and G, N, 
and V indicate growth, neutral and value. The factor portfolios based on size is the equally-weighted average of the returns on the three small stock 
portfolios for the region minus the equally-weighted average of the returns on the three big stock portfolios where all the six portfolios are all based on 
B/M. The factor portfolios based on B/M (or C/P) are calculated as the equally-weighted average of value-growth returns for small and big stocks, SV-
SG and BV-BG. The 2×3 sorts on size and lagged momentum are similar, but the size/momentum portfolios are formed monthly. For portfolios 
formed at the end of month t, the lagged momentum return is a stock’s cumulative return for t-11 to t-1. The independent 2×3 sorts on size and 
momentum produce six value-weighted portfolios, SL, SN, SW, BL, BN and BW, where S and B indicate small and big, and L, N, and W indicate 
losers, neutral, and winners. The factor portfolios based on momentum is constructed as the equally-weighted average of WMLS=SW-SL and 
WMLB=BW-BL. B/M(C/P) breakpoints are the same for all three samples within each scenario, the globally accessible sample uses its own size and 
momentum breakpoints, and the purely local sample uses regional size and momentum breakpoints. For each given region, the return spread factor 
portfolios of purely-local stocks relative to the globally-accessible stocks are the differences in the respective factor portfolio returns for the set of 
purely-local stocks in the region and for the globally-accessible stocks. For example, for the size-related spread factor portfolio, we compute the return 
difference between the factor portfolio for the locally-accessible stocks (measured, in turn, as the difference between an equally-weighted average of 
the SG, SN, and SV portfolios and an equally-weighted average of the BG, BN, and BV portfolios) and the globally-accessible stocks (measured 
similarly). The value- and momentum-related spread factor portfolios are built in the same way. All returns are in U.S. dollars. Market is the return on 
a value-weighted market portfolio globally or for the region minus the U.S. one month Treasury bill yield. Mean and Std Dev are the mean and 
standard deviation of the return, and t-Mean is the ratio of Mean to its standard error.  
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Table 3.3 
Summary Statistics for the 25 size/B/M Excess Returns, Nov. 1990 – Dec. 2010 
 
  Mean   Standard Deviation 
  Low 2 3 4 High   Low 2 3 4 High 
Global  
Small 0.06 0.55 1.36 0.93 1.25 
 
6.55 5.95 8.42 5.06 4.91 
2 0.09 0.59 0.64 0.76 0.94 
 
6.02 5.51 5.03 4.89 4.97 
3 0.15 0.37 0.56 0.62 0.83 
 
5.75 5.37 5.18 4.84 5.06 
4 0.40 0.47 0.59 0.60 0.81 
 
6.05 5.02 5.00 4.74 5.08 
Big 0.28 0.49 0.46 0.62 0.54 
 
4.87 4.44 4.43 4.38 4.73 
 
  
   
  
      Developed Markets Only  
Small 0.05 0.58 0.88 0.84 1.10 
 
6.66 5.72 5.88 5.08 4.65 
2 0.11 0.42 0.58 0.70 0.80 
 
6.50 5.61 5.02 4.70 4.87 
3 0.14 0.37 0.46 0.58 0.75 
 
6.16 5.50 5.32 4.74 5.00 
4 0.42 0.36 0.59 0.59 0.74 
 
6.29 4.97 4.81 4.80 5.09 
Big 0.26 0.49 0.42 0.63 0.51 
 
4.86 4.38 4.44 4.28 4.74 
 
  
   
  
      Global excl. North America (NA) 
Small -0.15 0.30 0.66 0.66 1.00 
 
6.77 5.71 5.32 5.00 5.16 
2 -0.11 0.36 0.88 0.63 0.74 
 
6.03 5.58 8.01 5.08 5.26 
3 -0.05 0.25 0.34 0.51 0.75 
 
5.73 5.57 5.25 5.19 5.40 
4 0.12 0.32 0.40 0.47 0.70 
 
5.70 5.34 5.27 5.22 5.60 
Big 0.02 0.30 0.43 0.54 0.65 
 
5.32 4.98 4.89 4.91 5.27 
 
  
   
  
      Developed Markets Only excl. North America (NA) 
Small -0.15 0.23 0.43 0.54 0.76 
 
6.84 5.46 5.25 4.86 4.87 
2 -0.31 0.19 0.31 0.47 0.47 
 
6.18 6.08 5.03 4.90 5.08 
3 -0.12 0.12 0.28 0.50 0.53 
 
6.04 5.49 5.35 5.11 5.41 
4 0.02 0.20 0.33 0.37 0.60 
 
6.10 5.21 5.21 5.27 5.58 
Big -0.04 0.29 0.37 0.55 0.64 
 
5.30 4.96 4.96 4.87 5.39 
 
  
   
  
      North America  
Small 0.89 1.14 1.45 1.32 1.64 
 
8.90 7.34 7.68 6.56 6.00 
2 0.61 0.94 1.03 1.00 1.20 
 
8.37 7.22 6.51 5.48 5.75 
3 0.96 0.67 0.85 0.92 1.11 
 
8.42 6.51 5.75 4.93 5.31 
4 0.89 0.75 0.93 0.77 0.99 
 
7.71 5.75 5.29 5.06 5.20 
Big 0.54 0.67 0.53 0.79 0.55   5.21 4.61 4.42 4.23 4.72 
 
  
   
  
      Europe                       
Small -0.20 0.07 0.51 0.50 0.87 
 
6.59 5.62 5.40 5.16 5.14 
2 0.14 0.28 0.40 0.72 0.96 
 
6.47 5.62 5.55 5.32 5.66 
3 0.19 0.38 0.41 0.72 0.90 
 
6.46 5.71 5.37 5.51 5.92 
4 0.35 0.39 0.66 0.68 0.75 
 
6.06 5.19 5.28 5.47 5.81 
Big 0.26 0.52 0.58 0.84 0.86 
 
5.34 4.79 5.29 5.17 5.63 
 
  
   
  
      Asia Pacific  
Small 0.68 0.93 1.30 1.45 2.11 
 
11.34 9.80 8.78 8.11 8.78 
2 0.17 0.93 0.60 1.03 1.12 
 
8.23 8.21 8.06 7.41 7.93 
3 -0.15 0.32 0.77 1.03 0.94 
 
7.97 6.84 7.25 7.11 7.32 
4 0.99 1.08 0.79 0.94 0.92 
 
7.14 8.28 6.41 6.13 7.38 
Big 0.54 1.02 0.56 0.77 1.24 
 
6.39 6.31 6.54 5.77 7.94 
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Table 3.3, continued 
 
  Mean   Standard Deviation 
  Low 2 3 4 High   Low 2 3 4 High 
            Japan                       
Small -0.46 -0.05 -0.06 0.18 0.09 
 
10.07 7.89 7.57 7.20 6.98 
2 -0.55 -0.13 -0.15 -0.05 -0.02 
 
8.90 8.19 7.50 7.10 6.97 
3 -0.47 -0.21 -0.14 -0.08 0.03 
 
8.39 8.19 7.19 7.03 7.05 
4 -0.51 -0.12 -0.09 -0.03 0.19 
 
7.82 7.11 6.68 6.63 6.77 
Big -0.48 -0.06 0.12 0.21 0.39 
 
6.90 6.32 5.78 5.66 6.33 
 
  
   
  
      Emerging Markets 
Small 0.13 0.55 1.45 1.04 1.72 
 
10.09 7.66 8.50 7.27 7.55 
2 0.36 0.92 0.73 1.02 1.31 
 
7.77 7.42 7.30 6.82 7.55 
3 0.26 0.86 0.56 1.00 1.41 
 
7.32 7.33 7.43 6.92 7.14 
4 0.19 0.46 0.56 0.74 1.22 
 
6.78 6.77 6.61 6.50 7.39 
Big 0.37 0.40 0.63 0.57 0.91 
 
6.42 6.72 6.32 6.89 7.17 
 
This table shows the summary statistics for the 25 size/B/M excess returns. At the end of June of each 
year we construct 25 size/B/M portfolios for each region. The size breakpoints are the 3rd, 7th, 13th, and 
25th percentiles of aggregate market cap for a region. The B/M quintile breakpoints use the big stocks (top 
90% of market cap) of a region. Regional quintile B/M breakpoints are used to allocate the stocks of these 
regions to the global test asset portfolios. The intersections of the 5×5 independent size and B/M sorts for 
a region produce 25 value-weighted size/B/M portfolios.  
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Table 3.4 
Summary Statistics for Regression Tests of the Fama-French Three-Factor Model Using Monthly Excess Returns on 25 Size/B/M  
Portfolios, With (5×5) and Without (4×5) Microcap Stocks: Nov. 1990 – Dec. 2010 
 
Panel A: Global Benchmark: Global Fama-French Three-factor Model 
 
Test Assets 
4×5 Size/B/M 
 
5×5 Size/B/M 
H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS   H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS 
G
lo
b
al
  Global 
0.39 0.11 0.41 0.94 0.20 1.74   1.13 0.16 0.62 0.92 0.21 3.12 
Developed Only 0.43 0.13 0.39 0.90 0.24 1.62   0.77 0.16 0.57 0.89 0.26 2.67 
Global excl. NA 0.68 0.25 0.34 0.83 0.51 1.24   0.80 0.24 0.39 0.83 0.46 1.27 
Developed only excl.NA 0.69 0.35 0.38 0.78 0.36 1.51   0.81 0.34 0.44 0.77 0.30 1.58 
R
eg
io
n
al
  
North America 0.86 0.35 0.44 0.71 0.12 2.00   0.94 0.41 0.54 0.70 0.15 2.41 
Europe 0.57 0.19 0.37 0.73 0.17 1.41   0.74 0.21 0.50 0.72 0.17 2.01 
Asia Pacific 1.45 0.25 0.44 0.58 0.13 2.00   2.09 0.30 0.51 0.56 0.21 2.08 
Japan 0.93 0.56 0.29 0.33 0.28 0.90   1.06 0.56 0.36 0.32 0.21 1.06 
Emerging Markets 0.77 0.18 0.30 0.55 0.34 0.94   1.16 0.23 0.39 0.52 0.36 1.25 
 
Panel B: Regional Benchmark: Local Fama-French Three-factor Model 
          Test Assets 
4×5 Size/B/M 
 
5×5 Size/B/M 
H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS   H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS 
North America 0.43 0.11 0.39 0.91 0.15 1.57   0.74 0.14 0.51 0.91 0.14 2.12 
Europe 0.43 0.11 0.35 0.92 0.33 1.24   0.51 0.12 0.46 0.92 0.25 1.71 
Asia Pacific 1.10 0.26 0.42 0.81 0.25 1.79   1.73 0.30 0.49 0.80 0.24 1.95 
Japan 0.32 0.10 0.26 0.92 0.42 0.75   0.49 0.10 0.31 0.92 0.31 0.81 
Emerging Markets 0.58 0.42 0.30 0.65 0.41 0.98   1.13 0.43 0.40 0.63 0.41 1.34 
 
Panel C: Hybrid Model Based on Main CL Sample 
 
Test Assets 
4×5 Size/B/M 
 
5×5 Size/B/M 
H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS   H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS 
G
lo
b
al
  Global 0.30 0.08 0.32 0.94 0.67 0.92   0.80 0.11 0.46 0.92 0.46 1.55 
Developed Only 0.35 0.07 0.35 0.95 0.46 1.12   0.72 0.09 0.53 0.95 0.41 2.05 
Global excl. NA 0.72 0.14 0.29 0.90 0.74 0.81   1.14 0.15 0.38 0.89 0.59 1.10 
Developed only excl.NA 0.28 0.07 0.28 0.94 0.61 0.76   0.51 0.08 0.42 0.94 0.49 1.27 
R
eg
io
n
al
  
North America 0.62 0.13 0.46 0.90 0.40 2.20   0.72 0.15 0.57 0.90 0.20 2.66 
Europe 0.48 0.12 0.35 0.90 0.38 1.22   0.71 0.13 0.51 0.91 0.17 2.06 
Asia Pacific 0.94 0.23 0.39 0.81 0.30 1.44   1.66 0.30 0.51 0.79 0.30 1.92 
Japan 0.54 0.08 0.25 0.92 0.55 0.65   0.54 0.09 0.35 0.93 0.45 0.97 
Emerging Markets 0.64 0.18 0.29 0.68 0.51 0.82   1.20 0.23 0.40 0.64 0.48 1.22 
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Table 3.4, continued 
 
The regressions use the global, local and hybrid version of the Fama-French three-factor model to explain the returns on four sets of global 
portfolios and five sets of regional portfolios on North America, Europe, Japan, Asia Pacific(excluding Japan), and Emerging Markets formed on 
size and B/M. The 5×5 results include microcap portfolios, the 4×5 results exclude microcap portfolios. The GRS statistic tests whether all 
intercepts in a set of 25 (5×5) or 20 (4×5) regressions are zero; H-L α is the difference between the highest and lowest intercepts for a set of 
regressions; |α| is the average absolute intercepts; SR(α) is the Sharpe ratio for the intercepts; R2 is the average time-series adjusted R2; CSR R2 is 
the GLS cross-sectional R2. With 25 portfolios and 242 monthly returns, critical values of the GRS statistic for all models are: 90%: 1.41; 95%: 
1.56; 97.5%: 1.69; 99%: 1.86 and 99.9%: 2.26. With 20 portfolios and 242 monthly returns, critical values of the GRS statistic for all models are: 
90%: 1.45; 95%: 1.62; 97.5%: 1.78; 99%: 1.95 and 99.9%: 2.41. Three classes of models are investigated: 
 
Global Fama-French Three-factor Model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐺 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐺(𝑅𝑚
𝐺 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖
𝐺𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐺 + ℎ𝑖
𝐺𝐹𝐵/𝑀
𝐺 + 𝜀𝑖 
Local Fama-French Three-factor Model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐿 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐿(𝑅𝑚
𝐿 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖
𝐿𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐿 + ℎ𝑖
𝐿𝐹𝐵/𝑀
𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖 
Hybrid Fama-French Three-factor Model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐻 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐴(𝑅𝑚
𝐴 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝑅𝑚
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝑠𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐴 + 𝑠𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
?̅?−𝐴 + ℎ𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝐵/𝑀
𝐴 + ℎ𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝐹𝐵/𝑀
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
The superscript “G” on the market and factor portfolios implies that they are constructed from all stocks around the world and the superscript 
designation of “L” on the market and factor portfolios implies that they are constructed only from local - or regional, in our experiments - stocks. 
The superscript “H” denotes the intercept for the hybrid model. The superscript “A” denotes a market or factor portfolio comprised of stocks only 
in the globally-accessible sample, which is represented by the sample of secondary cross-listings in this study, and the superscript “Ā-A” denotes a 
market or factor spread portfolio of the difference in the market or factor for purely-local stocks from the specific region (those not secondarily 
cross-listed overseas for which the test is performed) and that of the globally accessible stocks. The Main CL Sample is used here. 
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Table 3.5 
Summary Statistics for Regression Tests of the Hybrid Version of the Fama-French Three-Factor 
Model Using Monthly Excess Returns on 20 Size/B/M Portfolios When Different CL Samples 
are Used to Construct the Global Factors: Nov. 1990 – Dec. 2010 
 
 
Test Assets 
4×5 Size/B/M 
H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS 
 
 
Panel A: Main CL Sample 
 
 
(two viability constraints on target market trading) 
Global  
Global 0.30 0.08 0.32 0.94 0.67 0.92 
Developed Only 0.35 0.07 0.35 0.95 0.46 1.12 
Global excl. NA 0.72 0.14 0.29 0.90 0.74 0.81 
Developed only excl.NA 0.28 0.07 0.28 0.94 0.61 0.76 
Regional 
North America 0.62 0.13 0.46 0.90 0.40 2.20 
Europe 0.48 0.12 0.35 0.90 0.38 1.22 
Asia Pacific 0.94 0.23 0.39 0.81 0.30 1.44 
Japan 0.54 0.08 0.25 0.92 0.55 0.65 
Emerging Markets 0.64 0.18 0.29 0.68 0.51 0.82 
 
 
Panel B:CL1 
 
 
(no viability constraints on target market trading) 
Global 
Global 0.42 0.07 0.34 0.95 0.46 1.14 
Developed Only 0.35 0.07 0.38 0.94 0.27 1.23 
Global excl. NA 0.74 0.12 0.29 0.90 0.63 0.80 
Developed only excl.NA 0.26 0.12 0.35 0.93 0.64 1.06 
Regional 
North America 0.57 0.21 0.44 0.87 0.59 1.93 
Europe 0.43 0.19 0.44 0.89 0.61 1.76 
Asia Pacific 0.94 0.26 0.41 0.78 0.30 1.57 
Japan 0.63 0.16 0.33 0.91 0.43 1.13 
Emerging Markets 0.59 0.13 0.27 0.74 0.48 0.70 
 
 
Panel C: CL2a 
 
 
(non-zero target market trading in trailing 12 months) 
Global 
Global 0.44 0.09 0.40 0.94 0.44 1.65 
Developed Only 0.45 0.11 0.42 0.93 0.23 1.75 
Global excl. NA 0.74 0.11 0.39 0.90 0.61 1.54 
Developed only excl.NA 0.50 0.12 0.40 0.93 0.55 1.60 
Regional 
North America 0.53 0.11 0.36 0.83 0.47 1.36 
Europe 0.43 0.10 0.34 0.90 0.50 1.18 
Asia Pacific 0.93 0.23 0.40 0.80 0.32 1.55 
Japan 0.60 0.19 0.34 0.91 0.44 1.17 
Emerging Markets 0.54 0.12 0.26 0.67 0.57 0.69 
 
 
Panel D:CL2b 
 
 
(more stringent viability constraints on the Main CL Sample) 
Global 
Global 0.33 0.07 0.33 0.94 0.70 1.02 
Developed Only 0.37 0.07 0.38 0.95 0.42 1.38 
Global excl. NA 0.69 0.13 0.31 0.89 0.68 0.90 
Developed only excl.NA 0.35 0.08 0.33 0.93 0.65 1.05 
Regional 
North America 0.56 0.13 0.46 0.90 0.30 2.20 
Europe 0.46 0.13 0.39 0.89 0.40 1.51 
Asia Pacific 0.99 0.25 0.40 0.81 0.26 1.57 
Japan 0.48 0.08 0.25 0.92 0.54 0.63 
Emerging Markets 0.61 0.18 0.29 0.69 0.52 0.82 
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Table 3.5, continued 
 
 
The regressions use the hybrid model to explain the returns on four sets of global portfolios and five sets 
of regional portfolios on North America, Europe, Japan, Asia Pacific(excluding Japan), and Emerging 
Markets formed on size and B/M. The global factor portfolios are based on other globally accessible 
samples, where the Main CL Sample refers to the sample with two relative viability constraints, CL1 
refers to the sample without viability constraints, CL2a is the sample with absolute viable constraint, 
CL2b is the sample where more stringent screenings are imposed on the two viability constraints. Note 
that the regression results for the Main CL Sample are repeated from Table 4 for comparison. The 
selection criteria are described in the Appendix. The 4×5 results exclude microcap portfolios. The GRS 
statistic tests whether all intercepts in a set of 20 (4×5) regressions are zero; H-L α is the difference 
between the highest and lowest intercepts for a set of regressions; |α| is the average absolute intercept; 
SR(α) is the Sharpe ratio for the intercepts; R2 is the average time-series adjusted R2; CSR R2 is the GLS 
cross-sectional R2. With 20 portfolios and 242 monthly returns, critical values of the GRS statistic for all 
models are: 90%: 1.45; 95%: 1.62; 97.5%: 1.78; 99%: 1.95 and 99.9%: 2.41. The hybrid model based on 
the Fama-French three-factor model is: 
 
𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐻 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐴(𝑅𝑚
𝐴 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝑅𝑚
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝑠𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐴 + 𝑠𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
?̅?−𝐴 + ℎ𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝐵/𝑀
𝐴 + ℎ𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝐹𝐵/𝑀
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
The superscript “H” denotes the intercept for the hybrid model. The superscript “A” denotes a market or 
factor portfolio comprised of stocks only in the globally-accessible sample, which is represented by the 
sample of secondary cross-listings in this study, and the superscript “Ā-A” denotes a market or factor 
spread portfolio of the difference in the market or factor for purely-local stocks from the specific region 
(those not secondarily cross-listed overseas for which the test is performed) and that of the globally 
accessible stocks. 
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Table 3.6 
Summary Statistics for Regression Tests of the Carhart Four-Factor Model on 20 Size/Momentum Portfolios and the Hou-Karolyi-
Kho Extended Four-Factor Model on 20 Size/C/P Portfolios: Nov. 1990 – Dec. 2010 
 
Panel A: Global Benchmark: Global Carhart Four-Factor Model (left) and Global Hou-Karolyi-Kho Extended Four-Factor Model (right) 
 
Test Assets 
4×5 Size/Momentum 
 
4×5 Size/C/P 
H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS   H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS 
G
lo
b
al
  Global 0.57 0.12 0.43 0.92 0.17 1.89  
0.42 0.10 0.42 0.93 0.31 1.75 
Developed Only 0.71 0.14 0.45 0.89 0.17 2.05 
 
0.45 0.09 0.41 0.89 0.29 1.70 
Global excl. NA 0.89 0.25 0.44 0.81 0.05 1.96   0.54 0.20 0.38 0.84 0.49 1.44 
Developed only excl.NA 0.71 0.32 0.37 0.77 0.11 1.42   0.61 0.30 0.38 0.79 0.53 1.43 
R
eg
io
n
al
  
North America 0.82 0.45 0.37 0.72 0.43 1.37   0.70 0.52 0.41 0.70 0.29 1.68 
Europe 1.22 0.23 0.51 0.73 0.11 2.68   0.76 0.13 0.38 0.72 0.39 1.43 
Asia Pacific 1.61 0.34 0.52 0.58 0.08 2.74   1.24 0.24 0.46 0.58 0.34 2.15 
Japan 1.57 0.49 0.43 0.34 0.18 1.84   0.49 0.59 0.27 0.33 0.29 0.73 
Emerging Markets 2.53 0.47 0.44 0.45 0.08 1.96   1.08 0.30 0.38 0.54 0.34 1.47 
 
Panel B: Regional Benchmark: Local Carhart Four-Factor Model (left) and Local Hou-Karolyi-Kho Extended Four-Factor Model (right) 
           Test Assets 
4×5 Size/Momentum 
 
4×5 Size/C/P 
H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS   H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS 
North America 0.54 0.10 0.30 0.91 0.36 0.94   0.39 0.09 0.36 0.90 0.33 1.35 
Europe 0.98 0.20 0.55 0.91 0.11 2.98   0.36 0.10 0.37 0.92 0.59 1.34 
Asia Pacific 0.84 0.23 0.47 0.83 0.28 2.17   1.08 0.22 0.44 0.81 0.44 1.91 
Japan 0.63 0.19 0.36 0.92 0.11 1.37   0.46 0.10 0.30 0.92 0.37 0.95 
Emerging Markets 0.84 0.60 0.43 0.62 0.26 1.90   1.04 0.62 0.40 0.66 0.35 1.71 
 
Panel C: Hybrid Model Based on Main CL Sample: Hybrid Carhart Four-Factor Model (left) and Hybrid Hou-Karolyi-Kho Extended Four-Factor Model (right) 
 
Test Assets 
4×5 Size/Momentum 
 
4×5 Size/C/P 
H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS   H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS 
G
lo
b
al
  Global 0.44 0.13 0.44 0.93 0.52 1.74   0.40 0.10 0.38 0.94 0.50 1.29 
Developed Only 0.53 0.12 0.45 0.95 0.38 1.80   0.33 0.07 0.34 0.94 0.56 1.10 
Global excl. NA 0.99 0.19 0.47 0.89 0.44 2.07   0.50 0.15 0.38 0.90 0.68 1.34 
Developed only excl.NA 0.63 0.12 0.40 0.94 0.52 1.50   0.43 0.11 0.37 0.93 0.90 1.30 
R
eg
io
n
al
  
North America 0.73 0.21 0.42 0.90 0.50 1.77   0.63 0.15 0.42 0.89 0.45 1.77 
Europe 0.81 0.19 0.56 0.90 0.59 2.91   0.49 0.13 0.39 0.91 0.72 1.39 
Asia Pacific 0.79 0.24 0.48 0.83 0.50 2.12   1.46 0.23 0.48 0.81 0.61 2.07 
Japan 0.74 0.14 0.40 0.93 0.20 1.53   0.46 0.10 0.28 0.92 0.47 0.77 
Emerging Markets 1.17 0.32 0.40 0.64 0.49 1.51   0.78 0.21 0.34 0.69 0.61 1.09 
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Table 3.6, continued 
 
The regressions use the global, local and hybrid version of the Carhart four-factor model (left) and the Hou-Karolyi-Kho extended four-factor 
model (right) to explain the returns on four sets of global portfolios and five sets of regional portfolios on North America, Europe, Japan, Asia 
Pacific(excluding Japan), and Emerging Markets formed on size and momentum (left) and those on size and C/P (right). The 4×5 results exclude 
microcap portfolios. The GRS statistic tests whether all intercepts in a set of 20 (4×5) regressions are zero; H-L α is the difference between the 
highest and lowest intercepts for a set of regressions; |α| is the average absolute intercept; SR(α) is the Sharpe ratio for the intercepts; R2 is the 
average time-series adjusted R2; CSR R2 is the GLS cross-sectional R2. With 20 portfolios and 242 monthly returns, critical values of the GRS 
statistic for all models are: 90%: 1.45; 95%: 1.62; 97.5%: 1.78; 99%: 1.95 and 99.9%: 2.41. Six classes of models are investigated: 
 
Global Carhart Four-factor Model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐺 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐺(𝑅𝑚
𝐺 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖
𝐺𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐺 + ℎ𝑖
𝐺𝐹𝐵/𝑀
𝐺 + 𝑚𝑖
𝐺𝐹𝑀𝑜𝑚
𝐺 + 𝜀𝑖 
Local Carhart Four-factor Model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐿 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐿(𝑅𝑚
𝐿 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖
𝐿𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐿 + ℎ𝑖
𝐿𝐹𝐵/𝑀
𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖
𝐿𝐹𝑀𝑜𝑚
𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖 
Hybrid Carhart Four-factor Model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐻 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐴(𝑅𝑚
𝐴 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝑅𝑚
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝑠𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐴 + 𝑠𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
?̅?−𝐴 + ℎ𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝐵/𝑀
𝐴 + ℎ𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝐹𝐵/𝑀
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝑚𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝑀𝑜𝑚
𝐴 +
𝑚𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝐹𝑀𝑜𝑚
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Global Hou-Karolyi-Kho extended four-factor Model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐺 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐺(𝑅𝑚
𝐺 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖
𝐺𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐺 + 𝑐𝑖
𝐺𝐹𝐶/𝑃
𝐺 + 𝑚𝑖
𝐺𝐹𝑀𝑜𝑚
𝐺 + 𝜀𝑖 
Local Hou-Karolyi-Kho extended four-factor Model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐿 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐿(𝑅𝑚
𝐿 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖
𝐿𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐿 + 𝑐𝑖
𝐿𝐹𝐶/𝑃
𝐿 + 𝑚𝑖
𝐿𝐹𝑀𝑜𝑚
𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖 
Hybrid Hou-Karolyi-Kho extended four-factor Model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐻 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐴(𝑅𝑚
𝐴 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝑅𝑚
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝑠𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐴 + 𝑠𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝑐𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝐶/𝑃
𝐴 +
𝑐𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝐹𝐶/𝑃
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝑚𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝑀𝑜𝑚
𝐴 + 𝑚𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝐹𝑀𝑜𝑚
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
The superscript “G” on the market and factor portfolios implies that they are constructed from all stocks around the world and the superscript 
designation of “L” on the market and factor portfolios implies that they are constructed only from local - or regional, in our experiments - stocks. 
The superscript “H” denotes the intercept for the hybrid model. The superscript “A” denotes a market or factor portfolio comprised of stocks only 
in the globally-accessible sample, which is represented by the sample of secondary cross-listings in this study, and the superscript “Ā-A” denotes a 
market or factor spread portfolio of the difference in the market or factor for purely-local stocks from the specific region (those not secondarily 
cross-listed overseas for which the test is performed) and that of the globally accessible stocks. The Main CL Sample is used here. 
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Table 3.7 
Summary Statistics for Regression Tests of the Fama-French Three-Factor Model Using Monthly Excess Returns on 25 Size/B/M 
Portfolios and Industry Portfolios: Nov. 1990 – Dec. 2010 
 
Panel A: Global Benchmark: Global Fama-French Three-factor Model 
 
Test Assets 
5×5 Size/B/M + 10 Industry 
 
33 Industry 
H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS   H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS 
G
lo
b
al
  Global 1.13 0.18 0.77 0.87 0.13 3.28  
1.46 0.27 0.60 0.67 0.03 2.16 
Developed Only 1.07 0.18 0.69 0.85 0.12 2.66 
 
1.51 0.28 0.60 0.66 0.03 2.13 
Global excl. NA 1.01 0.24 0.58 0.80 0.17 1.84   1.46 0.30 0.56 0.67 0.04 1.85 
Developed only excl.NA 1.23 0.31 0.63 0.75 0.13 2.24   1.55 0.32 0.49 0.63 0.05 1.44 
R
eg
io
n
al
  
North America 1.21 0.38 0.59 0.66 0.11 1.93   1.76 0.31 0.48 0.47 0.11 1.37 
Europe 1.34 0.22 0.64 0.70 0.09 2.31   1.53 0.27 0.51 0.57 0.03 1.57 
Asia Pacific 2.09 0.27 0.55 0.56 0.14 1.69   2.70 0.36 0.46 0.46 0.09 1.25 
Japan 1.26 0.51 0.43 0.32 0.15 1.03   1.78 0.49 0.32 0.27 0.04 0.62 
Emerging Markets 1.16 0.26 0.54 0.51 0.12 1.63   1.88 0.32 0.50 0.42 0.05 1.47 
 
Panel B: Regional Benchmark: Local Fama-French Three-factor Model 
Test Assets 
5×5 Size/B/M + 10 Industry 
 
33 Industry 
H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS   H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS 
North America 0.78 0.15 0.57 0.83 0.11 1.83   1.46 0.23 0.48 0.56 0.13 1.42 
Europe 0.83 0.15 0.60 0.87 0.16 1.99   1.31 0.27 0.56 0.68 0.08 1.87 
Asia Pacific 2.03 0.30 0.54 0.78 0.18 1.56   2.98 0.37 0.59 0.62 0.22 2.01 
Japan 0.71 0.12 0.39 0.85 0.19 0.86   1.36 0.26 0.39 0.64 0.12 0.90 
Emerging Markets 1.23 0.45 0.56 0.62 0.27 1.79   2.04 0.54 0.58 0.50 0.15 2.04 
 
Panel C: Hybrid Model Based on Main CL Sample 
 
Test Assets 
5×5 Size/B/M + 10 Industry 
 
33 Industry 
H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS   H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS 
G
lo
b
al
  Global 0.80 0.12 0.62 0.88 0.39 1.86   0.85 0.16 0.51 0.70 0.14 1.37 
Developed Only 0.99 0.12 0.65 0.89 0.25 2.07   1.04 0.16 0.51 0.69 0.32 1.34 
Global excl. NA 1.17 0.16 0.56 0.86 0.36 1.62   0.95 0.19 0.57 0.73 0.15 1.74 
Developed only excl.NA 1.87 0.14 0.64 0.89 0.21 2.02   1.43 0.22 0.53 0.73 0.19 1.52 
R
eg
io
n
al
  
North America 0.83 0.18 0.66 0.83 0.10 2.38   1.36 0.28 0.56 0.56 0.16 1.84 
Europe 1.30 0.17 0.65 0.86 0.17 2.22   1.46 0.26 0.55 0.68 0.24 1.72 
Asia Pacific 1.66 0.27 0.58 0.78 0.27 1.67   3.02 0.35 0.55 0.64 0.34 1.61 
Japan 0.91 0.13 0.44 0.86 0.27 1.02   1.43 0.22 0.40 0.67 0.13 0.90 
Emerging Markets 1.80 0.26 0.53 0.65 0.35 1.47   2.50 0.33 0.54 0.54 0.13 1.62 
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Table 3.7, continued 
 
The regressions use the global, local and hybrid version of the Fama-French three-factor model to explain the returns on four sets of global 
portfolios and five sets of regional portfolios on North America, Europe, Japan, Asia Pacific(excluding Japan), and Emerging Markets formed on 
size and B/M together with 10 industry portfolios (left) and 33 industry portfolios (right). The 5×5 results include microcap portfolios The 10 
industry portfolios (left) are constructed by using the FTSE/Dow Jones Industry Classification Benchmark (Level 1 Industrial Classification In 
Datastream) to aggregate individual stocks from the specific region for which the test is performed into ten groups representing the industries Oil 
and Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, Consumer Goods, Healthcare, Consumer Services, Telecommunications, Utilities, Financials and 
Technology. Similarly, the 33 industry portfolios (left) are constructed by using the FTSE/Dow Jones Industry Classification Benchmark (Level 4 
Industrial Classification In Datastream). The GRS statistic tests whether all intercepts in a set of 35 (5×5+ 10) or 33 regressions are zero; H-L α is 
the difference between the highest and lowest intercepts for a set of regressions; |α| is the average absolute intercept; SR(α) is the Sharpe ratio for 
the intercepts; R2 is the average time-series adjusted R2; CSR R2 is the GLS cross-sectional R2. With 35 portfolios and 242 monthly returns, critical 
values of the GRS statistic for all models are: 90%: 1.35; 95%: 1.48; 97.5%: 1.60; 99%: 1.73 and 99.9%: 2.05. With 33 portfolios and 242 
monthly returns, critical values of the GRS statistic for all models are: 90%: 1.36; 95%: 1.49; 97.5%: 1.61; 99%: 1.75 and 99.9%: 2.08. Three 
classes of models are investigated: 
 
Global Fama-French Three-factor Model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐺 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐺(𝑅𝑚
𝐺 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖
𝐺𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐺 + ℎ𝑖
𝐺𝐹𝐵/𝑀
𝐺 + 𝜀𝑖 
Local Fama-French Three-factor Model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐿 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐿(𝑅𝑚
𝐿 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖
𝐿𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐿 + ℎ𝑖
𝐿𝐹𝐵/𝑀
𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖 
Hybrid Fama-French Three-factor Model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐻 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐴(𝑅𝑚
𝐴 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝑅𝑚
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝑠𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐴 + 𝑠𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
?̅?−𝐴 + ℎ𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝐵/𝑀
𝐴 + ℎ𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝐹𝐵/𝑀
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
The superscript “G” on the market and factor portfolios implies that they are constructed from all stocks around the world and the superscript 
designation of “L” on the market and factor portfolios implies that they are constructed only from local - or regional, in our experiments - stocks. 
The superscript “H” denotes the intercept for the hybrid model. The superscript “A” denotes a market or factor portfolio comprised of stocks only 
in the globally-accessible sample, which is represented by the sample of secondary cross-listings in this study, and the superscript “Ā-A” denotes a 
market or factor spread portfolio of the difference in the market or factor for purely-local stocks from the specific region (those not secondarily 
cross-listed overseas for which the test is performed) and that of the globally accessible stocks. The Main CL Sample is used here. 
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Table 3.8 
Summary Statistics for Regression Tests of the Alternative Model Based on Principal Component Analysis(PCA) Using Monthly 
Excess Returns on 20 Size/B/M Portfolios: Nov. 1990 – Dec. 2010 
 
  
H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS   H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS 
 
 
Panel A: Hybrid Model 
 
Panel B: PCA-based Alternative Model 
G
lo
b
al
  Global 0.30 0.08 0.32 0.94 0.67 0.92   0.75 0.27 0.46 0.90 0.38 2.18 
Developed Only 0.35 0.07 0.35 0.95 0.46 1.12   0.74 0.23 0.48 0.88 0.48 2.37 
Global excl. NA 0.72 0.14 0.29 0.90 0.74 0.81   0.80 0.47 0.42 0.75 0.45 1.83 
Developed only excl.NA 0.28 0.07 0.28 0.94 0.61 0.76   1.01 0.49 0.54 0.82 0.42 3.02 
R
eg
io
n
al
  
North America 0.62 0.13 0.46 0.90 0.40 2.20   0.42 0.15 0.40 0.74 0.35 1.59 
Europe 0.48 0.12 0.35 0.90 0.38 1.22   0.90 0.30 0.42 0.77 0.14 1.78 
Asia Pacific 0.94 0.23 0.39 0.81 0.30 1.44   1.56 0.57 0.53 0.67 0.19 2.90 
Japan 0.54 0.08 0.25 0.92 0.55 0.65   0.95 0.39 0.34 0.76 0.39 1.19 
Emerging Markets 0.64 0.18 0.29 0.68 0.51 0.82   0.97 0.64 0.39 0.60 0.24 1.52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 153 
 
 
 
Table 3.8, continued 
 
 
The regressions use the alternative model built on principal component analysis(PCA)  to explain the returns on four sets of global portfolios and 
five sets of regional portfolios on North America, Europe, Japan, Asia Pacific(excluding Japan), and Emerging Markets formed on size and B/M. 
The local factors in the PCA-based alternative model is constructed as follow: first orthogonalize the stock returns for the specific region for which 
the test is performed relative to the global factors of the globally-accessible set, next identify up to three principal components of the residuals, 
then the local factor portfolios are determined by the extracted principal factors, with portfolio weights given by the scaled eigenvector. The PCA-
based alternative model therefore consists of three global factors and three “local” principal component factors. Panel B reports the regression 
results of the PCA-based alternative model and, for comparison, Panel A supplements those of the hybrid model proposed in this chapter, which is 
also reported in Panel C, Table 4. The 4×5 results exclude microcap portfolios. The GRS statistic tests whether all intercepts in a set of 20 (4×5) 
regressions are zero; H-L α is the difference between the highest and lowest intercepts for a set of regressions; |α| is the average absolute intercept; 
SR(α) is the Sharpe ratio for the intercepts; R2 is the average time-series adjusted R2; CSR R2 is the GLS cross-sectional R2. With 20 portfolios and 
242 monthly returns, critical values of the GRS statistic for all models are: 90%: 1.45; 95%: 1.62; 97.5%: 1.78; 99%: 1.95 and 99.9%: 2.41. Two 
classes of models are investigated: 
 
PCA-based Candidate Fama-French Three-factor Model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐻 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐴(𝑅𝑚
𝐴 − 𝑅𝑓) + +𝑠𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐴 + ℎ𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝐵/𝑀
𝐴 + 𝜆𝑖
𝑃𝐶𝐴,1𝐹1
𝑃𝐶𝐴 + 𝜆𝑖
𝑃𝐶𝐴,2𝐹2
𝑃𝐶𝐴 +
𝜆𝑖
𝑃𝐶𝐴,3𝐹3
𝑃𝐶𝐴 + 𝜀𝑖 
Hybrid Fama-French Three-factor Model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐻 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐴(𝑅𝑚
𝐴 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝑅𝑚
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝑠𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐴 + 𝑠𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
?̅?−𝐴 + ℎ𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝐵/𝑀
𝐴 + ℎ𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝐹𝐵/𝑀
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
The superscript “H” denotes the intercept for the hybrid model. The superscript “PCA” on the local principal component factor portfolios implies 
that they are constructed only from local - or regional, in our experiments – stocks and determined by the principal components of the residual 
extracted from regression of local stock returns on the global factors of the globally-accessible set. The superscript “A” denotes a market or factor 
portfolio comprised of stocks only in the globally-accessible sample, which is represented by the sample of secondary cross-listings in this study, 
and the superscript “Ā-A” denotes a market or factor spread portfolio of the difference in the market or factor for purely-local stocks from the 
specific region (those not secondarily cross-listed overseas for which the test is performed) and that of the globally accessible stocks. The Main CL 
Sample is used here. 
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Table 3.9 
Summary Statistics for Regression Tests of the Hybrid Model on Europe and Emerging Markets: 
Nov. 1990 – Dec. 2010 
 
   Panel A: Emerging Markets 
 
Test Assets 
4×5 Size/B/M 
H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS 
Global  
EMEA 1.64 0.41 0.39 0.34 0.21 1.57 
Latin America 1.44 0.41 0.43 0.34 0.46 1.96 
Southeast Asia 0.69 0.18 0.25 0.45 0.22 0.63 
Local 
EMEA 1.28 0.71 0.38 0.45 0.45 1.52 
Latin America 1.40 0.31 0.41 0.55 0.17 1.76 
Southeast Asia 0.62 0.13 0.23 0.75 0.28 0.59 
Hybrid 
EMEA 1.44 0.30 0.33 0.52 0.42 1.09 
Latin America 1.46 0.29 0.40 0.53 0.44 1.64 
Southeast Asia 0.67 0.13 0.24 0.74 0.37 0.58 
 
  Panel B: Europe 
 
Test Assets 
4×5 Size/B/M 
H-L α |α | SR(α) R2 CSR R2 GRS 
Global  
Non Eurozone Members 0.56 0.11 0.24 0.64 0.34 0.60 
Original Eurozone Members 0.72 0.24 0.41 0.68 0.14 1.72 
    - Before Jan. 1999 1.12 0.24 0.67 0.46 0.50 1.63 
    - After Jan. 1999 0.76 0.25 0.40 0.76 0.32 0.87 
Local 
Non Eurozone Members 0.43 0.11 0.25 0.84 0.37 0.64 
Original Eurozone Members 0.57 0.17 0.37 0.88 0.30 1.47 
    - Before Jan. 1999 0.77 0.19 0.63 0.85 0.34 1.36 
    - After Jan. 1999 0.79 0.18 0.45 0.90 0.23 1.21 
  Hybrid 
Non Eurozone Members 0.58 0.14 0.30 0.83 0.41 0.94 
Original Eurozone Members 0.64 0.14 0.35 0.87 0.44 1.22 
    - Before Jan. 1999 1.05 0.22 0.68 0.82 0.37 1.63 
    - After Jan. 1999 0.59 0.11 0.32 0.90 0.76 0.50 
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Table 3.9, continued 
 
 
 
The regressions use the global, local and hybrid version of the Fama-French three-factor model to explain 
the returns on seven sets of portfolios formed on size and B/M (Panel A for Emerging Markets and Panel 
B for Europe). The 4×5 results exclude microcap portfolios. The GRS statistic tests whether all intercepts 
in a set of 20 (4×5) regressions are zero; H-L α is the difference between the highest and lowest intercepts 
for a set of regressions; |α| is the average absolute intercepts; SR(α) is the Sharpe ratio for the intercepts; 
R2 is the average time-series adjusted R2; CSR R2 is the GLS cross-sectional R2. Three classes of models 
are investigated: 
 
Global Fama-French Three-factor Model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐺 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐺(𝑅𝑚
𝐺 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖
𝐺𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐺 + ℎ𝑖
𝐺𝐹𝐵/𝑀
𝐺 + 𝜀𝑖 
Local Fama-French Three-factor Model: 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐿 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐿(𝑅𝑚
𝐿 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝑠𝑖
𝐿𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐿 + ℎ𝑖
𝐿𝐹𝐵/𝑀
𝐿 + 𝜀𝑖 
Hybrid Fama-French Three-factor Model: 
𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖
𝐻 + 𝛽𝑖
𝐴(𝑅𝑚
𝐴 − 𝑅𝑓) + 𝛽𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝑅𝑚
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝑠𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
𝐴 + 𝑠𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
?̅?−𝐴 + ℎ𝑖
𝐴𝐹𝐵/𝑀
𝐴 + ℎ𝑖
?̅?−𝐴𝐹𝐵/𝑀
?̅?−𝐴 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
The superscript “G” on the market and factor portfolios implies that they are constructed from all stocks 
around the world and the superscript designation of “L” on the market and factor portfolios implies that 
they are constructed only from local - or regional, in our experiments - stocks. The superscript “H” 
denotes the intercept for the hybrid model. The superscript “A” denotes a market or factor portfolio 
comprised of stocks only in the globally-accessible sample, which is represented by the sample of 
secondary cross-listings in this study, and the superscript “Ā-A” denotes a market or factor spread 
portfolio of the difference in the market or factor for purely-local stocks from the specific region (those 
not secondarily cross-listed overseas for which the test is performed) and that of the globally accessible 
stocks. The Main CL Sample is used here. 
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APPENDIX 
Procedure for Constructing the Globally Accessible Sample  
Target Market U.S. U.K. Europe Germany Luxembourg Singapore Hong Kong 
Target Exchanges 
NYSE/AMEX, London Euronext Frankfurt Luxembourg Singapore Catalist Hong Kong 
NASDAQ, London OTC Amsterdam  
 
Singapore OTC 
 
Non NASDAQ 
OTC 
London Plus Market Brussels  
 
Singapore 
 
New York, SEAQ International Lisbon  
   
NASDAQ/NMS, 
 
Paris  
   
NYSE Arca 
 
Easdaq  
   
E
x
cl
u
si
o
n
 C
ri
te
ri
a
 
 Non domestic stocks 
only 
9,632 4,114 5,165 14,542 430 300 314 
 Target market 
currency 
denominated only  
9,585 4,114 5,165 14,542 430 215 284 
 ADRs, GDRs, or 
equity only 
8,900 3,112 4,212 13,899 404 212 246 
 Available records of 
home market only  
9,181 3,086 4,205 13,873 363 212 246 
 Qualified records of 
parent code only 
8,857 3,078 4,205 12,591 363 211 246 
 Available RI records 
only 
7,586 2,413 2,997 12,186 143 179 216 
 Exclude dual record 
in one target market 
6,421 1,995 2,217 11,463 133 171 212 
 Qualified countries 
only   
6,320 1,791 2,165 11,292 126 170 210 
 Available records 
from Worldscope 
only  
5,080 1,517 1,058 9,986 101 160 201 
 Non-financial stocks 
only 
4,392 1,283 690 8,680 82 120 175 
 Exclude special cases 4,354 1,273 689 8,622 81 120 175 
 Total across regions                                                                                                                  11,319 
 Additional domestic 
stocks included 
                                                                                                                 11,335 
 Qualified stocks only CL1             11,057  
 Viability Constraints 
Main CL Sample            5,747  Relative viability constraints(I or II) 
CL2a            9,605    Absolute viability constraint 
CL2b           4,058  Stringent Relative viability constraints(I or II) 
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Appendix, continued 
This table shows the procedure on how to construct the globally accessible sample and the total number of stocks is reported for each step. The list of 
target exchanges is as shown and each exclusion criterion is explained in the table below. To be included in the global accessible sample, each stock has 
to be also cross listed in any of the 7 target markets with the types of ADRs, GDRs or equity, has sufficient information to identify its home market and 
parent codes, have at least one monthly returns, has sufficient information to calculate at least one of the characteristics including Size, B/M and C/P. 
“CL” stands for cross-listing.  
 
  Definitions of Exclusion Criteria 
Exclusion Criteria Description 
 Non domestic stocks only 
If one stock is only listed in its home market, it is excluded from the sample. And these stocks are excluded as follow,  
 Stocks are from U.S. and only listed in the target exchanges within the U.S.; 
 Stocks are from U.K. and only listed in the target exchanges within the U.K.; 
 Stocks are from Portugal and only listed in Euronext Lisbon; 
 Stocks are from France and only listed in Euronext Paris; 
 Stocks are from Netherland and only listed in Euronext Amsterdam; 
 Stocks are from Luxembourg and only listed in Luxembourg; 
 Stocks are from Singapore and only listed in the target exchanges within Singapore; 
 Stocks are from Hong Kong and only listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
 Target market currency denomination only  
If one stock is denominated with a currency other than that of the host market, it is excluded from the sample. This exclusion 
criterion only applies to stocks cross-listed in the U.S., Singapore and Hong Kong.  
 ADRs, GDRs, or equity only If one stock is recorded as other instrument types than ADRs, GDRs or equity from Datastream, it is excluded from the sample.  
 Available records of home market only  If one stock has no available records of home market from Datastream, it is excluded from the sample.  
 Qualified records of parent code only If one stock has no available records of parent code in each major exchange from Datastream, it is excluded from the sample.  
 Available RI records only If one stock has no available Return Index (RI) from Datastream, it is excluded from the sample.  
 Exclude dual record case in one target market 
If one stock is cross listed on more than one target exchange within one given target market, it is counted as only one stock in the 
sample.  
 Qualified countries only If one stock is from countries other than the country list in Table 1, it is excluded from the sample.  
 Available records from Worldscope only  If one stock has no available company account item from Worldscope, it is excluded from the sample.  
 Non-financial stocks only If one stock is financial stock, it is excluded from the sample.  
 Exclude special cases Special cases include but is not limited to that the ADR (or GDR), instead of the home equity, is primary quoted in Datastream. 
 Total across regions If one stock is listed in more than one target market, it is counted as only one stock in the sample.  
 Additional domestic stocks included 
Domestic stocks from the seven target markets are included as long as three criteria are satisfied: a. size (in the top 75% of market 
cap for the market); b. liquidity ( a minimum price of $5 for U.S. and equivalent levels in terms of percentile rank for non U.S. 
markets); and c. float  (a minimum 75% public float for listed stocks)  
 Qualified stocks only If one stock has less than 12 monthly returns, it is excluded from the sample.  
 Viability Constraints 
Viability constraints are evaluated by the Turnover (VO) from Datastream and it includes records in the home market and those in 
the target markets. 
 Relative viability constraint I 
For each cross-listed stock in the sample, there should be at least 0.5% of annual oversea trading value relative to all secondarily 
cross-listed stock trading from its country of domicile 
 Relative viability constraint II 
For each cross-listed stock in the sample, there should be at least 0.1% of annual global trading volume occurred in any of the 
target markets on average during the sample period 
 Absolute viability constraint 
For each cross-listed stock in the sample in a given year, if there is at least one month of non-zero trading occurred in the target 
markets, the stock is included in the sample for that year 
 Stringent Relative viability constraints(I or II) The screening ratios are 5% for relative viability constraint I and 1% for relative viability constraint II.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
WHAT FACTORS DRIVE TRADING AROUND THE WORLD? 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Over the past two decades, financial economists have become increasingly fascinated with the 
trading decisions of investors. Although there have been many rich explanations for the level of 
trading volume, such as tax-driven trading, liquidity trading, portfolio rebalancing and 
speculation, less effort has been devoted to improving our understanding of the commonality in 
trading activity across different stocks. Decomposing trading activity to measure how much of 
the trading process is driven by systematic factors and how much is because of firm-specific 
causes is valuable for modeling asset pricing and trading volume. Understanding commonality of 
trading around the world is also important for global asset managers concerned with diversifying 
their investment and trading strategies.  
Considerable evidence has shown that the systematic variation of stock returns are related with 
firm-level characteristics such as size, book-to-market equity, cash flow to price, momentum 
while we know little about the theoretical foundation for the co-movement in stock trading. To 
fill the gap, Lo and Wang (LW hereafter, 2000 and 2006) have developed a multi-factor model 
for turnover based on mutual fund separation theorem. This model suggests that the number of 
return factors and the number of turnover factors should be the same. And the turnover factors in 
turnover model are nothing but the turnover on the K return factors. Although their model gives 
rise to a decomposition of turnover into systematic and idiosyncratic components, difficulties 
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still exist in implementing conventional procedures of multifactor estimation due to severe 
heteroscedasticity and nonstationarity in turnover data. In order to overcome these problems, 
Cremers and Mei (CM hereafter, 2007) employ two statistical procedures developed by Bai and 
Ng (BN hereafter, 2002 and 2004) and document that there are four or five systematic factors 
driving stock turnover in the NYSE and AMEX for the period of 1962-2001. This chapter is 
motivated in the same spirit but broadens the investigation to over 30,000 stocks from 48 
countries using weekly turnovers over the 1977 to 2010 period. Given the widespread acceptance 
of the common factors in return, do these factors also drive the systematic trading around the 
world? The purpose of this chapter is to answer this important question. 
The global perspective helps to illuminate how the co-movement in trading activity varies across 
countries and over time. Furthermore, it furnishes a better understanding of the relationship 
between the commonality in return and the commonality in trading. Are the cross-country and 
time-series patterns in the commonality in trading similar to those for the commonality in 
returns? This extensive study enables us not only to determine how well classic multifactor 
models perform in developed or emerging markets in terms of capturing the systematic turnover, 
but also to identify which factors in stock returns are important for explaining the common 
variation in stock turnover for each country.   
This chapter uncovers several new findings on the commonality of trading around the world. 
First, the results suggest, the systematic turnover factors together capture 31% of the variation of 
individual stock turnover on average, lower than the 36% of systematic variation in individual 
stock excess returns. The average level of commonality in trading varies substantially across 
countries, with greater values for less developed countries, which is consistent with the findings 
and argument of Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000). In general, there are two to four pervasive return 
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factors while three to eight systematic turnover factors exist. In terms of time-series dynamics, I 
show that in North America the commonalities of both excess return and turnover are U-shaped 
over the last ten years.  
Secondly and perhaps more importantly, the return-based factors work poorly in capturing the 
common variation in stock turnovers around the world. Although the factors associated with size, 
book-to-market, and cash-flow-to-price help capture the cross-sectional variation in stock 
turnover, these common factor-mimicking portfolios, together with the market portfolio, can 
only explain up to 67% of the co-movement of trading, much lower than their performance in 
capturing over 90% of the cross-sectional variation in stock returns. Additionally, the component 
of systematic trading unrelated with return motives varies substantially across markets, with 
larger gaps for North America, Japan and most emerging markets.  
In terms of time-series dynamics, it shows that, according to LW (2000, 2006) model, trading 
due to systematic risk in returns can account for 64% of all systematic turnover variation on 
average. I further compare the performances of three asset pricing models – namely, CAPM, the 
Fama and French (FF hereafter, 1993) three-factor model and the Hou-Karolyi –Kho (HKK 
hereafter, 2011) model. CAPM market turnover captures on average 37% of all systematic 
turnover in individual stock trading. Two additional FF factor turnovers increase the mean 
performance of the 48 countries by 23% in capturing systematic turnover; two additional HKK 
(2011) factor turnovers increase by 16%.  I continue to identify which factors in returns are 
important for explaining the common variation in stock turnover. For all the major factors that 
have been suggested in the empirical asset pricing literature, a zero-investment factor-mimicking 
portfolio (in the spirit of Huberman, Kandel and Stambaugh, 1987, using the methodology of FF, 
1992, Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok, 1998 and HKK, 2011) is constructed by going long in 
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stocks that have high values on an attribute and short in stocks with low values of the attribute. 
Examining the turnover behavior of different factor mimicking portfolios can help us evaluate 
and interpret the trading implications related to these stock characteristics. Results show that 
factors associated with size, book-to-market, and cash flow to price are important in driving the 
systematic turnover in individual stock trading. I finally assess the performance of different 
models, which combine these factor-mimicking portfolios with the market portfolio, in capturing 
the systematic turnover in individual stock trading. A universal four-factor model, which 
includes a market turnover factor and three other factor turnovers associated with size, book-to-
market, and cash-flow-to-price, can explain on average up to 67% of the common variation in 
stock turnovers around the world. The results indicate that the return-based factors fare poorly in 
the regression of individual stock turnovers and there are around 33% left in the commonality of 
trading that cannot be explained by the return motives.  
Cross-country analysis shows that the explanatory power of the return-based multifactor model 
varies substantially across countries and markets, with better performance for European 
developed markets and China. When the FF three-factor model is used in the regression of 
individual stock turnovers, 27% of the systematic turnover is unexplained in U.K., Norway and 
Sweden while over 52% is left in U.S, 48% in the Tokyo stock exchange, and 54% in Taiwan, 
South Korea and other emerging markets. When the optimal four-factor model is applied, in 
terms of the average R2 from regression for each country and market, 20% of the systematic 
turnover in the U.K., Norway and Sweden cannot be explained by these return-based factors 
while over 40% is left in North America, 43% in the Tokyo stock exchange, and 36% left in the 
emerging markets. Here, China is a special case in that there is only 20% of all systematic 
turnover in individual stock trading left beyond what the return-based factors can capture, despite 
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that its commonality of trading ranks highest in the world. One possibility that might explain the 
superior performance of the return-based factors in European markets is that their total 
commonality in trading is small and therefore it is easy for the return-based factors to approach 
the optimal level. Why the return-based factors work even worse in the United States and Japan 
remains an open-ended question. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the 
data, followed by the methodology for decomposing turnover. Section 3 briefly describes the 
decomposition results. Section 4 shows how return factors explain the turnover file and Section 5 
concludes. 
 
4.2. Data and Methodology for Decomposing Turnover 
This section explains the data sources, the screening procedures, and the methodology of 
turnover decomposition. 
 
4.2.1 Data Sources and Screens 
I collect the weekly total return index (RI), the weekly trading turnover (VO; expressed in 
thousands of shares), the number of outstanding shares (NB), and the market capitalization (MV; 
expressed in millions of U.S. dollars) for individual stocks from Datastream. The choice of a 
weekly horizon is a compromise between maximizing sample size and minimizing the day-to-
day volume and return fluctuations that have less direct economic relevance (LW, 2000 and CM, 
2007). According to convention, I measure weekly turnovers and returns from Wednesday-day 
 163 
 
close to the following Wednesday close48.  
My sample includes 42,080 stocks from 48 countries from Dec. 29, 1976 to June, 30, 2010. 
According to the classification by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World 
Bank Group, 22 out of the 48 countries are developed (Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the 
U.S.) and 26 markets are developing (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech 
Republic Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Sri Lanka, South Africa, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey, and Venezuela). 
Because my focus is on the implications of portfolio theory for trading behavior, I restrict the 
sample to stocks from major exchanges, which I define as the exchanges on which the majority 
of stocks in that country are listed. However, multiple exchanges are included in samples for 
China (Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges), Japan (Osaka and Tokyo exchanges), and the United 
States (NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ). I exclude preferred stocks, warrants, REITs, depositary 
receipts, and other stocks with special features49.  
To limit the effect of survivorship bias, I include dead stocks in the sample. For both dead and 
active stocks, I confirm the ending date if it satisfies two conditions: 1) consecutive constant RIs 
                                                 
1 Seasonal patterns in weekly autocorrelations have been examined in detail by Keim and Stambaugh (1984), 
Bessembinder and Hertzel (1993), and Boudoukh et al. (1994). Bessembinder and Hertzel (1993) find, for example, 
that the patterns in autocorrelations across weekdays are related to the importance of weekend returns versus 
nonweekend returns in autocorrelation patterns and are robust to alternative market microstructures.  
49 The exclusion of these stocks is done manually by examining the names of the individual stocks, as neither 
Datastream nor Worldscope provide codes for discerning non-common shares from common shares. I drop stocks 
with name including “REIT”, “REAL EST”, “GDR”, “PF”, “PREE”, or “PRF” as these terms may represent REITS, 
GDRs, or preferred stocks. I drop stocks with name including “duplicate”, “dual purposes”, “TRUST”, “INCOME 
FD”, “INCOME FUND” due to various special features. 
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from that day until the end of the period, June, 30, 2010; 2) zero VOs from that day until the end 
of the period. Panel A in Table 4.1 shows a brief summary by year.  The second column of the 
sheet provides the number of firms with status of dead or suspended listed in Datastream, the 
third column gives the number of firms that are actually dead according to the two conditions 
stated above, the fourth column provides the number of firms that were alive until June 2010, 
and the fifth column sums up all the previous three columns. 
I use the following screens and adjustments. The stocks whose either VOs or RIs are unavailable 
from Datastream are dropped from the sample. For weekly returns, I apply several screening 
procedures suggested by Ince and Porter (2003) and HKK (2011). In addition, I require a 
minimum price of $1 (and equivalent value for foreign currencies) at previous week-end for a 
stock to be included in the analysis to minimize potential biases arising from low-price and 
illiquid stocks. Panel B in Table 4.1 confirms that the final sample has consistent value-weighted 
market returns with the MSCI country index returns.  
Panel C in Table 4.1 presents the number of firms in raw sample, unbalanced sample, and 
balanced sample. The first column provides the number of securities traded on the exchanges. 
The second column provides the unbalanced sample, which includes the number of securities 
with <50% missing observations in turnovers and no problematic data50.The third column 
provides the balanced sample, including the number of securities with neither missing 
observations in turnover nor problematic data. The last column provides average weekly 
turnovers estimates for the whole sample period, which are comparable to earlier studies such as 
                                                 
50 Two types of problematic data (CM, 2007) are considered. The first type includes stocks that have constant 
turnovers in the period. The second are those stocks that have likely data entry problems as evidenced by an 
unusually large standard deviation (specifically, 10 times the average standard deviation. See also the discussion on 
the so-called Z-flag in LW. As they argue, such large standard deviations probably indicate data errors). 
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LW (2000) and CM (2007). This chapter standardizes the turnover data by first de-meaning, and 
then normalizing, each stock turnover series by its sample standard deviation over the relevant 
period.  
Consistent with CM (2007) and LW (2000), the time series data have been divided into seven 
five-year sample periods. I further limit my final sample by just allowing positive turnovers for 
the sample period to prevent the problem of missing data. Table 4.2 presents a brief summary for 
seven five-year sample sub-periods. For each sub-period, the first column provides the simple 
average weekly turnover and the second column provides the number of firms which satisfies the 
positive turnover condition from the balanced sample. 48 out of 51 markets meet with the sub-
period screening criteria. Additionally, I impose the condition of no less than 50 firms for each 
sample; thirty-three out of fifty-one markets are available for turnover decomposition. 
To ensure that the accounting variables are known before the returns, I match the accounting data 
for fiscal year-end in year t-1 with weekly returns from July of year t to June of year t+1. Among 
the accounting ratios, L/B (Worldscope data item WC08226), D/P (WC09404), and E/P 
(WC09204) are directly obtained from Worldscope. I take the inverses of the price-to-book ratio 
(WC09304) and the price-to-cash-flow ratio (WC09604) to calculate the B/M and C/P ratios, 
respectively. Size is defined as the market value of equity at the last Wednesday of June of year 
t, and momentum (Mom) for month t is the cumulative raw return from month t-6 to month t-2, 
skipping month t-1 to mitigate the impact of microstructure biases such as bid-ask spread or 
nonsynchronous trading. In addition, I select the stocks with complete financial accounting 
information to construct the characteristic-based portfolios: book-to-market equity, cash flow-to-
price, and dividend-to-price.  
4.2.2 Methodology for Decomposing Turnover 
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LW (2000, 2006) provide a multifactor model for turnover: 
τjt = τj + δj1g1t + ⋯ + δjKgKt + ξjt      
                                                                                                                                           
(1) 
where τjt is the turnover of stock j in period t (number of shares traded divided by the total 
number of shares outstanding), δjk is the exposure of firm j to economy wide trading shocks 
gkt, and τj is a constant. Using terms common for discussing returns, I call δjk turnover betas. 
ξjt has mean zero and is assumed to be orthogonal to gkt. In addition, I assume ξjt satisfies the 
regularity conditions as given in BN (2002, 2004). Appendix A shows the detailed 
decomposition method proposed by BN (2002, 2004).  
 
4.3 Decomposition Results  
 
4.3.1 The Commonality in Turnover and Excess Return 
Decomposition results suggest that there is a strong presence of commonality in turnover and 
excess return for each country. On average, the systematic turnover factors together capture 31% 
of the variation of individual stock turnover, lower than the percentage of systematic variation in 
individual stock excess return, 36%.  The asymmetry between the commonality of trading and 
excess returns around the world is different from what CM (2007) find for the NYSE and 
AMEX. It might indicate that there are more firm-specific components incorporated in trading 
volume rather than the price for other foreign markets.  
Figure 4.1 illustrates the cross-country variation in commonality in turnover and excess return. 
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The figure sorts the average R2, a measurement of commonality in turnover, over the sample 
period for the thirty-three markets in out sample, from high to low. The average level of 
commonality in trading varies substantially across countries, with greater values for less 
developed countries. China stands out, with an average R2 of 64%. Among other less-developed 
countries, such as Taiwan, Turkey, Malaysia, commonality average around 31-54%, whereas 
developed countries like Australia, Finland, Canada and the U.K. have an average commonality 
of just around 13-19%. The cross-sectional variation from less-developed countries to developed 
countries also can be found from the commonality of excess return in Figure 4.1. This evidence 
is consistent with the information argument by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) and Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000). 
Figure 4.2 shows the trend of the commonality in turnover and excess return using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). Panel A exhibits the non-overlapping yearly time-
series of R2. In addition, the overlapping weekly R2s are obtained by regressing the past year 
stock turnover and excess return on the corresponding extracted factors, which are reported in 
Panel B. Although Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) attribute the stock price synchronicity to market 
inefficiency, the U-shape of the R2 over time, in both developed and emerging economies, does 
not necessarily mean that the market’s information environment has weakened for all the zones. 
Instead, the evidence from North America is consistent with recent finding on liquidity and 
institutional herding (Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001; Sias, 2003; Kamara, Lou and Sadka, 2008; 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Karolyi, Lee and Dijk, 2010). In the U.S. and Canada, the 
correlated trading by institutional investors has strengthened the co-movement of stock price. 
Especially, the Financial Crisis in 2006-2008 has increased the commonality in turnover, the 
comprehensive measure of the degree of correlated trading.   
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Additionally, the commonalities in both turnover and excess return spiked during 
macroeconomic shocks (such as the 1989-91 Economic Recession, and the 1994 economic crisis 
in Mexico), liquidity shocks (such as the Financial Crisis of 2007-2010, and the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis), corporate events (such as the WorldCom Bankruptcy, and the Enron Scandal in 
2001), and other shocks (such as the Black Monday in 1987, the September 11 attacks, and the 
Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004). This finding is consistent with the models by Roll (1988) and 
Morck, Yeung and Yu (2000) which argue that macroeconomic instability and financial crises 
interrupt the functioning of stock market, prevent firm-specific information from being 
capitalized into stock prices, and increase the synchronicity of stock movement.  
However, these commonalities in turnover and in excess return are not necessarily correlated 
with each other in some certain periods. Still taking U.S. NYSE& AMEX as an example, Figure 
4.3 shows the commonality in turnover is more sensitive than the commonality in excess return, 
especially during the 1989-91 Economic Recession, the 1994 Economic Crisis in Mexico, the 
1998-2001 North America Economic Crisis, and the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. Sometimes 
the commonality in turnover spiked even earlier, as in the subprime crisis.  
I consider two plausible explanations for the variances. First, because stock trading incorporates 
more information than the price, such as market sentiment, investor attention and non-public 
information transmissions, the commonality in turnover, to some extent, will tend to react more 
dramatically than the commonality in excess return. Second, the super-sensitivity of the 
commonality in turnover is related to the correlated trading by institutional investors. When the 
market experiences shocks, institutional investors will trade multiple stocks in a similar way due 
to changes in the information environment or to liquidity shocks they face. Because these 
investors hold many different stocks at the same time, they are likely to trade them 
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simultaneously to minimize trading costs and to maintain a well-diversified portfolio. 
Accordingly, correlated trading will increase even before the market registers the shocks into the 
price. My conception of the commonality in turnover includes these additional market forces and 
therefore can represent the optimal degree of correlated trading in the market.  
In conclusion, the commonalities in excess return and turnover describe how the market has 
functioned across countries and over time. Especially, the commonality in turnover indicates the 
pattern of information transmission across the stocks.  
 
4.3.2 The Number of Factors in Turnover and Excess Return 
Table 4.3 gives the results of the test of the number of factors in standardized turnover and 
excess return. There are more systematic turnover factors than return factors. For most of the 
countries, there are two to four pervasive return factors while three to eight systematic turnover 
factors exist. Table 4.4 summarizes the explanatory power for each principal component. The 
first principal component of turnover typically explains between 6% (Australia, 95-00) and 68% 
(Shenzhen stock exchange in China, 95-00), in average 17%, of the variation of the standardized 
turnover. Over time the numbers of systematic turnover factors have significantly increased. 
Furthermore, the sixth to eighth components still explain a fair amount of turnover variation, in 
average 2%. Compared with the results of excess return, the explanatory powers of systematic 
factors in turnover are relatively lower either for the individual stock turnover  (Panel A, Table 
4.4) or for all systematic turnover in individual stock trading (Panel B, Table 4.4) 
There are other two main findings from Table 4.3. Asian markets have more factors than other 
countries and markets. It motivates to the discussion on the role of government policy, 
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psychological bias and other non-fundamental factors in driving the cross-sectional variation of 
the correlated trading in local capital markets. Secondly, the number of factors has increased for 
almost all the markets over time. Even for the most recent ten years, there are more factors of 
common variation in turnover in thirteen markets, twelve markets still having the constant 
number of factors while only three markets having fewer number of factors. The evidence might 
be related with the increasing openness of local capital market for foreign investors.  
In order to better investigate how the number of factors changes over each week, not just across 
each five-year sub-period, additional work has done by decomposing the weekly stock turnovers 
over the past years to estimate the optimal number of systematic factors for each week.  The 
result shows that the number of turnover and excess return factors in developed markets has risen 
during the period of macroeconomic instability and financial crises. It is reasonable given that 
the constraints for the institutional tend to tight during these periods.  
In addition, BN (2004) PANIC analysis shows that the turnover decomposition breaks persistent 
turnover into two components:  a persistent systematic component and a stationary idiosyncratic 
component. The number (in red) from Table 4.3 denotes that the corresponding systematic factor 
is stationary. For example, as for the most recent five years for Shenzhen stock exchange in 
China, the first three systematic factors are stationary while the last two systematic factors are 
not. This not only gives us a better way to understand the dynamics of turnover at the firm level 
but also indicates another way to find the proxies for the systematic factors.  
 
4.4 Can Fundamental Factors Fully Explain the Correlated Trading around the World?  
It is well recognized that fundamental factors can capture common variation in stock returns. 
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This goal of this section is to check how fundamental factors explain stock turnover and its 
systematic co-variation. There are good reasons to think the systematic patterns in stock returns 
and trading activity are linked. If the market is perfectly efficient, systematic information 
incorporated in the trading volume should be reflected in the stock return on one hand, and, on 
the other hand, the risk factors driving the stock returns should also be expected to capture the 
cross-sectional variation in trading volume. Since the stock prices have been shown to be driven 
by the common factors associated with these characteristics, the same factors are expected to 
play a similar role in driving the corresponding trading volume. 
 
4.4.1 Four Empirical Asset Pricing Models 
As the first step, I compare the performance of three asset-pricing models: (a) CAPM; (b) the FF 
(1993) three-factor model; (c) the HKK (2011) model; and (d) the LW (2000) model, by the 
ability of turnover on their return factors to explain individual stock turnover. 
First two columns in Table 4.5 report the average R2 from regressing individual stock turnover on 
the CAPM market turnover over the all available sample periods for each market. The CAPM 
market turnover is the value-weighted turnover across all individual firms in each sub-period, 
using market capitalization weights for all firms. The second column reports that the CAPM 
market turnover on average explains 12% of individual stock turnover over the sample periods 
across all the countries. In comparison, CAPM market return can explain 29% of individual 
stock excess return. The Table 4.also reports the relative performance of the CAPM market 
turnover. I measure performance by computing the average R2 in the second column divided by 
the average R2 in the last column, which is obtained from regressing individual stock turnover on 
their principal components. We can see that the CAPM market turnover here captures on average 
 172 
 
37% of all systematic turnover in individual stock trading.  
Next two columns in Table 4.5 report the average R2 from regressing individual stock turnover 
on turnovers of the FF (1993) three return factors. The FF (1993) three portfolios are a value-
weighted market portfolio plus “small minus big” (SMB) portfolio and “high minus low” (HML) 
portfolio. Portfolio turnover is defined by computing a value-weighted average of individual 
stock turnover, with the weights being the absolute value of the portfolio weights. We can see 
that the FF (1993) factor turnovers typically explain 8-50% of individual stock turnover, 
capturing about 32-82% of all systematic turnover in individual stock trading. Therefore, the two 
additional FF (1993) factor turnovers increase the mean performance by 23% in capturing 
systematic turnover.  
Table 4.5 next shows the average R2 from regressing individual stock turnover on turnovers of 
the HKK (2011) return factors. The three HKK (2011) portfolios are a value-weighted market 
portfolio plus two value-weighted factor mimicking portfolios (FMP hereafter): that is, “price to 
cash flow” and “momentum”. We can see that the HKK (2011) factor turnovers typically explain 
6-47% of the individual stock turnover, which capture 30-75% of all systematic turnover in 
individual stock trading. The two additional HKK factor turnovers increase the mean 
performance by 16% in capturing systematic turnover.  
The average R2 from regressing individual stock turnover on turnovers of return factors extracted 
from the LW (2000) model is also presented in Table 4.5. The return factor portfolios here are 
determined by the principal component factors extracted from the return data, with portfolio 
weights given by the scaled eigenvector. The number of return factors used is reported in Table 
4.3.  Thus, the corresponding turnover for each factor portfolio is simply the weighted average 
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of individual turnover, using again the absolute value of scaled eigenvectors as weights. We can 
see that the LW (2000) turnover typically explain 8-52% of individual stock turnover, while they 
capture on average 37-93% of all systematic turnover in individual stock trading. Therefore, the 
LW (2000) turnovers on return factor portfolios outperform those of FF (1993) in capturing 
systematic turnover by adding 4%. Ideally, if the LW (2000) mutual fund separation holds, we 
would expect the LW (2000) turnovers to capture 100% of individual stock turnover. Thus, the 
average 64% of the systematic turnover by LW (2000) turnover indicates that the remainder 36% 
can be thought of as the distance to the true LW (2000) return-turnover model.  
Table 4.6 shows the average R2 from regressing individual stock excess return on return factors 
derived from the three asset-pricing models. And Table 4.7 summarizes the regressions results. It 
is shown that, on average, the factor mimicking portfolio performs well in explaining the cross-
sectional variation in excess returns. For example, FF (1993) three factor models capturing 90% 
of all systematic excess stock return, which is 29% higher than the explanatory power on the 
systematic turnover co-variation. The results complement those of CM (2007) and earlier 
empirical studies, which emphasize the role of portfolio rebalancing in determining turnover. On 
the other hand, the results also suggest that existing asset-pricing models have quite limited 
explanation for trading activity.  
Figure 4.4 presents the average performance by FF (1993) three-factor model for each market, 
sorted from high to low. The ability of turnover on their fundamental return factors in explaining 
stock turnover varies across markets, with greater values for developed European markets and 
China. Switzerland and Osaka stand out, with an average performance of over 80%, which 
means that only 20% of the common variation of stock turnover could not be explained by FF 
(1993) three factors. China also has a relatively high performance ratio of 75%.  The strong 
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motive of portfolio rebalancing in trading activity might be related with its homogenous market 
structure since it is a highly regulated market. In contrast, North American and relatively open 
emerging markets, like, Brazil, Taiwan, and Thailand, have an average performance of just 46%. 
This evidence initiates the later analysis on institutional herding and psychological bias since 
there are more different trading motives in these markets.  
 
4.4.2 A Horserace of Return-based Factors 
Previous evaluations discuss the role of accounting ratios (fundamental factors), statistical 
factors and the return on a market index (the market factor) for the cross-section of stock 
turnover.  In order to further explore which firm-level characteristics best account for 
systematic turnover co-variation around the world, this section continues to explore other 
fundamental factors and two additional sets of empirical factors that are based on past return 
(technical factors) and macroeconomic variates (macroeconomic factors). Together, these make 
up all the major possible candidates for stock return co-variation that have been discussed in the 
literature.  
I follow FF (1993) and Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (1998) in constructing proxy factors as 
returns on zero-investment portfolios that go long in stocks in stocks with high values of a 
characteristic and short in stocks with low values of a characteristic. And I judge how well 
different FMPs can explain common variation in turnover across size quintile portfolios as test 
assets (with the F-test of Gibbons, Ross and Shanken, 1989) and individual stocks as R2 
discussed in previous section. 
i. Fundamental Factors 
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D/P is the ratio of dividends to market value of equity. E/P is the ratio of earnings to market 
value of equity. L/B is the leverage ratio. In each case I exclude a firm if it has a zero or negative 
value for the particular value for the particular accounting ratio. For each of the characteristics, 
quintile portfolios at the end of June of each year t using accounting information from fiscal year 
ending in year t-1, and their value-weighted turnovers are calculated from July of year t to June 
of t+1, as in FF (1992,1993). The FMP turnovers are calculated as the highest-quintile turnover 
minus the lowest-quintile turnover. 
ii. Technical Factors 
This set of factors is inspired by earlier findings that a firm’s past return helps to predict future 
returns (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985; Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron, 1992; Jegadeesh and 
Titman, 1993, 1995; Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonsishock, 1996). The most obvious trading 
strategies are those based on the past return pattern of stocks. Momentum and contrarian 
strategies are two opposite example of those. Two of the simplest and most widely used technical 
rules are also investigate: moving average-oscillator and trading range break-out.  
The momentum FMP is formed following Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) 6-month/6-month 
strategy where each month’s turnover is an equal-weighted average of six individual strategies of 
buying the winner quintile and selling the loser quintile and rebalanced monthly. In order to 
minimize the bid-ask bounce effect, one month is skipped between ranking and holding periods 
in constructing the momentum FMP. The contrarian FMP is formed following Jegadeesh and 
Titman’s (1995) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990) one week strategy which each week’s turnover is 
weighted average of selling the winner stocks relative to the equally-weighted index and buying 
the loser quintile in past week. The portfolio weight (𝑤𝑖,𝑡) assign to stock i at time t is  
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wi,t = −
1
N
(ri,t−1 − rt−1̂) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(2) 
where N is the number of stocks and  𝑟𝑡−1̂is the equally-weighted index return at time t-1.  
The rule of moving average-oscillator initiates buy (sell) signals when the short moving average 
is above (below) the long moving average by an amount larger than the band. The moving-
average FMP is formed following Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992) two week strategy 
which each two-weeks’ turnover is weighted average of buying the upper part51 and selling the 
lower part where the short period is one week and the long period is twenty-one weeks. With the 
rule of trading range break, buy (sell) signals are generated when the price level moves above 
(below) local maximums (minimums). The local maximums (minimums) are computed over the 
preceding twenty-one weeks. The trading-range-break FMP is formed as two-week strategy 
which each two-weeks’ turnover is average of buying the upper part52 and selling the lower part.  
iii. Macroeconomic Factors 
Because stock returns reflect the state of the economy, various measures of macro-economic 
conditions serves as the basis for the third set of factors. The first variable is the growth rate of 
monthly industrial production (IP). Next is the change in unemployment rate (UE), and the third 
one is the change in monthly expected inflation (CPI). In forming FMP, the relevant attribute is a 
stock’s loading on the factor, which is estimated from a regression using the most recent past 
sixty months of data prior to the portfolio formation data. The excess return on the market 
portfolio is included as an explanatory variable along with the particular macroeconomic variable 
                                                 
51 It refers to when the short moving average is above its long moving average. 
52 It refers to when the price level is above its local maximum.  
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in order to control for market-wide movements in stock prices. The regression slope on the pre-
specified factor serves as the attribute on which stocks are ranked and assigned to portfolios.  
Motivated by Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (1998), I check the volatilities of turnover on the 
mimicking portfolios. By summarizing the largest standard deviations of turnovers on the factor 
portfolios during each sub-period for each market, I find that C/P, E/P and size FMPs are the 
three factor portfolios that mostly ranked as the largest volatility in factor portfolio turnover. 
Additionally, the contrarian FMP beats other alternatives of technical factors in terms of the 
standard deviation. It is understandable because only this factor portfolio is constructed by the 
weekly return performance. Among three macroeconomic FMPs, the CPI FMP has relatively 
larger volatility in turnover for most of the markets. Table 4.8 reports the average standard 
deviation of FMPs across all the possible sub-periods for all of the markets. Among the eight out 
of thirty-three markets, C/P (denoted by CHL in the table) FMP has the highest standard 
deviation in turnover on average. It is also the same case for E/P (denoted by EPG in the table) 
FMP. The last row of Table 4.8 reports the average standard deviation of these factor portfolio 
turnovers across all the markets. It shows that CPI FMP exhibits largest turnover volatility, then 
it might be contributing a substantial common component to turnover movements.  
Furthermore, given previous statistical results that the turnover tends to have more systematic 
factors than the return, it is reasonable to start from looking for a four-factor model. I proceed in 
four steps.  
The first step is to find the model that fits the best across sub-periods. In order to find the most 
powerful model in explaining the cross variation of turnover among different stocks within the 
market, I perform a horse race on all the possible combinations of fundamental factors, 
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momentum and contrarian factors, which are extensively studies in multifactor asset pricing 
models. The second column of Table 4.9 reports the list of models that achieve the highest 
equally-weighted average R2 across sample periods in the individual stock turnover regressions 
for each of the markets. The important factors for most of the market include size, B/M, C/P, 
E/P, L/B and contrarian (denoted by CON in the table) factors.  
The second step evaluates the explanatory powers of each possible model across different 
markets with the aim to find the universal four-factor model that fit the best around the world. It 
turns out that the model combing market factor, size factor, B/M factor and C/P factor together 
(MSBC model, thereafter) is the one that has the highest equally-weighted average R2 in 
regression of individual stock turnovers on mimicking portfolios across markets. MSBC model 
explain on average 21% of individual stock turnover, capturing about 67% of all systematic 
turnover in individual stock trading. And Carhart’s (1997) four-factor model, which adds the 
momentum to the FF three-factor model, achieves the second highest R2. 
As the third step, I employ F-test of Gibbons, Ross and Shanken (1989) to judge how well 
different combinations of FMPs can explain average turnover across size quintiles as test assets. 
It turns out none of these return-based factors could help GRS statistics fall below the critical 
value. Despites all models fares poorly in the test, MSBC model has the second lowest average 
GRS statistic, which is only slightly lower than the model including market factor, size factor, 
B/M factor and leverage ratio factor.  
The last step is to find the most appropriate macroeconomic factor. Another run of horse race 
finds that adding CPI to MSBC model could contribute additional 2% in average R2 and 
therefore the extended five-factor model captures 73% of the co-movement of trading.  
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To sum up, the horse race of  various proposed factors finds that the model including market 
factor, size, B/M and C/P factors is the relatively desirable choice that fits across country and 
over each sample periods, resulting in capturing additional 8% of all systematic turnover in 
individual stock trading than the FF (1993) three-factor model. 
 
4.4.3 A Cross-country Analysis 
Given the fact that return-based factor model fares poorly in explaining the trading activity 
around the world, I next investigate whether they perform relatively better in some specific 
markets with the aim to find out what characteristics of these markets help to explain the failure 
of return motives in driving cross-sectional variation in the commonality in turnover. 
The explanatory power of the return-based multifactor model varies substantially across markets, 
with better performance for European developed markets and China. When the FF (1993) three-
factor model is used in the regression of individual stock turnovers, there are 27% of the 
systematic turnover left unexplained in U.K., Norway and Sweden while 45% left in the NYSE 
and AMEX, 48% in Tokyo stock exchange, 58% left either in the NASDAQ, Taiwan, India, and 
Thailand. I also try other models, including the HKK (2011) three-factor model, the Carhart’s 
(1997) four-factor model, and the MSBC model. The ranking and the range are still similar as 
shown in Table 4.10. For instance, when applying the optimal market-specific four factor model 
in terms of the average R2 from turnover regression, the difference of the performance ratios 
across markets is still substantially large, from almost 90% for Spain to 52% for the NASDAQ. 
Although it is reasonable to disregard the cases of Spain and Osaka stock exchange because of 
their smaller sample sizes, there are still on average 20% of the systematic turnovers that could 
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not be explained the common return factors in U.K., Norway and Sweden. On the other hand, the 
unexplained component of the systematic turnover still stay up to 38% in the NYSE&AMEX, 
42% in Tokyo stock exchange, 43% for countries like Taiwan, India and Thailand, and 48% in 
the NASDAQ.  
North America, Japan and emerging markets always lag behind on the list because there are 
larger amount of the commonality in trading, mostly higher than 47%, that could not be captured 
by their return-based factors. In contrast, the factor models have stable better performance in 
Norway, Sweden, Denmark and U.K. I first relate this finding with the previous that there is 
higher level of commonality in trading in less developed countries. If a country has a lower level 
of commonality in trading, it might be relatively easy to capture its commonality by the factor 
model. However, the rank of the commonality level is not reversely consistent with that one of 
the performance ratios. And the argument only seems sensible for the emerging markets and 
European markets but not for North America and Japan. Furthermore, China is a special case in 
that there is only 20% of all systematic turnover in individual stock trading left beyond what the 
return-based factors could capture despite that its commonality of trading ranks in the top around 
the world. 
I further test the correspondence between the stock return and trading activity. That is to say, if 
one market is worse fit by the factor pricing model than other markets, taking FF (1993) three-
factor model as an example, then this market is expected to incorporate more components that 
can’t be explained by size or value premium and therefore the FF (1993) three-factor model 
would achieve lower power in explaining the trading activity in this market relative to other 
markets. However I fail to find evidence to support the hypothesis. Figures 4 to 8 show that, for 
those countries which have higher performance ratios in excess returns regression, it doesn’t 
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necessarily mean that they have similarly higher performance ratios in turnover regressions. On 
the other hand, if the factor model gives higher performance ratios for the country in turnover 
regression, it does not necessarily mean that the market is better fit by the corresponding factor 
pricing model.  
 
4.5 Conclusions  
This chapter seeks to identify which factors are important for driving the time-series and cross-
section variation in stock turnovers around the world. It is an experiment of linking the 
systematic pattern in trading activity with the systematic pattern in stock returns. The key finding 
is that on average 33% of the co-movement of trading around the world could not be explained 
by these common factors in return. The difference between the return-motivated commonality in 
trading and the true commonality in trading varies substantially across markets, with larger gaps 
for North America, Japan and emerging markets.  
This chapter confirms CM (2007)’s finding on the NYSE and AMEX stocks but also uncovers 
several new findings on the commonality of trading. From weekly data of over 30,000 individual 
stocks from 48 markets over the 1977 to 2010 period, I employ two statistical procedures 
developed by BN (2002, 2004) for decomposing individual stocks from 48 countries into 
systematic and firm-specific components to turnover and return panels. Totally the systematic 
turnover factors capture 31% of the variation of individual stock turnover while systematic return 
factors could explain 36% of the variation in individual stock excess return. The average level of 
commonality in trading varies substantially across countries, with greater values for less 
developed countries. Furthermore, the decomposition breaks turnover into a persistent systematic 
component and stationary idiosyncratic components and in general there are two to four 
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pervasive return factors while three to eight systematic turnover factors exist.  
To further identify the factors driving the trading, this chapter compares the performance of three 
asset-pricing models: (a) CAPM, (b) the FF (1993) three-factor model, (c) the HKK (2011) 
three-factor model and (d) the LW (2000) model, by the ability of turnover on their return factors 
in explaining individual stock turnover. CAPM market turnover capture on average 37% of all 
systematic turnover in individual stock trading. Two additional FF (1993) factor turnovers 
increase the mean performance by 23% in capturing systematic turnover and two additional 
HKK (2011) factor turnover increase by 16%. According to LW (2000, 2006) model, trading due 
to systematic risk in returns can only on average account for 64% of the all systematic turnover 
variation in the weekly time series. This chapter continues to evaluate the performance of 
fundamental factors, technical factors, macroeconomic factors and statistical factors that have 
been suggested in the existing empirical asset pricing literature, in capturing the systematic co-
variation in stock turnovers by constructing the zero-investment FMPs based on these firm-level 
characteristics. It shows that factors associated with size, book-to-market ratio, and cash flow to 
price ratio are important in driving the systematic turnover in individual stock trading. The 
model, which includes market factor, size, book-to-market ratio and cash flow to price ratio 
factors, is proposed based on its relatively better ability of fitness across country and over sub-
period in explaining on average 67% of all systematic turnover in individual stock trading. 
This chapter continues to check the cross-country evidence on how the return-based factor model 
explains the trading activity around the world and find that the explanatory power varies 
substantially across market, with better performance for European developed markets and China. 
North America, Japan and emerging markets always lag behind on the ranking list because there 
is a larger amount of the commonality in trading, mostly higher than 47% of the systematic 
 183 
 
turnover, which could not be explained by their return-based factors. The economic 
interpretation of the results is intriguing. If the market is perfectly efficient, systematic 
information incorporated in the trading volume should be reflected in the stock return on one 
hand, and, on the other hand, the risk factors driving the stock returns should also be expected to 
capture the cross-sectional variation in trading volume. However this chapter fails in find 
sufficient evidence to support this hypothesis.  
I consider two plausible explanations for the failures. First, as previous researchers proposed, the 
general failure around the world can be attributed to irrational motives which might constitute 
one part of the commonality in trading but doesn’t necessarily result in increasing the 
commonality in return. Trading could arise naturally from the portfolio rebalancing needs of 
investors in response to changes in asset valuations. Apart from this motive, there are two 
schools of thought that develop theories for trading activity. In the first set of models, trading 
occurs due to the profit motives of privately informed investors, as well as non-informational 
reasons. These models generally examine trading among privately informed traders, uninformed 
traders, and liquidity traders. In these models, investors try to infer information from trading 
activity and market prices. One example of this strand is institutional herding. The second school 
of thought models trading as induced by differences of opinion; investor share the same public 
information but interpret it differently, a scenario which induces trading activity. Investor might 
be also trading by some kind of group psychology stories, like institutional herding or 
overconfidence. Second, the extent of commonality in a country is inversely related to the 
measures of its economic and institutional development. The commonality in trading volume is 
greater in countries with weaker legal protections for investors and a more opaque information 
environment, like emerging markets. Given the higher level of the commonality in trading, it is 
 184 
 
hard for the factor model to capture all of the systematic turnover in individual stock trading. 
Here China is an interesting case. Its commonality of trading ranks the highest among all the 
thirty-three markets, which goes up to over 64% of individual stock turnover. At the same time 
the return-based factor model performs relatively well, only leaving 20% of all systematic 
turnover unexplained. Given the prominent performance of its first principal component and its 
market portfolio, I conjecture that the strong motive of portfolio rebalancing in trading activity 
might be related with its homogenous market structure since it is a highly regulated market.  
The question left unanswered in this chapter is why there are much larger components of the 
systematic turnover in North America and Japan that are unrelated with return motives while 
their commonalities in trading are similar with other developed countries. Without detailed 
trading records by different types of investors in these markets, we are unlikely to find 
convincing explanations for the puzzle in North America and Japan. We also cannot disregard 
the influence of measurement problems. For instance, the weekly frequency level of my analysis 
of commonality may be not appropriate for these two markets. We also have little understanding 
of the commonality in trading across asset classes, including bonds and other derivatives. 
Additionally, the preliminary experiment of the major common factors in return is tentative and 
incomplete. For example, I might omit some important factors in driving the common variation 
in stock turnovers, like the return on assets (Chen, Novy-Marx and Zhang, 2010). I invite further 
theoretical and empirical work to explore these issues.  
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     Figure 4.1 
     The Commonality in Turnover and Excess Return 
 
 
This figure depicts the average local commonality in turnover (Panel A) and excess return (Panel B) in 33 countries, respectively, over the period Jan 1977 
to June 2010. The commonality in turnover (excess return) is measured by the R2 of weekly regressions of the individual stock turnover (excess return) on 
the selected systematic turnover (excess return) factors.  
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Figure 4.1, continued 
 
Panel B: Commonality in Excess Return 
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   Figure 4.2 
The Trends of the Commonalities in Turnover and Excess Return 
 
This figure depicts the trend of the commonality in excess return and turnover using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Here we consider both the non-
overlapping yearly time-series of R2 (Panel A) and the overlapping weekly time-series of R2 that are obtained from regressing the past year stock 
turnover/excess return on the corresponding extracted factors (Panel B for the U.S. NYSE & AMEX). In Panel A, North American uses the major axis and 
other areas use the secondary axis.  
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The Trend of the Commonality in Excess Return                                                      The Trend of the Commonality in Turnover 
 
  
 
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
North American
emerging countries
European developed countries
Asian developed countries
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
North American
emerging countries
European developed countries
Asian developed countries
 191 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2, continued 
 
 
Panel B: Over-lapping R2 for NYSE & AMEX 
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    Figure 4.3 
The Commonality in Turnover and Excess Return for NYSE & AMEX
  
This figure depicts the weekly 𝑅2 that are obtained from regressing the past year stock turnover/excess return on the corresponding extracted factors. The 
blue line represents the commonality in turnover and the red line is for the commonality in excess return. 
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Figure 4.4 
Performance Ratios of the Fama-French (1993) Three-factor Model for the Commonality in 
Turnover and Excess Return 
 
This figure depicts the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model performance ratios for the commonality in 
turnover (Red bar on the left hand side) and excess return (Blue bar on the right hand side) in 33 
countries, respectively, over the period from January 1977 to June 2010. The ratios for turnover are 
shown in negative number just for the illustration convenience and the real ratios are positive.  
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Figure 4.5 
Performance Ratios of the Hou-Karolyi-Kho (2011) Three-factor Model for the Commonality in 
Turnover and Excess Return 
 
This figure depicts the Hou-Karolyi-Kho (2011) three-factor model performance ratios for the 
commonality in turnover (Red bar on the left hand side) and excess return (Blue bar on the right hand 
side) in 33 countries, respectively, over the period from January 1977 to June 2010. The ratios for 
turnover are shown in negative number just for the illustration convenience and the real ratios are 
positive.  
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Figure 4.6 
Performance Ratios of the Carhart (1997) Four-factor Model for the Commonality in Turnover 
and Excess Return 
 
This figure depicts the Carhart (1997) four-factor model performance ratios for the commonality in 
turnover (Red bar on the left hand side) and excess return (Blue bar on the right hand side) in 33 
countries, respectively, over the period from January 1977 to June 2010. The ratios for turnover are 
shown in negative number just for the illustration convenience and the real ratios are positive.  
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Figure 4.7 
Performance Ratios of the MSBC Four-factor Model for the Commonality in Turnover and 
Excess Return 
 
This figure depicts the MSBC four-factor model performance ratios for the commonality in turnover (Red 
bar on the left hand side) and excess return (Blue bar on the right hand side) in 33 countries, respectively, 
over the period from January 1977 to June 2010. The ratios for turnover are shown in negative number 
just for the illustration convenience and the real ratios are positive.  
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Figure 4.8 
Performance Ratios of the Market Specific Four-factor Model for the Commonality in Turnover 
and Excess Return 
 
This figure depicts the market specific four-factor model performance ratios for the commonality in 
turnover (Red bar on the left hand side) and excess return (Blue bar on the right hand side) in 33 
countries, respectively, over the period from January 1977 to June 2010. The ratios for turnover are 
shown in negative number just for the illustration convenience and the real ratios are positive.  
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Table 4.1 
Summary Statistics (1977-2010) 
 
This table reports summary statistics of weekly data sample from 1976 to 2010.  Panel A and C reports 
the average number of firms for each year and across markets, respectively.  And Panel B shows the 
value-weighted market returns from our sample and their correlations with WSCI index returns.  
 
   Panel A: Summary Statistics of the Numbers of Stocks by Year 
Year 
Stocks with status of 
DEAD or SUSPENDED 
Additional Stocks that 
are ACTUALLY Dead 
Stocks that are Alive 
until 06/10 
Total Available 
Number of Stocks 
1977 18 0 4,069 4,087 
1978 18 0 4,125 4,143 
1979 18 0 4,200 4,218 
1980 18 0 4,329 4,347 
1981 18 1 4,489 4,508 
1982 20 1 4,651 4,672 
1983 20 1 4,983 5,004 
1984 20 1 5,463 5,484 
1985 20 1 5,862 5,883 
1986 21 3 6,537 6,561 
1987 26 3 7,337 7,366 
1988 69 5 8,898 8,972 
1989 184 5 10,483 10,672 
1990 295 7 12,434 12,736 
1991 376 11 13,327 13,714 
1992 497 18 14,253 14,768 
1993 640 21 15,259 15,920 
1994 766 27 16,919 17,712 
1995 972 32 18,249 19,253 
1996 1,241 46 19,838 21,125 
1997 1,559 78 21,576 23,213 
1998 2,108 113 22,912 25,133 
1999 2,984 157 23,631 26,772 
2000 4,064 195 24,660 28,919 
2001 5,164 226 25,256 30,646 
2002 6,106 272 25,347 31,725 
2003 7,015 315 25,257 32,587 
2004 7,902 367 25,615 33,884 
2005 8,702 442 26,413 35,557 
2006 9,564 514 27,250 37,328 
2007 10,653 596 28,005 39,254 
2008 11,788 706 28,404 40,898 
2009 12,875 868 27,746 41,489 
2010 13,673 1,208 27,199 42,080 
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Table 4.1, continued 
 
Panel B: Correlations with WSCI Index Returns by Market 
Country 
Data 
Beginning Date 
MSCI 
Beginning 
Date 
Index Return Sample Return Correlation 
Developed Markets   
   
U.K. 01/1977 01/1980 0.17% 0.25% 0.99 
Japan 01/1977 01/1980 0.09% 0.10% 0.98 
France 01/1977 01/1980 0.19% 0.23% 0.98 
Sweden 01/1982 01/1980 0.33% 0.29% 0.97 
Netherlands 01/1977 01/1980 0.18% 0.25% 0.97 
Australia 01/1977 01/1980 0.17% 0.25% 0.97 
Germany 01/1977 01/1980 0.16% 0.17% 0.97 
Hong Kong 01/1977 01/1980 0.26% 0.30% 0.96 
Ireland 01/1977 01/1988 0.06% 0.15% 0.93 
Canada 01/1977 01/1980 0.15% 0.21% 0.94 
Finland 01/1987 01/1987 0.25% 0.30% 0.94 
Norway 01/1977 01/1980 0.18% 0.24% 0.94 
Singapore 01/1980 01/1980 0.15% 0.18% 0.93 
New Zealand 01/1986 12/1986 -0.04% 0.13% 0.92 
Austria 01/1977 01/1980 0.09% 0.15% 0.89 
Denmark 01/1977 01/1980 0.24%1 0.24% 0.88 
Italy 01/1977 01/1980 0.21%2 0.28% 0.88 
Belgium 01/1977 01/1980 -1.56%3 -2.05% 0.86 
Spain 01/1986 01/1980 0.21%4 0.16% 0.82 
Switzerland 01/1977 01/1980 0.16%5 0.19% 0.98 
 
  
   
Emerging Markets   
   
Taiwan 09/1987 01/1988 0.18% 0.19% 0.98 
Malaysia 01/1977 01/1988 0.19% 0.20% 0.97 
India 01/1990 01/1993 0.30% 0.33% 0.96 
Korea, South 04/1980 01/1988 0.22% 0.22% 0.96 
Thailand 01/1987 01/1988 0.20% 0.17% 0.96 
Hungary 01/1991 01/1995 0.41% 0.35% 0.95 
Indonesia 04/1990 01/1988 0.23% 0.26% 0.94 
Mexico 01/1988 01/1988 0.56% 0.50% 0.94 
Pakistan 07/1992 01/1993 0.22% 0.31% 0.94 
Argentina 01/1988 01/1988 1.32% 1.13% 0.93 
Colombia 01/1992 01/1993 0.42% 0.39% 0.92 
Czech Republic 08/1993 01/1995 0.21% 0.14% 0.92 
Russian Federation 09/1995 01/1995 0.55% 0.70% 0.92 
Philippines 09/1987 01/1988 0.23% 0.20% 0.91 
Greece 01/1988 01/1988 0.22% 0.31% 0.90 
South Africa 01/1977 01/1993 0.25% 0.28% 0.90 
Sri Lanka 06/1987 01/1993 0.27% 0.26% 0.89 
Portugal 01/1988 01/1988 0.05% 0.08% 0.85 
Turkey 01/1988 01/1988 0.99%6 0.83% 0.83 
Poland 04/1991 01/1993 0.43%7 0.24% 0.81 
Israel 01/1986 01/1993 0.15%8 0.20% 0.78 
Peru 01/1998 03/2009 1.02%9 0.69% 0.73 
Brazil 01/1994 01/1992 1.30%10 0.37% 0.69 
Chile 07/1989 01/1988 0.35%11 0.39% 0.64 
Note: 1)   the correlation is 0.92 if the sample starts from 01/1990; 
          2)   the correlation is 0.90 if the sample starts from 01/1981; 
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Table 4.1, continued 
 
Panel B: Correlations with WSCI Index Returns by Market (continued) 
 
 
Note: 
3) the correlation is 0.99 if the sample starts from 01/2004; 
4) the correlation is 0.91 if the sample starts from 01/1990; 
5) the correlation is 0.98 if the sample starts from 01/2004; 
6) the correlation is 0.95 if the sample starts from 01/2004; 
7) the correlation is 0.97 if the sample starts from 01/2004; 
8) the correlation is 0.90 if the sample starts from 01/2004; 
9) the correlation is 0.85 if the sample starts from 01/2004; 
10) the correlation is 0.96 if the sample starts from 01/1995. 
11) the correlation is 0.98 if the sample starts from 01/2004. 
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Table 4.1, continued 
 
Panel C: Summary Statistics of the Numbers of Stocks by Market 
Country 
Number of 
firms 
Firms with >50% turnover data 
and no problem data 
Firms with no missing 
and problem data 
Average weekly 
turnover (%) 
Argentina 92 77 4 0.23* 
Australia 2,467 2,353 599 0.26 
Austria 164 137 45 3.84 
Belgium 221 72 26 0.09 
Brazil 504 322 154 0.61 
Canada 3,306 3,053 811 0.33 
Chile 246 168 40 0.11 
China-Shanghai 897 739 151 1.49 
China-Shenzhen 929 929 443 0.82 
Colombia 56 37 9 0.34 
Czech Republic 85 74 1 0.004* 
Denmark 297 249 46 0.53 
Finland 179 158 52 0.55 
France 1,453 549 153 0.12 
Germany 1,257 844 206 0.16 
Greece 381 375 170 0.87 
Hong Kong 1,270 1,246 327 0.25 
Hungary 53 45 4 1.43* 
India 1,224 1,152 372 0.32 
Indonesia 480 384 52 0.42 
Ireland 223 114 25 0.22 
Israel 175 168 54 0.24 
Italy 468 366 231 0.43 
Japan- Tokyo 2,943 2,800 789 0.65 
Japan- Osaka 510 504 172 0.85 
Luxembourg 35 13 2 0.07* 
Malaysia 1,013 1,012 179 0.44 
Mexico 186 140 33 0.7 
Netherlands 270 247 91 0.91 
New Zealand 193 176 48 0.22 
Norway 419 406 143 0.92 
Pakistan 142 128 1 1.17* 
Peru 150 69 5 0.37* 
Philippines 268 203 6 0.49* 
Poland 265 204 147 0.56 
Portugal 131 50 10 0.47 
Russian Federation 302 220 12 0.002 
Singapore 801 790 273 0.41 
South Africa 1,076 745 156 0.14 
South Korea 902 900 209 1.32 
Spain 204 160 43 0.66 
Sri Lanka 37 30 0 1.19* 
Sweden 645 642 298 0.74 
Switzerland 353 164 47 0.4 
Taiwan 825 800 2 2.29* 
Thailand 1,078 1,054 1,054 0.71 
Turkey 269 265 42 1.74 
U.K. 3,692 2,663 614 0.39 
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Table 4.1, continued 
 
Panel C: Summary Statistics of the Numbers of Stocks by Market (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
Number of 
firms 
Firms with >50% turnover data 
and no problem data 
Firms with no missing 
and problem data 
Average weekly 
turnover (%) 
U.S.-NASDAQ 4,995 4,955 3,109 1.29 
U.S.- NYSE &AMEX 3,906 3,814 1,997 2.01 
Venezuela 43 18 0 0.16* 
Note: *the average weekly turnover is calculated from the firm sample on the second column. 
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Table 4.2 
Summary Statistics of Seven Five-year Sub-periods (1977-2010) 
 
This table shows average weekly turnover (%) and number of firms (#) for each sub-period.  
 
Country 
1985-1990 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 
Average 
weekly 
turnover 
(%) 
#  
Average 
weekly 
turnover 
(%) 
#  
Average 
weekly 
turnover 
(%) 
#  
Average 
weekly 
turnover 
(%) 
#  
Average 
weekly 
turnover 
(%) 
#  
Argentina         0.56 21 0.58 10 0.48 25 
Australia 0.92 65 0.78 100 0.96 202 1.14 334 1.47 474 
Austria     3.52 15 4.34 28 1.71 29 1.15 36 
Belgium     2.18 13 2.85 21 0.88 66 0.79 74 
Brazil         NA 6 2.95 53 2.43 75 
Chile     1.18 19 0.4 16 0.32 28 0.57 37 
China-Shanghai         5.15 120 2.73 406 10.10 183 
China-Shenzhen         6.28 51 2.66 397 9.79 85 
Columbia         0.17 2 0.33 3 1.11 11 
Czech Public             1.66 4 1.32 6 
Denmark         3.06 40 2.05 46 1.79 74 
Finland     0.83 4 2.96 17 1.52 60 1.49 92 
France     3.00 4 2.68 153 1.31 293 1.26 307 
Germany     4.80 9 4.02 2 0.56 324 0.34 229 
Greece     2.36 20 4.42 61 1.20 202 1.00 163 
Hong Kong     1.12 110 1.55 121 1.19 183 1.35 282 
Hungary             2.62 7 2.24 8 
India         1.23 227 1.56 373 1.10 688 
Indonesia         2.14 26 1.81 43 1.41 54 
Ireland             1.04 30 1.22 48 
Israel         0.63 15 0.85 53 1.03 90 
Italy     0.79 15 1.13 87 1.21 155 1.73 180 
Japan-Tokyo     0.65 12 0.75 1,486 1.17 1,546 1.80 1,753 
Japan-Osaka     0.60 36 0.69 72 0.78 66 1.32 127 
Malaysia 0.98 3 2.08 93 1.54 201 0.86 266 1.25 264 
Mexico     2.66 7 2.61 24 1.50 28 1.03 34 
Netherland     4.61 56 4.55 73 2.14 106 2.24 84 
Norway 4.47 6 3.03 13 3.28 43 2.64 43 2.67 75 
New Zealand     0.67 5 0.61 31 0.62 44 0.66 43 
Pakistan         2.83 14 4.19 12 NA 0 
Peru         1.02 3 1.15 4 0.87 14 
Philippine     0.42 8 1.02 29 0.34 25 0.58 40 
Poland         2.91 8 1.70 5 1.82 26 
Portugal         3.52 12 1.19 32 1.25 30 
Russia             0.66 10 0.28 3 
Singapore 2.16 33 1.80 73 1.47 104 1.36 133 1.75 152 
South Africa     0.43 30 0.83 55 1.04 112 1.01 147 
South Korea 3.22 79 3.24 207 5.46 226 4.61 256 3.18 371 
Spain     3.21 14 3.07 31 2.11 49 3.72 62 
Sweden 5.94 7 4.89 23 3.07 98 2.52 143 1.96 201 
Switzerland     5.18 16 3.87 42 2.20 101 1.54 135 
Taiwan         4.73 61 4.18 187 4.31 408 
Thailand     1.19 2 3.83 16 3.57 23 3.06 115 
Turkey     3.25 3 2.92 5 5.91 72 4.57 142 
U.K.     2.32 101 1.77 320 2.20 481 2.22 556 
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Table 4.2, continued 
 
 
 
Country U.S.- NASDAQ U.S.- NYSE &AMEX Canada 
1977-1980 
Average weekly turnover(%) 2.91 3.30 1.58 
#  26 756 60 
1980-1985 
Average weekly turnover(%) 3.17 3.60 1.36 
#  24 826 47 
1985-1990 
Average weekly turnover(%) 3.14 3.29 1.13 
#  307 1,208 103 
1990-1995 
Average weekly turnover(%) 3.24 2.77 1.06 
#  609 1,339 162 
1995-2000 
Average weekly turnover(%) 3.26 2.77 1.45 
#  1,046 1,396 344 
2000-2005 
Average weekly turnover(%) 3.33 3.29 1.27 
#  1,607 1,480 488 
2005-2010 
Average weekly turnover(%) 3.69 4.90 1.23 
#  1,666 1,460 870 
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Table 4.3 
Test of the Number of Factors in Turnover (Excess Return) Using the Balanced Panel 
This table gives the incremental 𝑅2 explained by subsequent ordered eigenvectors, k=1, …, 8 of the covariance matrix of weekly turnover of ordinary common 
shares in all the available markets for seven(or maximum) sub-periods from January 1977 to June 2010. In addition, this table depicts the number of factors 
selected by the IC and cross-sectional average 𝑅2 for the selected factor model for each sample period. We also employ Bai and Ng (2004) PANIC test for 
nonstationarity and denote the stationary factors in red and the nonstationary factor in black.  
 
Panel A: Balanced Turnover 
Sub-
period 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No. of 
Factors 
R2 (%) 
China-Shenzhen   64.53% 
95-00 67.99% 5.09% 3.01% 2.39%         4 78.48% 
00-05 30.06% 5.53% 4.14% 2.75% 2.45% 2.37% 1.85% 1.69% 8 50.84% 
05-10 42.83% 8.75% 6.15% 3.53% 3.00%       5 64.26% 
China-Shanghai   58.45% 
95-00 43.96% 7.39% 4.63% 3.56% 2.15%       5 61.69% 
00-05 29.31% 6.05% 3.55% 3.12% 2.21% 2.19% 1.93% 1.69% 8 50.05% 
05-10 44.28% 8.46% 4.65% 2.48% 2.07% 1.66%     6 63.60% 
Taiwan   54.41% 
95-00 31.13% 8.65% 4.97% 4.12% 3.99%       5 52.86% 
00-05 20.75% 18.48% 7.05% 3.82% 2.87% 2.45% 2.13% 2.05% 8 59.60% 
05-10 19.06% 8.51% 6.38% 5.26% 4.15% 3.08% 2.19% 2.13% 8 50.76% 
South Korea   50.94% 
85-90 29.11% 13.61% 7.48% 4.60% 3.24%       5 58.04% 
90-95 26.84% 8.68% 7.47% 3.77% 3.23% 2.54% 2.19% 1.85% 8 56.57% 
95-00 37.12% 5.64% 4.12% 3.17% 2.83% 2.59% 1.99% 1.80% 8 59.26% 
00-05 22.65% 6.81% 3.74% 3.11% 3.05% 2.40%     6 41.76% 
05-10 13.99% 10.06% 4.22% 3.74% 2.45% 2.36% 2.27%   7 39.09% 
Malaysia   44.68% 
90-95 31.24% 6.37% 4.41% 3.84%         4 45.86% 
95-00 18.45% 9.26% 4.91% 4.21% 3.33% 2.82% 2.64% 2.33% 8 47.95% 
00-05 18.58% 5.66% 4.51% 3.39% 3.06% 2.58% 2.32%   7 40.10% 
05-10 20.87% 5.60% 4.85% 3.22% 3.07% 2.79% 2.32% 2.10% 8 44.82% 
Singapore 
 
40.72% 
90-95 21.70% 6.40% 5.38%           3 33.48% 
95-00 30.76% 10.75% 5.91% 3.59% 3.03%       5 54.04% 
00-05 15.00% 6.11% 5.36% 3.85% 3.49%       5 33.81% 
05-10 14.93% 8.17% 6.43% 5.41% 3.61% 2.99%     6 41.54% 
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Table 4.3, continued 
 
Panel A: Balanced Turnover (continued) 
Sub-
period 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No. of 
Factors 
R2 (%) 
Turkey   39.87% 
00-05 24.66% 9.41% 6.67% 4.35%         4 45.09% 
05-10 15.18% 10.04% 4.94% 4.49%         4 34.65% 
Germany   38.61% 
00-05 13.35% 8.33% 3.86% 3.64% 2.69%       5 31.87% 
05-10 30.47% 5.15% 4.07% 3.24% 2.41%       5 45.34% 
India   37.12% 
95-00 18.90% 6.58% 5.41% 3.61% 2.80%       5 37.30% 
00-05 18.50% 7.53% 5.41% 3.34% 2.72% 2.25% 2.06%   7 41.81% 
05-10 13.94% 5.41% 3.31% 2.94% 2.56% 2.18% 1.92%   7 32.26% 
Japan-Tokyo   36.55% 
95-00 11.32% 6.66% 3.27% 2.87% 2.40% 2.28% 1.80% 1.70% 8 32.30% 
00-05 18.54% 4.36% 3.29% 3.23% 2.31% 1.89% 1.72% 1.62% 8 36.96% 
05-10 16.01% 9.93% 4.25% 2.49% 2.36% 1.95% 1.72% 1.69% 8 40.40% 
Brazil   36.58% 
00-05 15.41% 11.77% 6.70%           3 33.88% 
05-10 19.50% 8.49% 6.52% 4.77%         4 39.28% 
Italy   34.52% 
95-00 34.91% 7.48% 4.97% 4.02%         4 51.38% 
00-05 12.37% 8.17%             2 20.54% 
05-10 14.99% 8.26% 4.84% 3.55%         4 31.64% 
Hong Kong   33.04% 
90-95 19.66% 6.78% 4.75%           3 31.19% 
95-00 16.24% 9.54% 5.83% 4.44% 3.81%       5 39.86% 
00-05 14.72% 7.24% 5.20% 4.21%         4 31.37% 
05-10 10.26% 6.56% 5.95% 4.16% 2.79%       5 29.72% 
Thailand   32.38% 
05-10 12.63% 9.73% 5.22% 4.80%         4 32.38% 
Indonesia   30.60% 
05-10 15.51% 8.33% 6.76%           3 30.60% 
Spain   29.59% 
05-10 19.05% 10.54%             2 29.59% 
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Table 4.3, continued 
 
Panel A: Balanced Turnover (continued) 
Sub-
period 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No. of 
Factors 
R2 (%) 
Israel   29.56% 
00-05 25.68% 7.07%             2 32.75% 
05-10 13.94% 7.23% 5.20%           3 26.37% 
Greece   29.42% 
95-00 18.33% 10.36% 6.01%           3 34.70% 
00-05 18.91% 6.54% 4.87%           3 30.32% 
05-10 18.28% 4.95%             2 23.23% 
Switzerland   27.04% 
00-05 18.85% 8.94%             2 27.79% 
05-10 14.32% 11.96%             2 26.28% 
U.S. - NYSE & AMEX    26.33% 
77-80 10.96% 5.89% 4.13%           3 20.98% 
80-85 9.51% 7.95% 3.57% 2.50%         4 23.53% 
85-90 13.26% 4.22% 2.59% 2.02%         4 22.09% 
90-95 8.61% 4.00% 3.54% 2.71%         4 18.86% 
95-00 8.77% 4.64% 3.52% 2.64% 2.11%       5 21.68% 
00-05 12.15% 6.40% 4.40% 2.89% 2.29% 1.78%     6 29.91% 
05-10 26.11% 6.62% 4.33% 3.18% 2.37% 1.70% 1.52% 1.40% 8 47.23% 
U.S.-NASDAQ   23.49% 
85-90 10.49% 3.46% 3.16%           3 17.11% 
90-95 8.56% 4.50% 3.44% 3.03%         4 19.53% 
95-00 6.90% 5.73% 3.02% 2.36%         4 18.01% 
00-05 9.25% 6.67% 3.82% 3.29% 2.50% 1.98%     6 27.51% 
05-10 10.49% 8.32% 4.78% 3.46% 2.58% 2.06% 1.92% 1.69% 8 35.30% 
Netherland   23.31% 
90-95 12.09% 7.22%             2 19.31% 
95-00 16.11% 6.91%             2 23.02% 
00-05 18.46% 5.92%             2 24.38% 
05-10 14.36% 12.15%             2 26.51% 
Norway   23.17% 
05-10 16.99% 6.18%             2 23.17% 
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Table 4.3, continued 
 
Panel A: Balanced Turnover (continued) 
Sub-
period 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No. of 
Factors 
R2 (%) 
Belgium   21.98% 
00-05 13.96% 6.88%             2 20.84% 
05-10 13.07% 10.04%             2 23.11% 
Denmark   21.28% 
05-10 14.37% 6.91%             2 21.28% 
France   19.89% 
95-00 7.96% 5.99%             2 13.95% 
00-05 7.24% 6.42% 4.57%           3 18.23% 
05-10 10.88% 9.97% 3.69% 2.95%         4 27.49% 
Sweden   19.33% 
95-00 13.38%               1 13.38% 
00-05 11.56% 6.38%             2 17.94% 
05-10 14.08% 5.41% 3.65% 3.53%         4 26.67% 
Canada    19.18% 
77-80 15.85%               1 15.85% 
80-85 13.50% 9.60% 8.89%           3 31.99% 
85-90 10.16% 5.93%             2 16.09% 
90-95 9.69% 4.81%             2 14.50% 
95-00 6.56% 4.59% 3.31%           3 14.46% 
00-05 6.88% 4.66% 3.62% 2.74% 2.47%       5 20.37% 
05-10 7.35% 4.38% 3.65% 3.27% 2.34%       5 20.99% 
U.K. 
 
18.52% 
90-95 16.33% 6.00%             2 22.33% 
95-00 8.65% 3.92%             2 12.57% 
00-05 10.29% 3.20% 2.60%           3 16.09% 
05-10 15.34% 5.40% 2.35%           3 23.09% 
South Africa 
 
18.28% 
95-00 17.48% 7.29%             2 24.77% 
00-05 8.77% 5.11%             2 13.88% 
05-10 9.70% 6.49%             2 16.19% 
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Table 4.3, continued 
 
Panel A: Balanced Turnover (continued) 
Sub-
period 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No. of 
Factors 
R2 (%) 
Japan-Osaka   17.46% 
95-00 13.35%               1 13.35% 
00-05 13.45%               1 13.45% 
05-10 16.86% 4.63% 4.10%           3 25.59% 
Finland   17.29% 
00-05 10.15% 7.21%             2 17.36% 
05-10 10.15% 7.06%             2 17.21% 
Australia   13.00% 
85-90 9.39%               1 9.39% 
90-95 6.37%               1 6.37% 
95-00 5.79% 4.39%             2 10.18% 
00-05 8.07% 4.27% 3.48% 2.84%         4 18.66% 
05-10 8.52% 5.71% 3.55% 2.64%         4 20.42% 
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Table 4.3, continued 
 
Panel B: Excess Return 
Sub-
period 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No. of 
Factors 
R2 (%) 
China-Shenzhen   55.42% 
95-00 52.05% 5.79%             2 57.84% 
00-05 45.32% 3.56% 2.07% 1.59%         4 52.54% 
05-10 51.29% 4.60%             2 55.89% 
China-Shanghai   52.42% 
95-00 45.83% 3.91% 3.32%           3 53.06% 
00-05 43.96% 3.23% 1.73%           3 48.92% 
05-10 50.83% 2.32% 2.12%           3 55.27% 
Taiwan   46.93% 
95-00 40.07% 4.93%             2 45.00% 
00-05 35.94% 6.30% 2.79% 2.34%         4 47.37% 
05-10 37.48% 5.46% 3.59% 1.89%         4 48.42% 
South Korea   48.35% 
85-90 35.66% 11.68% 4.30%           3 51.64% 
90-95 37.72% 7.69% 6.28% 2.44%         4 54.13% 
95-00 48.97% 4.39% 3.54%           3 56.90% 
00-05 31.21% 2.93%             2 34.14% 
05-10 42.89% 2.03%             2 44.92% 
Malaysia   48.42% 
90-95 43.98% 5.03%             2 49.01% 
95-00 59.00% 3.74% 2.02% 1.48%         4 66.24% 
00-05 38.44% 2.55%             2 40.99% 
05-10 34.23% 3.19%             2 37.42% 
Singapore   43.04% 
90-95 43.48% 3.90%             2 47.38% 
95-00 44.68% 4.91%             2 49.59% 
00-05 29.31% 3.53%             2 32.84% 
05-10 38.97% 3.36%             2 42.33% 
Turkey   52.15% 
00-05 53.86%               1 53.86% 
05-10 50.44%               1 50.44% 
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Table 4.3, continued 
 
Panel B: Excess Return (continued) 
Sub-
period 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No. of 
Factors 
R2 (%) 
Germany   27.76% 
00-05 17.45% 4.47%             2 21.92% 
05-10 33.60%               1 33.60% 
India   38.63% 
95-00 29.30% 3.97% 2.84%           3 36.11% 
00-05 27.68% 2.93% 2.48%           3 33.09% 
05-10 44.17% 2.51%             2 46.68% 
Japan-Tokyo   37.21% 
95-00 32.47% 3.53% 2.72% 1.64%         4 40.36% 
00-05 31.00% 2.46% 1.64%           3 35.10% 
05-10 30.00% 4.02% 2.14%           3 36.16% 
Brazil   48.74% 
00-05 46.42%               1 46.42% 
05-10 51.06%               1 51.06% 
Italy   35.31% 
95-00 26.79% 4.65%             2 32.08% 
00-05 26.64% 4.79%             2 31.57% 
05-10 42.03%               1 42.28% 
Hong Kong   36.50% 
90-95 38.59% 4.03%             2 42.62% 
95-00 35.23% 4.52%             2 39.75% 
00-05 27.52% 3.57%             2 31.09% 
05-10 29.39% 3.14%             2 32.53% 
Thailand   37.73% 
05-10 37.73%               1 37.73% 
Indonesia   47.49% 
05-10 47.49%               1 47.49% 
Spain   73.73% 
05-10 57.84% 10.89% 2.76% 2.24%         4 73.73% 
Israel   44.68% 
00-05 49.49%               1 49.49% 
05-10 39.86%               1 39.86% 
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Table 4.3, continued 
 
Panel B: Excess Return (continued) 
Sub-
period 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No. of 
Factors 
R2 (%) 
Greece   43.74% 
95-00 38.02% 6.86%             2 44.88% 
00-05 42.76% 2.95%             2 45.71% 
05-10 40.62%               1 40.62% 
Switzerland   35.65% 
00-05 22.27% 9.17%             2 31.44% 
05-10 35.54% 4.32%             2 39.86% 
U.S. - NYSE & AMEX   26.64% 
77-80 22.32% 3.22%             2 25.54% 
80-85 18.60% 3.61% 2.27%           3 24.48% 
85-90 24.44% 3.08%             2 27.52% 
90-95 15.07% 2.84%             2 17.91% 
95-00 14.31% 3.05% 2.38%           3 19.74% 
00-05 20.53% 3.52% 2.65% 2.22%         4 28.92% 
05-10 32.68% 3.47% 2.69% 2.03% 1.51%       5 42.38% 
U.S.-NASDAQ   17.14% 
85-90 18.65%               1 18.65% 
90-95 9.80%               1 9.80% 
95-00 8.67% 2.64%             2 11.31% 
00-05 14.94% 2.75% 2.03%           3 19.72% 
05-10 21.17% 2.98% 2.07%           3 26.22% 
Netherland   29.39% 
90-95 31.32%               1 31.32% 
95-00 16.59%               1 16.59% 
00-05 22.19% 5.66%             2 27.85% 
05-10 41.78%               1 41.78% 
Norway   42.90% 
05-10 42.90%               1 42.90% 
Belgium   34.58% 
00-05 23.86% 6.84%             2 30.70% 
05-10 38.46%               1 38.46% 
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Table 4.3, continued 
 
Panel B: Excess Return (continued) 
Sub-
period 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No. of 
Factors 
R2 (%) 
Denmark   36.72% 
05-10 36.72%               1 36.72% 
France   28.16% 
95-00 13.97% 4.45%             2 18.42% 
00-05 19.69% 4.87% 3.26%           3 27.82% 
05-10 35.55% 2.68%             2 38.23% 
Sweden   30.76% 
95-00 22.64%               1 22.64% 
00-05 27.98% 4.68%             2 32.66% 
05-10 36.99%               1 36.99% 
Canada    21.54% 
77-80 20.99%               1 20.99% 
80-85 26.61%               1 26.61% 
85-90 22.60% 4.71%             2 27.31% 
90-95 12.64% 4.14%             2 16.78% 
95-00 9.87% 3.71%             2 13.58% 
00-05 12.25% 3.14%             2 15.39% 
05-10 25.23% 2.93% 1.97%           3 30.13% 
U.K.   27.50% 
90-95 35.92%               1 35.92% 
95-00 12.13% 3.47% 0.0306           3 18.66% 
00-05 14.91% 3.42% 2.65%           3 20.98% 
05-10 29.22% 2.78% 2.44%           3 34.44% 
South Africa 
 
39.64% 
95-00 23.24% 9.40%             2 32.64% 
00-05 30.60% 5.86%             2 36.46% 
05-10 45.92% 3.89%             2 49.81% 
Japan-Osaka 
 
26.89% 
95-00 32.86%               1 32.86% 
00-05 22.39%               1 22.39% 
05-10 25.42%               1 25.42% 
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Table 4.3, continued 
 
                                       Panel B: Excess Return (continued) 
Sub-
period 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No. of 
Factors 
R2 (%) 
Finland   33.33% 
00-05 21.57% 7.40%             2 28.97% 
05-10 37.69%               1 37.69% 
Australia   29.14% 
85-90 40.99%               1 40.99% 
90-95 24.43% 4.48%             2 28.91% 
95-00 20.07%               1 20.07% 
00-05 20.70%               1 20.70% 
05-10 32.60% 2.43%             2 35.03% 
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Table 4.4 
Summary Statistics on the Explanatory Power of Each Principal Component for Individual Turnover and Excess Return  
 
This tables gives the summary statistics, including average level, min and max, on the incremental proportions of the explained variation in turnover and 
excess return across country and sample period.  
 
Panel A: Absolute Value 
Principal Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No. of 
Factors 
R2 (%) 
Turnover 
Average 17.06% 7.19% 4.67% 3.47% 2.80% 2.31% 2.03% 1.83% 4 30.95% 
Min 5.79% 3.20% 2.35% 2.02% 2.07% 1.66% 1.52% 1.40% 1 6.37% 
Max 67.99% 18.48% 8.89% 5.41% 4.15% 3.08% 2.64% 2.33% 8 78.48% 
Excess 
Return 
Average 32.17% 4.34% 2.73% 1.99% 1.51% 
   
2 36.10% 
Min 8.67% 2.03% 1.64% 1.48% 1.51% 
   
1 9.80% 
Max 59.00% 11.68% 6.28% 2.44% 1.51% 
   
5 73.73% 
 
 
 
                                                Panel B: Relative Value(over the systematic component) 
Principal Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Turnover 
Average 56.67% 25.55% 14.38% 10.01% 7.20% 5.43% 4.78% 3.90% 
Min 29.72% 10.00% 7.00% 4.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 3.00% 
Max 100.00% 46.00% 27.79% 15.58% 12.13% 7.20% 6.00% 5.00% 
Excess 
Return 
Average 88.52% 13.22% 7.76% 4.50% 4.00% 
   
Min 65.00% 4.00% 3.00% 2.00% 4.00% 
   
Max 100.00% 29.00% 16.00% 8.00% 4.00%       
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Table 4.5 
Explaining Stock Turnover by Turnovers on Return Factors 
 
This table displays the average R2 from time-series regression of individual stock turnover on turnovers of return factors derived from four 
asset-pricing models: (a) CAPM, (b) Fama and French (1993), (c) Hou, Karolyi and Kho (2011), (d) Lo and Wang (2000). Performance is 
computed as the average R2 of the model divided by the average R2 obtained from regressions stock turnover on extracted turnover factors.  
 
  CAPM Fama and French Hou-Karolyi-Kho Lo and Wang 
Factors 
Average 
Stock R2 
 Market/ 
Sub-period 
 
Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance 
  (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
China-Shenzhen 44.4 68.8 49.8 77.2 46.9 72.7 52.1 80.8 64.5 
95-00 66.3 84.5 67.9 86.5 67.6 86.1 72.4 92.2 78.5 
00-05 28.5 56.1 33.0 64.9 30.9 60.7 36.5 71.8 50.8 
05-10 38.5 59.8 48.7 75.8 42.4 66.0 47.6 74.0 64.3 
China-Shanghai 36.8 63.0 42.4 72.6 40.4 69.1 47.9 82.0 58.5 
95-00 40.9 66.3 43.9 71.2 42.8 69.3 54.5 88.4 61.7 
00-05 27.6 55.2 32.3 64.5 31.0 61.9 35.6 71.2 50.1 
05-10 41.9 65.9 51.1 80.3 47.4 74.5 53.6 84.3 63.6 
Taiwan 9.8 18.0 23.8 43.7 16.2 29.8 31.1 57.2 54.4 
95-00 12.5 23.7 23.9 45.2 17.9 33.9 32.7 61.9 52.9 
00-05 11.9 19.9 26.5 44.4 20.3 34.0 34.8 58.3 59.6 
05-10 5.0 9.9 21.1 41.5 10.5 20.8 25.9 51.0 50.8 
South Korea 21.0 41.2 29.1 57.0 25.3 49.7 35.8 70.3 50.9 
85-90 22.8 39.3 33.7 58.0 31.8 54.8 49.1 84.5 58.0 
90-95 21.6 38.2 25.2 44.5 25.5 45.0 44.1 77.9 56.6 
95-00 34.3 57.9 39.4 66.4 36.5 61.6 43.6 73.5 59.3 
00-05 15.5 37.2 25.1 60.2 17.6 42.2 27.2 65.1 41.8 
05-10 10.8 27.6 21.9 56.1 15.3 39.0 15.2 38.9 39.1 
Malaysia 17.3 38.8 24.2 54.1 22.1 49.4 27.9 62.5 44.7 
90-95 29.2 63.7 32.0 69.7 33.1 72.2 34.1 74.3 45.9 
95-00 10.9 22.8 22.9 47.7 18.7 39.0 32.7 68.2 48.0 
00-05 11.9 29.6 19.4 48.5 15.4 38.5 21.8 54.3 40.1 
05-10 17.3 38.6 22.4 50.1 21.1 47.0 23.2 51.7 44.8 
Singapore 13.8 33.8 24.1 59.2 20.0 49.1 26.3 64.6 40.7 
90-95 17.9 53.3 25.1 74.8 22.2 66.2 26.1 77.9 33.5 
95-00 20.6 38.2 32.7 60.5 25.7 47.6 40.4 74.7 54.0 
00-05 7.9 23.2 16.5 48.8 13.7 40.6 18.5 54.6 33.8 
05-10 8.8 21.1 22.2 53.3 18.5 44.4 20.4 49.1 41.5 
 217 
 
 
  CAPM Fama and French Hou-Karolyi-Kho Lo and Wang 
Factors 
Average 
Stock R2 
 Market/ 
Sub-period 
 
Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance 
  (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Turkey 11.4 28.5 20.0 50.2 16.3 40.8 18.3 45.8 39.9 
00-05 14.4 31.8 20.9 46.3 20.9 46.4 22.5 49.9 45.1 
05-10 8.4 24.2 19.1 55.2 11.6 33.4 14.0 40.4 34.7 
Germany 18.7 48.4 25.0 64.9 23.4 60.6 23.7 61.5 38.6 
00-05 10.4 32.6 17.2 54.0 15.6 49.1 17.7 55.7 31.9 
05-10 27.0 59.4 32.9 72.5 31.1 68.7 29.7 65.6 45.3 
India 8.5 23.0 15.4 41.4 13.8 37.2 24.2 65.3 37.1 
95-00 10.1 27.0 16.7 44.8 16.5 44.3 28.2 75.7 37.3 
00-05 8.2 19.6 14.6 34.8 14.4 34.5 27.3 65.2 41.8 
05-10 7.4 22.8 14.9 46.1 10.5 32.4 17.3 53.5 32.3 
Japan-Tokyo 10.7 29.3 19.2 52.4 14.8 40.5 23.2 63.4 36.6 
95-00 9.0 27.7 15.6 48.3 11.8 36.4 20.0 62.0 32.3 
00-05 12.7 34.3 18.6 50.3 16.4 44.2 23.4 63.4 37.0 
05-10 10.5 26.0 23.3 57.6 16.2 40.2 26.0 64.5 40.4 
Brazil 10.9 29.9 17.2 47.0 15.0 40.9 13.9 37.9 36.6 
00-05 8.0 23.5 13.3 39.2 11.1 32.9 13.2 38.9 33.9 
05-10 13.9 35.3 21.1 53.8 18.8 47.8 14.5 37.0 39.3 
Italy 12.7 36.7 23.1 66.8 18.2 52.6 22.8 66.1 34.5 
95-00 25.0 48.6 35.8 69.6 32.9 64.0 38.9 75.7 51.4 
00-05 6.6 31.9 15.3 74.5 8.8 42.8 15.9 77.3 20.5 
05-10 6.5 20.6 18.1 57.1 12.8 40.4 13.7 43.1 31.6 
Hong Kong 10.8 32.7 18.2 55.1 16.0 48.5 21.0 63.7 33.0 
90-95 15.5 49.6 19.6 62.7 17.0 54.4 24.6 78.8 31.2 
95-00 12.1 30.2 22.4 56.2 19.9 49.8 24.4 61.1 39.9 
00-05 8.9 28.4 16.2 51.6 14.7 46.7 19.6 62.5 31.4 
05-10 6.8 22.8 14.7 49.3 12.7 42.7 15.6 52.4 29.7 
Thailand 7.4 22.8 13.2 40.7 11.7 36.1 12.0 37.1 32.4 
05-10 7.4 22.8 13.2 40.7 11.7 36.1 12.0 37.1 32.4 
Indonesia 10.9 35.7 15.4 50.5 17.7 57.9 14.4 47.0 30.6 
05-10 10.9 35.7 15.4 50.5 17.7 57.9 14.4 47.0 30.6 
Spain 8.2 27.8 20.2 68.4 18.5 62.5 27.5 93.0 29.6 
05-10 8.2 27.8 20.2 68.4 18.5 62.5 27.5 93.0 29.6 
Israel 11.1 37.6 19.6 66.3 18.6 63.0 19.0 64.4 29.6 
00-05 12.6 38.4 24.2 73.9 23.2 70.8 25.2 76.8 32.8 
05-10 9.7 36.7 15.0 56.9 14.1 53.4 12.9 49.1 26.4 
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Table 4.5, continued 
  CAPM Fama and French Hou-Karolyi-Kho Lo and Wang 
Factors 
Average 
Stock R2 
 Market/ 
Sub-period 
 
Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance 
  (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Greece 6.8 23.1 9.5 32.3 12.1 41.0 22.1 75.2 29.4 
95-00 7.5 21.7 14.0 40.3 15.7 45.2 26.8 77.1 34.7 
00-05 7.1 23.4 4.8 16.0 10.9 36.0 21.9 72.3 30.3 
05-10 5.8 25.0 9.7 41.8 9.6 41.2 17.7 76.1 23.2 
Switzerland 12.9 47.6 21.9 80.9 16.9 62.5 17.8 65.7 27.0 
00-05 16.3 58.5 20.8 74.9 18.5 66.6 18.3 65.9 27.8 
05-10 9.5 36.0 22.9 87.3 15.3 58.1 17.2 65.4 26.3 
U.S. - NYSE & 
AMEX  
9.1 34.4 14.3 54.5 14.1 53.4 18.1 68.6 26.3 
77-80 NA NA NA NA NA NA 11.6 55.3 21.0 
80-85 1.3 5.6 7.7 32.7 9.7 41.3 17.6 74.7 23.5 
85-90 10.9 49.5 14.6 66.3 14.1 64.0 14.9 67.4 22.1 
90-95 5.6 29.9 9.6 51.0 8.2 43.5 8.8 46.4 18.9 
95-00 6.1 28.0 9.0 41.4 8.7 40.1 11.6 53.4 21.7 
00-05 5.9 19.7 13.7 45.7 11.9 39.9 18.9 63.1 29.9 
05-10 24.4 51.7 31.4 66.5 31.7 67.1 36.6 77.6 47.2 
U.S.-NASDAQ 5.3 22.6 9.9 42.3 9.5 40.4 11.6 49.5 23.5 
85-90 7.2 41.8 8.7 50.7 9.2 53.5 9.1 53.2 17.1 
90-95 4.1 21.1 7.5 38.5 7.5 38.5 6.0 30.8 19.5 
95-00 4.1 22.5 8.3 45.9 7.3 40.4 9.4 52.2 18.0 
00-05 5.1 18.7 11.2 40.6 9.7 35.2 15.6 56.7 27.5 
05-10 6.0 17.1 14.1 39.8 13.8 39.0 18.1 51.1 35.3 
Netherland 10.6 45.6 17.1 73.3 15.9 68.3 14.7 62.9 23.3 
90-95 8.0 41.5 11.7 60.5 12.1 62.6 11.3 58.7 19.3 
95-00 11.3 49.2 16.4 71.2 14.0 60.7 15.2 66.2 23.0 
00-05 13.9 56.8 19.1 78.5 17.9 73.4 20.0 82.2 24.4 
05-10 9.4 35.3 21.2 79.8 19.7 74.2 12.0 45.3 26.5 
Norway 13.0 55.9 17.6 75.7 15.1 65.2 14.4 62.1 23.2 
05-10 13.0 55.9 17.6 75.7 15.1 65.2 14.4 62.1 23.2 
Belgium 7.2 32.9 15.3 69.7 11.9 54.0 13.3 60.7 22.0 
00-05 3.7 17.7 13.8 66.2 7.5 36.0 15.8 75.9 20.8 
05-10 10.8 46.6 16.8 72.8 16.2 70.1 10.8 46.9 23.1 
Denmark 8.4 39.6 15.7 73.6 14.8 69.4 11.3 53.1 21.3 
05-10 8.4 39.6 15.7 73.6 14.8 69.4 11.3 53.1 21.3 
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Table 4.5, continued 
  CAPM Fama and French Hou-Karolyi-Kho Lo and Wang 
Factors 
Average 
Stock R2 
 Market/ 
Sub-period 
 
Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance 
  (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
France 2.6 13.2 10.6 53.1 6.9 34.9 13.1 66.0 19.9 
95-00 5.5 39.1 9.1 65.3 8.4 60.2 8.8 63.4 14.0 
00-05 0.9 5.0 7.9 43.1 5.3 29.2 12.0 65.8 18.2 
05-10 1.5 5.5 14.7 53.6 7.1 25.8 18.6 67.6 27.5 
Sweden 7.2 37.1 14.6 75.5 10.5 54.4 13.0 67.3 19.3 
95-00 7.5 56.1 13.1 98.0 10.8 80.8 12.4 92.3 13.4 
00-05 6.5 36.0 14.0 78.2 8.5 47.1 14.4 80.2 17.9 
05-10 7.6 28.4 16.7 62.5 12.3 46.0 12.3 46.1 26.7 
Canada  5.2 26.7 9.5 48.3 9.7 49.6 10.8 60.6 19.2 
77-80 NA NA NA NA NA NA 14.6 92.3 15.9 
80-85 9.7 43.0 16.9 52.7 18.3 57.2 10.9 33.9 32.0 
85-90 6.9 47.4 11.3 70.0 12.2 76.0 13.0 80.6 16.1 
90-95 6.9 17.8 10.0 69.2 9.1 62.5 11.1 76.4 14.5 
95-00 2.6 10.9 3.9 27.0 6.4 44.5 7.7 53.2 14.5 
00-05 2.2 14.9 5.1 25.0 5.5 26.9 8.4 41.2 20.4 
05-10 3.1 26.0 9.7 46.1 6.4 30.6 9.8 46.9 21.0 
U.K. 10.1 54.4 12.8 69.2 13.0 70.1 14.4 77.6 18.5 
90-95 13.6 60.7 16.3 73.2 16.9 75.9 15.9 71.2 22.3 
95-00 4.9 38.8 7.7 61.1 8.6 68.2 9.4 75.0 12.6 
00-05 7.9 49.3 9.7 60.4 11.0 68.2 12.8 79.4 16.1 
05-10 13.9 60.2 17.5 75.7 15.5 67.1 19.4 83.9 23.1 
South Africa 9.1 49.9 12.5 68.5 11.8 64.6 14.3 78.4 18.3 
95-00 14.9 60.0 19.6 79.0 19.8 80.0 22.2 89.8 24.8 
00-05 5.0 35.7 7.0 50.5 6.6 47.4 10.3 74.1 13.9 
05-10 7.6 46.8 11.0 67.9 9.0 55.8 10.5 64.8 16.2 
Japan-Osaka 9.8 56.0 14.4 82.5 13.1 75.2 13.6 77.8 17.5 
95-00 8.6 64.3 14.3 106.7 12.7 94.9 12.5 93.9 13.4 
00-05 9.0 66.8 14.2 105.7 12.6 94.0 12.6 93.5 13.5 
05-10 11.8 45.9 14.8 57.7 14.1 55.0 15.7 61.2 25.6 
Finland 4.5 26.0 7.8 45.3 6.7 38.5 11.9 69.0 17.3 
00-05 4.2 24.3 7.2 41.2 6.2 35.6 14.0 80.7 17.4 
05-10 4.8 27.7 8.5 49.4 7.1 41.4 9.8 57.2 17.2 
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Table 4.5, continued 
  CAPM Fama and French Hou-Karolyi-Kho Lo and Wang 
Factors 
Average 
Stock R2 
 Market/ 
Sub-period 
 
Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance 
  (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Australia 3.9 29.7 7.5 57.5 6.0 45.8 8.1 62.1 13.0 
85-90 4.4 46.3 9.3 98.8 6.3 66.7 8.5 90.0 9.4 
90-95 3.1 48.2 5.6 87.3 5.6 87.6 7.7 121.4 6.4 
95-00 3.5 34.0 5.2 50.9 5.2 50.6 5.2 51.5 10.2 
00-05 3.7 19.8 6.5 35.0 5.8 30.9 6.8 36.6 18.7 
05-10 4.7 23.1 10.9 53.1 7.1 34.5 12.1 59.3 20.4 
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Table 4.6 
Explaining Stock Return by Return Factors 
 
This table presents the average R2 from time-series regression of individual stock excess return on return factors derived from three asset-pricing 
models: (a) CAPM, (b) Fama and French (1993), (c) Hou, Karolyi and Kho (2011). Performance is computed as the average R2 of the model 
divided by the average R2 obtained from regressions stock excess return on extracted excess return factors.  
 Market/ 
Sub-period 
CAPM Fama and French Hou, Karolyi and Kho Factors Average 
Stock R2 Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
China-Shenzhen 46.9 84.5 50.0 90.1 47.9 86.4 55.4 
95-00 50.2 86.8 51.2 88.5 50.3 87.0 57.8 
00-05 42.8 81.5 46.3 88.2 44.7 85.1 52.5 
05-10 47.5 85.0 52.4 93.7 48.6 87.0 55.9 
China-Shanghai 43.6 83.1 47.9 91.4 46.3 88.3 52.4 
95-00 42.8 80.7 46.2 87.1 44.4 83.6 53.1 
00-05 41.6 85.0 45.8 93.5 45.1 92.2 48.9 
05-10 46.3 83.8 51.8 93.7 49.5 89.5 55.3 
Taiwan 34.9 74.4 38.8 82.8 36.2 77.2 46.9 
95-00 37.9 84.2 40.0 88.9 40.0 89.0 45.0 
00-05 33.3 70.3 39.6 83.6 34.0 71.9 47.4 
05-10 33.6 69.4 36.9 76.3 34.6 71.4 48.4 
South Korea 31.0 64.1 38.9 80.4 32.6 67.4 48.3 
85-90 31.0 60.0 39.1 75.8 34.8 67.4 51.6 
90-95 25.9 47.8 32.5 60.0 26.9 49.7 54.1 
95-00 36.8 64.7 48.5 85.2 37.7 66.3 56.9 
00-05 23.8 69.8 31.2 91.5 25.1 73.4 34.1 
05-10 37.5 83.5 43.0 95.8 38.5 85.6 44.9 
Malaysia 37.9 78.4 45.1 93.1 39.4 81.3 48.4 
90-95 40.7 83.0 44.6 91.0 42.8 87.4 49.0 
95-00 51.6 77.9 60.9 92.0 52.5 79.2 66.2 
00-05 29.8 72.7 39.2 95.5 31.0 75.6 41.0 
05-10 29.7 79.5 35.6 95.0 31.2 83.4 37.4 
Singapore 31.0 72.1 38.6 89.8 34.0 79.0 43.0 
90-95 39.6 83.7 45.2 95.3 42.5 89.7 47.4 
95-00 30.8 62.0 38.7 77.9 35.7 72.1 49.6 
00-05 20.5 62.5 30.3 92.3 22.8 69.3 32.8 
05-10 33.1 78.2 40.4 95.4 35.0 82.7 42.3 
Turkey 40.1 76.9 42.2 81.0 42.9 82.2 52.2 
00-05 33.8 62.7 37.5 69.6 35.5 65.9 53.9 
05-10 46.5 92.1 47.0 93.1 50.3 99.6 50.4 
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          Table 4.6, continued 
 Market/ 
Sub-period 
CAPM Fama and French Hou, Karolyi and Kho Factors Average 
Stock R2 Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Germany 20.4 73.4 25.8 93.0 23.7 85.5 27.8 
00-05 13.8 62.7 18.5 84.5 17.1 78.0 21.9 
05-10 27.0 80.3 33.1 98.6 30.4 90.4 33.6 
India 27.3 70.6 33.0 85.5 31.1 80.5 38.6 
95-00 24.1 66.7 28.2 78.2 29.0 80.3 36.1 
00-05 20.2 60.9 26.5 80.1 24.2 73.1 33.1 
05-10 37.5 80.4 44.3 95.0 40.1 85.8 46.7 
Japan-Tokyo 25.6 68.7 33.0 88.8 29.2 78.4 37.2 
95-00 24.1 59.7 34.0 84.2 31.8 78.8 40.4 
00-05 25.8 73.4 32.8 93.4 27.8 79.3 35.1 
05-10 26.9 74.3 32.3 89.4 27.9 77.2 36.2 
Brazil 46.2 94.7 49.4 101.4 47.5 97.5 48.7 
00-05 43.9 94.5 47.0 101.2 46.2 99.5 46.4 
05-10 48.5 94.9 51.9 101.6 48.8 95.6 51.1 
Italy 27.7 79.4 33.1 94.6 29.0 82.8 35.0 
95-00 22.8 72.5 28.7 91.4 24.1 76.7 31.4 
00-05 22.3 70.9 27.8 88.4 23.5 74.9 31.4 
05-10 38.2 90.8 42.7 101.7 39.2 93.2 42.0 
Hong Kong 26.8 73.4 31.1 85.1 29.4 80.6 36.5 
90-95 34.2 80.3 37.8 88.6 36.2 84.9 42.6 
95-00 28.9 72.7 37.5 94.3 31.7 79.8 39.8 
00-05 21.2 68.3 28.5 91.7 25.5 82.1 31.1 
05-10 22.8 70.1 20.5 62.9 24.2 74.5 32.5 
Thailand 31.9 84.4 36.4 96.6 33.4 88.5 37.7 
05-10 31.9 84.4 36.4 96.6 33.4 88.5 37.7 
Indonesia 44.4 93.5 48.9 103.0 46.9 98.8 47.5 
05-10 44.4 93.5 48.9 103.0 46.9 98.8 47.5 
Spain 29.2 39.6 33.8 45.8 30.7 41.6 73.7 
05-10 29.2 39.6 33.8 45.8 30.7 41.6 73.7 
Israel 38.1 85.2 44.7 100.0 41.5 92.9 44.7 
00-05 43.5 87.9 49.8 100.5 47.3 95.6 49.5 
05-10 32.6 81.8 39.6 99.4 35.7 89.5 39.9 
Greece 29.1 66.4 33.5 76.5 29.6 67.6 43.7 
95-00 34.4 76.7 38.8 86.5 35.0 77.9 44.9 
00-05 21.2 46.3 29.8 65.1 21.6 47.1 45.7 
05-10 31.6 77.8 31.8 78.2 32.2 79.1 40.6 
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 Market/ 
Sub-period 
CAPM Fama and French Hou, Karolyi and Kho Factors Average 
Stock R2 Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Switzerland 23.0 64.4 30.0 84.0 24.8 69.5 35.7 
00-05 15.9 50.5 22.9 72.7 18.5 58.9 31.4 
05-10 30.0 75.4 37.1 93.0 31.0 77.7 39.9 
U.S. - NYSE & AMEX  18.6 69.9 22.2 83.3 20.4 76.6 26.6 
77-80 NA NA NA NA NA NA 25.5 
80-85 17.5 71.5 20.7 84.5 19.0 77.6 24.5 
85-90 22.0 79.8 26.0 94.4 22.9 83.2 27.5 
90-95 13.2 73.6 16.0 89.5 14.7 82.3 17.9 
95-00 11.0 55.7 15.4 77.8 13.0 65.8 19.7 
00-05 17.5 60.7 21.4 74.1 20.0 69.1 28.9 
05-10 30.6 72.2 33.6 79.2 32.8 77.4 42.4 
U.S.-NASDAQ 12.3 71.8 14.6 85.4 14.1 82.1 17.1 
85-90 17.1 91.4 18.9 101.3 17.7 95.0 18.7 
90-95 8.4 85.3 9.7 98.9 9.4 96.1 9.8 
95-00 6.3 55.4 8.4 74.0 7.3 64.5 11.3 
00-05 11.9 60.2 14.6 74.2 14.8 75.2 19.7 
05-10 18.0 68.5 21.6 82.3 21.1 80.6 26.2 
Netherland 22.3 76.0 28.0 95.4 24.7 84.0 29.4 
90-95 24.5 78.1 28.9 92.2 27.6 88.0 31.3 
95-00 11.2 67.5 16.8 101.5 13.9 83.7 16.6 
00-05 16.6 59.6 23.8 85.5 18.5 66.5 27.9 
05-10 37.0 88.7 42.6 101.9 38.7 92.6 41.8 
Norway 38.5 89.7 41.0 95.7 39.2 91.4 42.9 
05-10 38.5 89.7 41.0 95.7 39.2 91.4 42.9 
Belgium 20.9 60.4 26.9 77.9 23.0 66.5 34.6 
00-05 18.5 60.4 24.2 78.9 20.8 67.7 30.7 
05-10 23.3 60.5 29.7 77.1 25.2 65.5 38.5 
Denmark 32.8 89.3 37.2 101.4 34.2 93.1 36.7 
05-10 32.8 89.3 37.2 101.4 34.2 93.1 36.7 
France 18.9 67.2 25.5 90.6 21.0 74.6 28.2 
95-00 10.4 56.5 16.8 91.1 12.7 69.2 18.4 
00-05 14.9 53.6 22.3 80.2 17.2 61.9 27.8 
05-10 31.4 82.2 37.4 97.9 33.1 86.5 38.2 
Sweden 24.1 78.4 29.7 96.5 25.6 83.3 30.8 
95-00 15.4 67.9 22.3 98.3 18.5 81.8 22.6 
00-05 23.4 71.6 29.4 90.0 24.3 74.3 32.7 
05-10 33.6 90.8 37.4 101.2 34.1 92.2 37.0 
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Table 4.6, continued 
 Market/ 
Sub-period 
CAPM Fama and French Hou, Karolyi and Kho Factors Average 
Stock R2 Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance 
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Canada  15.9 73.6 18.6 86.5 17.7 82.0 21.5 
77-80 NA NA NA NA NA NA 21.0 
80-85 24.7 92.8 29.3 110.0 28.1 105.7 26.6 
85-90 20.6 75.2 23.4 85.8 22.7 83.1 27.3 
90-95 11.1 66.0 13.4 79.6 12.5 74.4 16.8 
95-00 6.9 50.5 8.4 62.2 8.8 64.9 13.6 
00-05 9.9 64.0 12.1 78.5 11.3 73.6 15.4 
05-10 22.1 73.5 25.3 83.8 22.5 74.7 30.1 
U.K. 18.7 67.8 24.3 88.3 21.1 76.5 27.5 
90-95 33.3 92.6 37.4 104.0 35.1 97.6 35.9 
95-00 6.0 32.1 13.6 72.6 8.3 44.6 18.7 
00-05 10.3 48.9 15.9 75.6 13.5 64.2 21.0 
05-10 25.1 72.9 30.4 88.3 27.4 79.4 34.4 
South Africa 29.6 74.6 34.9 88.0 32.2 81.2 39.6 
95-00 20.7 63.3 27.4 83.8 23.8 73.0 32.6 
00-05 25.7 70.6 30.4 83.5 28.4 77.8 36.5 
05-10 42.3 84.9 46.9 94.1 44.4 89.1 49.8 
Japan-Osaka 24.2 90.1 27.5 102.1 26.1 96.9 26.9 
95-00 31.3 95.2 34.3 104.5 32.8 99.8 32.9 
00-05 19.1 85.2 22.8 101.9 21.0 93.7 22.4 
05-10 22.3 87.7 25.2 99.3 24.4 96.0 25.4 
Finland 13.7 41.1 22.9 68.7 15.7 47.1 33.3 
00-05 4.1 14.2 16.4 56.6 7.0 24.3 29.0 
05-10 23.3 61.8 29.4 78.0 24.4 64.7 37.7 
Australia 25.3 86.7 28.0 96.2 26.5 90.9 29.1 
85-90 38.7 94.5 42.5 103.6 40.2 98.0 41.0 
90-95 22.5 77.7 25.7 88.8 24.1 83.3 28.9 
95-00 17.2 85.7 19.1 95.0 18.0 89.8 20.1 
00-05 18.0 86.8 20.0 96.7 19.1 92.3 20.7 
05-10 30.0 85.7 32.9 94.0 31.1 88.7 35.0 
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Table 4.7 
Summary Statistics on the Explanatory Power of Asset-pricing Models for Individual Turnover and Excess Return 
 
  CAPM Fama and French Hou-Karolyi-Kho Lo and Wang Factors 
Average 
Stock R2 
 
Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance 
  (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
 
Turnover 
Mean 11.8 36.7 18.5 59.7 16.4 53.0 20.1 64.1 31.2 
Min 2.6 13.2 7.5 32.3 6.0 29.8 8.1 37.1 13.0 
Max 44.4 68.8 49.8 82.5 46.9 75.2 52.1 93.0 64.5 
 
Excess Return 
Mean 28.8 74.7 33.8 88.5 30.8 80.4  
 
38.7 
Min 12.3 39.6 14.6 45.8 14.1 41.6  
 
17.1 
Max 46.9 94.7 50.0 103.0 47.9 98.8  
 
73.7 
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Table 4.8 
Average Standard Deviation of Turnovers on FMPs 
 
This table presents the average standard deviation of turnovers on all FMPs across the sub-periods. The standard deviations of turnovers for each 
FMP are calculated over selected sub-periods. All the standard deviations from the sub-periods for each market are equally-weighted averaged 
and offer a way to compare the volatility of turnovers on FMPs within each market. The FMPs are as follow: 1)MKT, value-weighted market 
portfolio ;  2) SMB, FMP formed on size;  3)HML, FMP formed on book value of common equity relative to market value; 4) CHL, FMP 
formed on C/P, cash flow to price ratio; 5)DPG, FMP formed on D/P, dividend yield; 6) EPG, FMP formed on E/P, earning to price ratio; 
7)LBG, FMP formed on leverage ratio; 8) MTN, momentum FMP; 9) CON, contrarian FMP; 10)MAG, FMP formed by the rule of moving 
average-oscillator; 11) RB, FMP formed by the rule of trading range break-out; 12) CPI, FMP formed on the growth rate of CPI; 14)IP, FMP 
formed on the growth rate of industrial production; 15)UE, FMP formed on the change of unemployment rate. And the * denotes the 
corresponding factor which gives the largest average volatility in turnover.  
 
 
Market Fundamental Factor Technical Factor 
 
Macroeconomic Factor 
 
MKT * SMB HML CHL DPG EPG LBG MTN CON MAG RB * CPI IP UE 
China-Shenzhen 3.94 HML 3.20 6.06 2.80 2.67 2.70 3.19 1.49 26.36 3.59 8.56 IP 2.41 2.56 
 China-Shanghai 2.64 SMB 3.46 2.36 2.28 2.52 2.93 3.09 1.67 22.40 2.52 7.78 CPI 2.38 2.25 
 Taiwan 3.85 CHL 5.00 5.58 6.84 3.39 4.79 2.33 1.56 12.19 1.56 5.33 IP 5.65 8.53 5.93 
South Korea 1.22 SMB 2.91 2.04 2.35 2.06 1.90 1.94 0.98 20.21 1.78 6.36 UE 1.38 1.48 1.53 
Malaysia 0.62 SMB 2.20 1.23 0.88 0.77 1.06 0.74 0.78 10.42 1.12 4.22 IP 0.65 0.82 
 Singapore 0.36 SMB 1.83 0.72 0.97 1.36 1.57 1.76 1.25 8.45 0.95 2.82 CPI 1.10 0.63 
 Turkey 2.71 LBG 4.84 4.15 4.38 4.30 7.28 10.41 2.37 16.47 2.54 7.36 UE 1.92 
 
2.79 
Germany 0.05 SMB 0.58 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.32 5.01 0.21 1.49 IP 0.17 0.31 0.26 
India 1.58 EPG 1.99 5.62 3.56 2.75 5.79 1.88 0.69 6.24 0.71 3.66 CPI 4.59 
 
2.53 
Japan-Tokyo 0.39 SMB 0.69 0.43 0.37 0.37 0.47 0.27 0.51 3.05 0.35 2.04 CPI 0.47 0.36 0.32 
Brazil 1.25 EPG 2.27 2.07 2.84 2.59 3.11 1.56 1.24 8.95 1.44 4.06 IP 1.83 2.58 3.60 
Italy 0.86 HML 1.35 1.70 1.27 1.36 1.27 0.92 0.60 5.07 0.56 2.08 CPI 1.61 1.58 1.55 
Hong Kong 0.52 SMB 1.11 0.76 0.58 0.79 0.72 0.79 0.78 6.93 0.70 2.24 UE 1.07 
 
1.08 
Thailand 2.08 EPG 2.76 5.64 4.37 5.29 6.97 3.34 1.28 8.83 1.71 5.22 CPI 3.60 2.30 2.28 
Indonesia 0.53 HML 1.56 2.63 1.85 1.75 1.68 2.23 1.49 10.97 1.19 3.03 IP 1.06 1.45 
 Spain 1.88 CHL 2.97 6.39 8.18 3.83 3.49 5.15 2.46 4.85 2.82 4.56 CPI 2.29 2.24 2.08 
Israel 0.32 EPG 0.68 0.70 0.74 0.61 0.96 0.51 0.52 2.74 0.43 1.38 CPI 0.59 0.53 
 Greece 2.66 CHL 3.10 3.61 5.00 1.31 4.11 4.78 0.91 11.25 1.51 4.45 UE 4.14 4.62 4.87 
Switzerland 3.80 CHL 3.86 4.77 5.95 1.72 1.58 5.95 0.88 4.63 0.87 3.81 IP 4.91 5.06 2.47 
U.S. - NYSE & AMEX  1.07 HML 1.00 1.63 1.33 0.99 0.96 1.09 0.81 6.53 0.50 1.86 CPI 1.33 1.09 1.13 
Netherland 1.77 EPG 2.20 3.61 3.24 3.20 4.15 2.40 1.74 6.62 1.37 4.84 UE 3.00 3.00 3.01 
Norway 3.03 LBG 2.58 4.15 2.96 2.61 3.19 9.01 2.30 10.55 1.41 3.48 CPI 3.25 2.41 2.30 
U.S.-NASDAQ 1.26 DPG 2.20 1.99 2.78 2.96 1.97 1.65 0.68 7.55 0.59 2.13 IP 2.81 2.35 1.94 
Belgium 0.40 EPG 0.53 0.80 0.71 1.07 1.49 0.84 0.73 2.97 0.52 2.25 UE 0.74 0.95 1.22 
Denmark 1.12 CHL 2.21 1.02 6.80 1.95 2.92 1.13 0.79 5.50 0.96 4.16 CPI 3.54 3.33 3.36 
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        Table 4.8, continued 
 
Market Fundamental Factor Technical Factor 
 
Macroeconomic Factor 
 
MKT * SMB HML CHL DPG EPG LBG MTN CON MAG RB * CPI IP UE 
Denmark 1.12 CHL 2.21 1.02 6.80 1.95 2.92 1.13 0.79 5.50 0.96 4.16 CPI 3.54 3.33 3.36 
France 0.96 HML 1.14 1.99 1.46 1.76 1.97 1.10 0.66 3.59 0.55 1.95 IP 1.53 1.90 1.71 
Sweden 1.40 CHL 1.77 2.80 3.89 2.80 2.83 2.85 0.95 5.37 0.96 3.17 CPI 3.22 2.91 2.31 
U.K. 0.68 EPG 0.73 0.75 1.28 1.14 1.43 0.86 0.53 4.32 0.48 2.21 UE 1.22 0.98 1.35 
South Africa 0.43 DPG 0.97 0.98 1.05 1.79 1.44 1.52 0.53 3.16 0.44 1.77 UE 0.88 
 
1.04 
Japan- Osaka 0.58 CHL 1.17 0.91 1.18 1.01 0.59 0.80 0.92 9.73 0.76 4.16 CPI 1.18 0.87 0.97 
Canada  0.63 CHL 0.98 0.95 1.68 1.14 1.65 1.19 0.86 5.24 0.46 1.57 CPI 1.19 1.19 1.37 
Finland 0.95 EPG 1.40 1.73 2.71 1.76 3.57 1.54 0.73 3.49 0.60 2.71 CPI 2.81 1.47 4.50 
Australia 0.49 DPG 0.74 0.66 0.94 1.17 1.04 0.62 0.49 3.23 0.37 1.60 UE 0.87 
 
0.98 
Average 1.39 CHL 2.00 2.44 2.65 1.97 2.48 2.35 1.05 8.27 1.11 3.58 UE 2.10 2.13 2.17 
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Table 4.9 
Summary Statistics of the Market Specific Model and Two Universal Models 
  Market  Specific Model Carhart Four-factor Model MKT+SMB+HML+CHL Factors Average 
Stock R2 Market Three Factors Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance Average R2 Performance 
    (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
China-Shenzhen SMB+HML+EPG 52.6 81.5 51.5 79.9 52.0 80.6 64.5 
China-Shanghai SMB+HML+EPG 45.5 77.9 45.1 77.2 45.2 77.3 58.4 
Taiwan SMB+CHL+EPG 30.6 56.3 29.4 54.0 30.6 56.2 54.4 
South Korea SMB+HML+LBG 33.0 64.9 32.1 63.0 32.5 63.8 50.9 
Malaysia SMB+HML+CHL 27.4 61.2 26.8 59.9 27.4 61.2 44.7 
Singapore SMB+CHL+LBG 27.4 67.4 26.8 65.7 27.3 67.1 40.7 
Turkey SMB+HML+LBG 25.4 63.7 25.1 63.0 24.1 60.5 39.9 
Germany SMB+HML+MTN 27.1 70.2 27.1 70.2 26.5 68.8 38.6 
India SMB+HML+CON 19.5 52.6 19.4 52.2 19.1 51.6 37.1 
Japan-Tokyo SMB+HML+MTN 21.2 57.9 21.2 57.9 21.0 57.5 36.6 
Brazil SMB+HML+DPG 23.8 65.1 22.0 60.3 22.4 61.3 36.6 
Italy SMB+CHL+CON 24.3 70.5 22.8 66.0 24.1 69.7 34.5 
Hong Kong SMB+EPG+CON 21.2 64.3 20.6 62.4 20.1 60.9 33.0 
Thailand SMB+HML+DPG 19.9 61.6 18.3 56.5 18.0 55.5 32.4 
Indonesia SMB+HML+CHL 20.8 68.0 18.9 61.9 20.8 68.0 30.6 
Spain SMB+HML+CHL 26.5 89.7 25.6 86.4 26.5 89.7 29.6 
Israel SMB+HML+LBG 24.8 84.1 24.2 81.8 23.6 79.9 29.6 
Greece CHL+LBG+CON 18.8 64.1 12.5 42.4 14.9 50.7 29.4 
Switzerland SMB+CHL+CON 20.7 76.7 19.9 73.4 20.6 76.1 27.0 
U.S. - NYSE & AMEX  SMB+CHL+CON 16.2 61.5 15.1 57.5 15.1 57.4 26.3 
Netherland SMB+HML+CHL 19.0 81.7 18.0 77.2 19.0 81.7 23.3 
Norway SMB+HML+DPG 20.1 86.6 19.2 82.8 18.8 81.1 23.2 
U.S.-NASDAQ SMB+HML+MTN 12.2 52.1 12.2 52.1 12.0 51.1 23.5 
Belgium SMB+HML+LBG 18.7 84.9 14.5 66.0 14.2 64.8 22.0 
Denmark SMB+CHL+DPG 17.2 80.6 13.8 64.9 15.6 73.1 21.3 
France SMB+HML+CON 13.8 69.5 13.5 67.9 13.7 69.1 19.9 
Sweden SMB+HML+CHL 16.1 83.2 15.0 77.7 16.1 83.2 19.3 
U.K. SMB+CHL+EPG 14.3 77.4 13.6 73.5 13.9 75.0 18.5 
South Africa SMB+CHL+DPG 13.9 76.3 12.8 70.2 13.0 71.1 18.3 
Japan- Osaka SMB+HML+LBG 16.0 91.4 15.5 88.9 15.4 88.0 17.5 
Canada  SMB+CHL+LBG 12.4 64.5 10.8 56.5 11.8 61.7 19.2 
Finland SMB+HML+LBG 11.9 68.9 11.0 63.6 10.8 62.6 17.3 
Australia SMB+CHL+EPG 9.3 71.4 8.4 64.5 8.5 65.2 13.0 
Average   21.9 70.0 20.7 66.2 21.1 67.4 31.2 
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Table 4.10 
Cross-country Comparison on the Performances of Empirical Asset Pricing Models 
 
This table provides the performance ratios of the Fama-French (FF in the table, 1993) three-factor model, Hou, Karolyi and Kho (HKK in the table, 2011) three-
factor model, Carhart (1997) four-factor model, the MSBC four-factor model and the market-specific four factor model. Panel A presents the results for the 
Fama-French three-factor model and the Hou-Karolyi-Kho three-factor model, which reliable explain the average returns around the world. Panel B presents the 
results for the other three factor models which show relatively better power in capturing the common variation in stock turnovers around the world. Performance 
is computed as the average R2 of the model divided by the average R2 obtained from regressions stock return (turnover) on extracted return (turnover) factors. 
The countries are ranked by the performance ratio on the turnover regressions.                                        
Panel A: Fama-French Three-factor Model and Hou-Karolyi-Kho Three-factor Model
 
  FF Three-factor Model   HKK Three-factor Model 
Market 
Performance 
on Return 
Performance 
on Turnover Market 
Performance 
on Return 
Performance 
on Turnover 
  (%) (%)   (%)  (%) 
Japan-Osaka 102.1 82.5 Japan- Osaka 96.9 75.2 
Switzerland 84.0 80.9 China_Shenzhen 86.4 72.8 
China-Shenzhen 90.1 77.2 U.K. 76.5 70.2 
Norway 95.7 75.7 Denmark 93.1 69.4 
Sweden 79.1 75.5 China_Shanghai 88.3 69.1 
Denmark 101.4 73.6 Netherland 84.0 68.3 
Netherland 95.4 73.3 Norway 91.4 65.2 
China-Shanghai 91.4 72.6 South Africa 81.2 64.6 
Belgium 78.4 69.7 Israel 92.9 63.0 
U.K. 88.3 69.2 Spain 41.6 62.5 
South Africa 88.0 68.5 Switzerland 69.5 62.5 
Spain 44.4 68.4 Germany 85.5 60.6 
Italy 94.6 66.8 Indonesia 98.8 57.9 
Israel 100.0 66.3 Sweden 83.3 54.4 
Germany 93.0 64.9 Belgium 66.5 54.0 
Singapore 89.8 59.2 U.S. - NYSE & AMEX  76.6 53.4 
Australia 96.2 57.5 Italy 82.8 52.6 
South Korea 80.4 57.0 South Korea 67.4 49.7 
Hong Kong 85.1 55.1 Canada  82.0 49.6 
U.S. - NYSE & AMEX  83.3 54.5 Malaysia 81.3 49.4 
Malaysia 93.1 54.1 Singapore 79.0 49.2 
France 84.9 53.1 Hong Kong 80.6 48.6 
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Table 4.10, continued 
 
Panel A: Fama-French Three-factor Model and Hou-Karolyi-Kho Three-factor Model (continued)
 
  FF Three-factor Model   HKK Three-factor Model 
Market 
Performance 
on Return 
Performance 
on Turnover Market 
Performance 
on Return 
Performance 
on Turnover 
  (%) (%)   (%)  (%) 
Japan-Tokyo 88.8 52.4 Australia 90.9 45.9 
Indonesia 103.0 50.5 Greece 67.6 41.0 
Turkey 81.0 50.2 Brazil 97.5 40.9 
Canada  86.5 49.4 Turkey 82.2 40.8 
Brazil 101.4 47.0 Japan-Tokyo 78.4 40.5 
Finland 63.0 45.3 Finland 47.1 38.5 
Taiwan 82.8 43.7 U.S.-NASDAQ 82.1 38.5 
U.S.-NASDAQ 85.4 42.3 India 80.5 37.2 
India 85.5 41.4 Thailand 88.5 36.1 
Thailand 96.6 40.7 France 74.6 34.9 
Greece 76.5 32.3 Taiwan 77.2 29.9 
Average 87.6 59.7   80.4 52.9 
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Panel B: Carhat Four-factor Model, MSBC Four-factor Model, and Market Specific Model
 
  Carhart Four-factor Model   MSBC Four-factor Model   Market Specific Model 
Market 
Performance 
on Return 
Performance 
on Turnover Market 
Performance 
on Return 
Performance 
on Turnover Market 
Performance 
on Return 
Performance 
on Turnover 
  (%) (%)   (%) (%)   (%) (%) 
Japan- Osaka 104.0 88.9 Spain 45.2 89.7 Japan- Osaka 105.9 91.4 
Spain 44.7 86.4 Japan-Osaka 105.6 88.0 Spain 45.2 89.7 
Norway 98.8 82.8 Sweden 83.5 83.2 Norway 99.1 86.6 
Israel 104.2 81.8 Netherland 94.3 81.7 Belgium 83.0 84.9 
China-Shenzhen 94.6 79.9 Norway 98.2 81.1 Israel 104.7 84.1 
Sweden 80.0 77.7 China-Shenzhen 94.6 80.6 Sweden 83.5 83.2 
China-Shanghai 93.8 77.2 Israel 103.8 79.9 Netherland 94.3 81.7 
Netherland 93.7 77.2 China-Shanghai 93.8 77.3 China-Shenzhen 94.9 81.5 
U.K. 86.3 73.5 Switzerland 82.2 76.1 Denmark 93.8 80.6 
Switzerland 83.0 73.4 U.K. 87.5 75.0 China-Shanghai 94.0 77.9 
Germany 90.6 70.2 Denmark 93.4 73.1 UK 86.2 77.4 
South Africa 86.6 70.2 South Africa 88.7 71.1 Switzerland 81.5 76.7 
France 85.9 67.9 Italy 90.7 69.7 South Africa 91.2 76.3 
Italy 89.7 66.0 France 86.3 69.1 Australia 97.8 71.4 
Belgium 80.5 66.0 Germany 93.9 68.8 Italy 92.5 70.5 
Singapore 96.0 65.7 Indonesia 106.3 68.0 Germany 90.6 70.2 
Denmark 91.5 64.9 Singapore 96.6 67.1 France 87.6 69.5 
Australia 96.1 64.5 Australia 96.7 65.2 Finland 70.9 68.9 
Finland 64.3 63.6 Belgium 80.4 64.8 Indonesia 106.3 68.0 
Turkey 97.1 63.0 South Korea 88.8 63.8 Singapore 95.4 67.4 
South Korea 88.3 63.0 Finland 65.4 62.6 Brazil 103.0 65.1 
Hong Kong 93.7 62.4 Canada  90.3 61.7 South Korea 88.7 64.9 
Indonesia 106.3 61.9 Brazil 101.5 61.3 Canada  90.4 64.5 
Brazil 102.2 60.3 Malaysia 96.3 61.2 Hong Kong 93.4 64.3 
Malaysia 95.7 59.9 Hong Kong 95.0 60.9 Greece 92.1 64.1 
Japan-Tokyo 89.2 57.9 Turkey 97.8 60.5 Turkey 97.6 63.7 
U.S. - NYSE & AMEX  83.8 57.5 Japan-Tokyo 89.1 57.5 Thailand 101.1 61.6 
Canada  87.7 56.5 U.S. - NYSE & AMEX  85.2 57.4 U.S. - NYSE & AMEX  84.8 61.5 
Thailand 101.2 56.5 Taiwan 81.5 56.2 Malaysia 96.3 61.2 
Taiwan 81.0 54.0 Thailand 101.7 55.5 Japan-Tokyo 89.2 57.9 
India 89.6 52.2 India 89.4 51.6 Taiwan 79.8 56.3 
U.S.-NASDAQ 87.7 52.1 U.S.-NASDAQ 87.8 51.1 India 91.4 52.6 
Greece 75.0 42.4 Greece 79.5 50.7 U.S.-NASDAQ 87.7 52.1 
  89.2 66.6   90.0 67.9   90.7 71.1 
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APPENDIX 
 
This appendix briefly discusses the BN (2002, 2004) methodology for decomposing turnover and 
excess return. As the first step, this article estimate common factors in large panels by the 
method of asymptotic principal components based on the variance-covariance matrix of turnover 
over different periods rather than among different stocks. This is because the variance-
covariance matrix for turnover among stocks, or portfolios, is not well defined because of time 
trends in turnover. This article follow the same logic as CM (2007) and get around this problem 
by taking advantage of the large cross-section of individual stocks and using the variance-
covariance matrix of turnover over different time periods. 
The number of factors that can be estimated by this nonparametric method is min{N,T}, much 
larger than permitted by estimation of state space models. This article start with an arbitrary 
number k max and estimate the k systematic factor and factor loadings by solving the following 
optimization problem 
V(k) = min
Dk,Gk
T−1N−1 ∑ ∑(τjt − Dj
kGt
k)
2
N
j=1
       
T
t=1
 
where G𝑡
k denotes the k-vector of systematic factors and Dj
k denotes k-vector of factor loadings 
for firm j. 
To determine the number of factors, BN (2002) propose the following selection criterion: 
K̂ = argmin0<k<kmaxIC(k)                                 
where IC(k) equals the measure of the goodness of fit V(k) plus a second term that serves as an 
adjustment for the increase in the degrees of freedom that results from increasing k: 
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IC(k) = log{V(k, Ĝk} + k ∙ (
N+T
NT
) ln (
NT
N+T
)                       
The selection criterion depends on the trade-off between the goodness of fit and parsimony. The 
advantage of the IC(k) statistic criteria is that it not only takes the sample size in both the cross-
section and the time-series dimensions into consideration, but also the fact that the factors are not 
observed. 
BN (2002) show that, ?̂?, the value of k that minimizes the IC(k) statistic in selection criterion is 
a consistent estimate for the number of factors in the factor model.  Additionally, there are 
several advantages of the BN (2002) statistics. First BN (2002) do not impose any restrictions 
between N and T, allowing for both large N and large T. Second, the results hold under 
heteroscedasticity in both the time and serial dependence and cross-section dependence. In 
addition, the model selection procedure is easy to implement.  
After decomposing the panel data into systematic and idiosyncratic components to stock returns 
and turnover panels, BN (2004) develop a PANIC (panel analysis of nonstationarity in 
idiosyncratic and common components) methodology to detect whether there is nonstationarity 
in either the systematic or idiosyncratic components, or in both. They show that common 
stochastic trends can be consistently estimated by using the principal components method, 
regardless of whether the idiosyncratic series contain unit roots. Similarly, their proposed unit 
root test of the idiosyncratic series is valid whether any of the systematic factors contain a unit 
root. A great advantage of PANIC is that it directly tests the unobserved components of the data.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation sheds new light on at least three important issues on the fields of empirical asset 
pricing and international finance. First, I investigate a new dimension of liquidity risk: the 
likelihood of market liquidity at its extremes, and find that extreme liquidity risk is priced cross-
sectionally in the U.S. equity market. This finding underscores the empirical relevance of 
liquidity risk. Secondarily, we interpret our findings in the Chapter 3 as a step forward in the 
international asset pricing literature with important implications for practitioners in guiding cost-
of-capital calculations and risk control and performance evaluation analysis of global portfolios. 
Last but not least, Chapter 4 tries to understand the common factors driving trading around the 
world. It enables us not only to determine how well classic multifactor models perform in 
developed or emerging markets in terms of capturing the systematic turnover, but also to identify 
which factors in stock returns are important for explaining the common variation in stock 
turnover for each country.   
In line with prior studies, I next outline some related research projects in the near future. Like 
Fama and French (1998, 2012), Griffin (2002) and Hou, Karolyi, and Kho (2011) and others, our 
initial tests in Chapter 2 assume that there is no currency risk. But our framework allows us to 
further relax this restriction and study the effect of currency risks on the relative performance of 
global factors and local factors in the new “hybrid” model. Currency risk is certainly a potential 
problem in global asset pricing. To date, academic studies have had limited success in 
empirically indentifying significant exposure of nonfinancial firms with regard to unexpected 
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changes in exchange rates (Bodnar and Wong, 2003; Griffin and Stulz, 2001; He and Ng, 1998; 
Bartov et al., 1996; Prasad and Rajan, 1995; Bartov and Bodnar, 1994). Our project takes a new 
look at the exposure puzzle by studying how global investors and local investors trade differently 
in response to currency fluctuations and its potential impact on firm value. Because what 
constitutes globally-accessible stocks and purely-local stocks vary for investors by country of 
domicile, the need to hedge exchange rates varies and currency risks are expected to play 
different roles in the risk prices of global factors and local factors. To accommodate the 
extensive practice that exists for foreign currency hedging, we will also push the new “hybrid” 
structure to incorporate cross-sectional variation in currency forward, commodities and bonds, 
which comprise a significant portion of global investment activity. Finally, we will extend our 
unconditional testing framework for the hybrid model to a conditional one allowing for time 
variation in expected returns, variances and covariances, a potentially important factor for the 
transitioning emerging markets (Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; Bekaert, Harvey, Lundblad, and 
Siegel, 2011) for which our hybrid model performs especially well. 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
